


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**FOREIGN
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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Critique of Costs of Original Decision to Deploy Missiles

PM1808113388 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 17 Aug 88 p 5

[International observer Georgiy Dadyants article: "The Echo of the Saryozek Explosions"—first paragraph bold-face as published]

[Text] The destruction of Soviet shorter-range missiles has started in Saryozek. These are the first steps in the specific implementation of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles treaty, and they quite naturally have attracted the world public's special attention. "But our joy that weapons capable of killing millions of people are finally being destroyed," our newspaper's reader S. Konoplev from Moscow writes to the editorial office, "is mixed with a sense of bitterness. What about the resources spent on producing and siting them?"

This is probably a legitimate question and, in the conditions of glasnost, it calls for a frank answer.

There is also another aspect which cannot be ignored by our public opinion. During the preliminary discussion of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles treaty by the Supreme Soviet commissions and in the process of its ratification, it was stated that the principle of equality and identical security would be observed during the elimination of missiles and that the security of the USSR and its allies would remain reliably guaranteed. But since the military-strategic balance would not be disrupted as a result of the elimination of missiles, why were these missiles necessary in the first place? Why is it that, having departed from point A, we are now returning to that point?

The 19th party conference mentioned mistakes that occurred in our foreign policy activity in the past. It was said in particular that, in response to the nuclear challenge with which we were presented, we concentrated huge resources on the military aspect of countering imperialism and did not always take advantage of political opportunities to ease tension and ensure our state's security. Consequently the country found itself caught up in the arms race, and this could not fail to affect its socioeconomic development and international position.

Is this situation not illustrated to a certain extent by the story of the siting of intermediate-range missiles, and afterwards of shorter-range missiles, on the continent of Europe?

Let us recall that the problem of intermediate-range missiles as a class of nuclear weapons arose after we embarked on replacing our outdated nuclear missiles by new ones, which were codenamed SS-20 in the West. In itself, the modernization of nuclear weapons and replacing one set of missiles with another is something natural. But the combat specifications of the SS-20's, their mobility, and their operational range differed substantially

from those of the SS-12's, and this gave the West a pretext to perceive our actions as an attempt to disrupt the strategic balance prevailing in Europe. U.S. and West European propaganda launched an extensive campaign in connection with the "new Soviet threat" allegedly facing Europe.

Was it or was it not necessary to site the SS-20 missiles? Now, reviewing the issue through the prism of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles treaty, it is possible to give an unambiguous answer: It was not necessary. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the situation in the world in the early eighties was not the same as today. That was the "peak" of tension in the international arena.

It seems to me that reproach for this ought to be addressed not to our military for having started the siting of missiles, but rather to the politicians who failed at that time to take advantage of the opportunity for a peaceful solution to the "missile crisis." In particular, we rejected the "zero option" proposed by President Reagan and insisted on including in the "Eurostrategic balance" the nuclear forces of Britain and France—countries which were not participants in the Geneva talks between the USSR and the United States. Our call to impose a moratorium on missile siting was not all that convincing, since our missiles were already sited and the Americans had no missiles of that class in Europe at the time.

The outcome of evading a political solution to the question is well known. NATO made its "two-track decision," and the siting of U.S. Pershing-2 and ground-based cruise missiles, of a class similar to the SS-20's, began at the end of 1983 in West Europe.

In response to the start of the deployment of U.S. missiles, we pulled out of the Geneva talks and proclaimed our decision to deploy additional enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles on GDR and CSSR territory. The logic of confrontation once more gained the upper hand.

Meanwhile, the siting of U.S. intermediate-range missiles on the continent of Europe created a direct threat to the security of our country and our allies, since the flight time of a Pershing-2 is 8-10 minutes. Essentially, by way of "compensation" for the SS-20's, we ended up with U.S. missiles in Europe which were strategic as far as our country was concerned—the SS-20's, despite all their high combat and flight specifications, were incapable of reaching U.S. territory, while the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles could have reached our territory in a matter of minutes.

It was at that time that the situation in Europe reached the height of exacerbation, while the arms race approached a critical point. Against this background, the 19th party conference emphasized, our traditional political and public activity in favor of peace and disarmament started losing its persuasiveness. To put it more

bluntly, had the logic of such a development not been destroyed, it would have been perfectly feasible to find ourselves on the brink of military confrontation.

There was a need for new political thinking making it possible to perceive and discover new opportunities to counter the policy of strength on a broader political basis than before. An example of such thinking was provided by the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles treaty signed in Washington, envisaging a "double zero" for two classes of nuclear arms—the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (which was the new name given to operational-tactical missiles). It can be seen from this treaty's example that the ensuring of states' security today is moving from the sphere of the correlation of military potential to the sphere of political cooperation and strict fulfillment of international commitments.

Now that the SS-20's, Pershing-2's, ground-based cruise missiles, and shorter-range missiles are on their way to the trash heap, it is appropriate to ask: What did we gain and what did we lose as a result of the solution to the "missile crisis"? The main political gain is, of course, the Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles itself, because its importance reaches far beyond the framework of both the siting and destruction of missiles. It is not in vain that this treaty is described as the first step toward a nuclear-free world, a precedent providing the basis for building all future agreements on disarmament. Among other things, the treaty attests that armed forces must be organized on the principles of sufficiency for defense purposes.

It must not be forgotten, however, that we acquired this treaty at a high price. A tremendous quantity of expensive military equipment is being destroyed. The latest missiles will be demolished by detonation or eliminated by burning, while their warhead airframes will be crushed in presses. Launchers and support equipment will be rendered useless for military purposes.

It was said at the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session on the treaty's ratification that the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will ultimately make it possible to release considerable resources to satisfy social needs. This is true, of course. The scientific and production potential that will be released in industry's defense sectors will be geared toward the production of civilian output: Additional output worth tens of millions of rubles is planned to flow into the national economy already this year as a result of the conversion of industrial capacities used for missile production. Instead of missiles, they will produce drilling equipment, metal cutting machine tools, high technology machines for the processing of agricultural produce, and so on. According to preliminary estimates, some R300 million previously allocated for military expenditure will now be channeled into the social sphere.

Unfortunately, however, nobody has yet calculated accurately either the specific losses incurred by our national economy by actually producing the missiles, launchers, and support equipment which will now be destroyed, or the actual cost of their elimination. In all probability, calculations here will also run into hundreds of millions of rubles.

It is only to be expected that our readers' feelings of joy and relief at the elimination of the missiles should be accompanied by a sense of some bitterness.

Western countries, and the United States in particular, have a rule: Any expenditure, including that on specific types of arms, is appropriated by Congress. Evidently we also need to elaborate a corresponding legislative procedure for the approval of military appropriations. This would be in line with the shaping of a constitutionally empowered mechanism to debate and adopt the most important foreign policy decisions, as it was said at the 19th party conference and the recently held scientific and practical conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry.

The question is: Has our response to imperialism's nuclear missile provocations always been appropriate? This must cross people's minds as they hear the echo of the Saryozek explosions.

Ethnic Tensions in Military
18010256 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 11, Jun 88 pp 58-62

[Article by Senior Lieutenant V. Motolytskiy, Komso-mol committee secretary of an armored regiment: "No Bonds More Sacred..."]

[Text] I would like to begin a discussion on the international orientation in educating our youth and on effecting cohesion within the collective with a look into the recent past of our regiment. I wish to focus on the things that made us uneasy and caused us to take a closer look at the relationships which were being formed among servicemen of various nationalities.

A letter arrived one day at the command from the mother of one of our soldiers, K. Mato, an Estonian. It was not a happy letter, I will say quite frankly. The woman painfully related how difficult it was for her to raise a son not in the best of health, how she hoped that military service would toughen him and help him become a real man. But the letters she was receiving from her son caused her to become alarmed. It turns out that Private Mato had not established relationships with his fellow soldiers and that conflicts would often arise with those of Uzbek origin. Private B. Urazalin even attempted to prove his superiority over Private Mato with his fists... Decisive measures were taken, of course. The commander severely punished Urazalin and those who looked the other way during displays of roughness and callousness. But administrative measures alone, of

course, could not guarantee that similar incidents would not happen again. The question was raised as to whether the things being done to effect cohesion in our multinational collective met the guidelines of a well thought-out system, permeated everyday training, duty and living conditions, and had a precise orientation. We set a specific goal: to create an environment where each soldier's ethnic pride became intertwined with a deep respect for the service members representing other nationalities, for their culture, customs and language.

And the Active Membership Must Be Multi-National

We recall that it was not very long ago that speaking about one problem or another concerning the interrelationships among servicemen of various nationalities was unpleasant. It was implied here that every individual coming into the army was both a patriot and an internationalist, that the qualities of each had been imbued by family and school, had entered the individual's flesh and blood as if right along with his mother's milk, and that all that remained for us to do was develop to a higher level that which had already been formed and emplaced in the man. But then we saw faint notes of ethnic pretentiousness, hostility—sometimes hidden, sometimes rising to the surface—towards those brought up in another republic or region, who spoke with their fellow countrymen in their own language. All of this still exists, both in the utterances and in the deeds of certain individuals.

We began with the premise that we would call a spade a spade. We said forthrightly and honestly that the supreme task of the Komsomol organization is to unite the servicemen of all nationalities into one harmonious family, to teach each one how to relate to his comrades as brother-to-brother in everyday life, teach him to respect ethnic dignity and bring him up in a culture of promoting interrelationships with members of other nationalities. This is a vitally important task for us which must always remain in the foreground. It cannot and should not be relegated to a secondary position, even when other tasks are being pursued. How do we carry out this mission? Allow me to share our experiences and our ideas on the subject.

It is known that service in the military today will in and of itself bring together soldiers of various nationalities. And in extreme circumstances when an individual interacts with others, as a rule, he generally lays aside his ethnic orientation and behaves according to international laws, not making a distinction with regard to who is standing beside him—Russian or Lithuanian, Uzbek or Chechen. It is these seemingly natural laws which provide the basis for asserting that no matter how poorly work in education and upbringing might be conducted, there are no problems in effecting cohesion in the military collective, nor can there be any. But something else is also clear—any discontent which takes place in the multi-national atmosphere will be shifted to national grounds. This cannot be ignored.

But it has been in fact ignored. Let us consider, for example, the question of representation of the various nationalities in the elective Komsomol body. What people recently became Komsomol committee members? Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. What people were in the battalion Komsomol bureaus? They had a few representatives from the Baltic republics. And that is how the entire active membership was constituted right down to and including the Komsomol group organs. Yet every training period in the regiment was attended by representatives of about 40 nationalities. Each year there is an increase in the number of conscripts coming from ethnic groups native to the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Can we close our eyes to this? Allow me to note that the present composition of the Komsomol committee includes seven nationalities. Each battalion Komsomol bureau has five, each company bureau—five-six, and The Komsomol group organs include representatives of 14 nationalities. Heading the Komsomol bureaus of the subunits are an Avar, a Russian, a Karakalpak, a Kazakh, a Lithuanian and a Moldavian. In other words, we are striving to get as many nationalities as possible represented in the Komsomol bodies.

Another aspect of the selection of the active membership is presently more important, without a doubt—the qualitative aspect. Who is in charge of our company-level Komsomol organizations today? Without exception they are conscientious people who have earned their authority by strenuous effort. Many have higher education, uncompleted higher education and mid-level specialized education. Those who have chosen the teaching profession are particularly successful.

In selecting leaders for our youth we strive to get representatives of the nationality which predominates in the given company (according to capabilities, of course). For example, Sergeant A. Yesenaliyev, a Kazakh, heads the Komsomol bureau of one of our companies. About one-fifth of the company's personnel are soldiers of Kazakh origin. The Komsomol leader of another company, Sergeant M. Dzhavadkhanov, an Avar, occupies that position largely due to the fact that a great many natives of the Caucasus serve in that collective. This selection practice might perplex some—is it not being done to flatter the ethnic self-esteem of some? And, in doing so, are not the ethnic feelings of others affected? I must confess that I asked myself the same questions when implementing the new procedures with respect to our active membership. But experience has shown that although there are arguments against it, a greater number support it. The most important consideration here is that, whether we like it or not, young soldiers getting together the first few times congregate most frequently according to their national backgrounds. If time slips by and work is not effectively set up with these small groups, the moment may arrive when the "townsman" come to feel at home and take up an isolated stance.

What small group will lay claims to leadership? Most likely, the one with the greatest numbers, with people

who are physically strong and have a stubborn, independent nature. And who will work with them? The commander and political officer, certainly. But not least important—the Komsomol activist. He knows the language, customs and traditions of the people in question. He knows the particulars of their nature and culture. He can assist in the educational effort under one condition, of course—if he is a true leader, i.e., a man whose opinion is accepted authoritatively in the collective, who is truly capable of leading men.

Now let us imagine that not one, but several ethnic groupings have formed within the company. Cause for alarm? Well, the Komsomol bureau consists not of one man, but from five to seven men. And if the composition of the elective body sufficiently reflects the ethnic composition of the subunit, if the activists are authoritative people, well trained in the military, political and moral spheres, and if, finally, they understand the need for inculcating a culture of interaction with different nationalities and know how to do it, it may then be boldly asserted that undistorted mutual relationships will develop here and no grounds for ethnic conflict will be permitted to develop.

I remember the first steps I took in the profession of Komsomol secretary. In the company where Sergeant V. Guba was serving as Komsomol bureau secretary, soldiers of Armenian origin were causing a great deal of trouble. Now it happened that a theme-oriented evening or morning was organized in the regiment almost every month and dedicated to friendship among all the nationalities and peoples of our country. The personnel in this particular company attended these events. But the orientation of the Armenian soldiers present was always the same—they would flaunt a certain "superiority" and attempt to shift some of their responsibilities onto their comrades. They were chided, they were punished, but it was of little use. Here I made a point of trying to understand just what the Komsomol bureau secretary in that company, for example, was talking to them about. I was convinced that, outside of general statements and admonishment, what Sergeant Guba was saying did not amount to much. And it is no wonder—how would he know the way of life—the customs and traditions of the Armenian people? How could he sound the right mental and emotional chords which might cause a man to reevaluate himself and his duty performance? Master Sergeant Ilya Khachatryan, entrusted by the Komsomol committee to look after this group, was able to sound the proper chords. What were his conversations with them like? First of all, of course, he addressed duty performance, comradeship in the military, and the fact that merely an attempt to somehow set oneself apart as an individual would be intolerable in the military collective. With patience and clarity, sometimes in the Armenian language (at that time the soldiers did not have good command of Russian), Master Sergeant Khachatryan explained that both responsibility and the joys of success in the army are to be shared equally, that soldiers have a single mission—to enhance their combat readiness and

improve their military skills, and that no differentiations should be able to prevent them from reaching their common goal in a united formation. But in addition to talking about aspects equally significant to every Soviet individual, Khachatryan also dealt with those aspects which might directly agitate an Armenian... Using his excellent knowledge of Armenian history, Ilya discussed things in detail with his comrades, their ethnic heritage marked by an excruciating movement to national liberation filled with blood and suffering, and related how much the fraternal assistance of the Russian, Georgian and other neighboring nationalities meant to him. He gave specific examples of military comradeship between Armenians and soldiers of other nationalities in the Civil War and Great Patriotic War, in Afghanistan...

When did Master Sergeant Khachatryan conduct these conversations? When did he delve into the lives and the minds of his subordinates? Not from time to time, but every day. The fact is that the Komsomol committee requested the command to plan its training process in such a way so that MSgt Khachatryan (who was serving in a combat vehicle training subunit) would get involved with soldiers in one of the companies who were causing trouble, help them in their study of tank materiel and the acquisition of practical tank-driving skills. The instructor-mechanic was with the troops under his wardship from reveille to taps—observing, discussing, explaining... His efforts caused this group to begin to relate differently to their duty performance and to their comrades in the ranks.

But then again, this is an ideal example in a way—ideal because MSgt Khachatryan needed no prompting to know what to work on, and because he had had teaching experience prior to his military service. He had an understanding of psychology and knew those roots which go deep back into the ages, from which the soul of the Armenian people has acquired nourishment since time immemorial.

They Must See Everyone, Work With Everyone

But usually you get no more than one or two servicemen endowed with the pedagogical gift and erudition. And it is necessary that all activists, not just certain individuals, get involved in providing an internationally oriented upbringing—only then will we be able to have an effect on all of them. What conclusions come to mind here? That the active membership must receive object lessons. But let us examine this—what were we teaching them before, and what are we teaching them now? Three years ago when I asked myself this question, I was convinced that the absolute majority of Komsomol bureau secretaries were only capable of drawing up a report and conducting a meeting—and even in that they made mistakes. Whenever the question would come up of speaking candidly with a comrade, of learning his views on life or finding out how he relates to the history of his

ethnic origin and his nationality's relations with neighboring peoples—such a proposition met with nothing but confusion and embarrassment.

It gradually became clear that it was necessary to radically change both the content and form of training the Komsomol active membership. The program of instruction drawn up jointly by the Komsomol and party committees for each training session now devotes ever increasing attention to world outlook-related questions, psychological and pedagogical issues. In this regard we strive to relate the study of psychological and teaching fundamentals, of political and ideological education in the military, as closely as possible to the life of our collective. Specifically, we teach the active membership how to get an idea as to the degree of consciousness of one person or another, elicit frankness, delve into his opinions on the pressing issues of domestic and international life. We teach them how to exert a purposeful influence on people whose psychology and behavior show defects, including those caused by a tendency to exaggerate the merits of one's nationality and underrate others. One factor should be stressed here, however: the knowledge acquired is to be used in practical fashion. Those activists who have daily contact with the company political officer and party organization are objectly involved with international education. Let us look, for example, at the collective in which Senior Lieutenant G. Izgagen serves as deputy commander for political affairs. I must say quite frankly that, although we have been devoting more time to the activists of this subunit than to others, the return has so far been small. The reason for this, in my opinion, is that both the political officer and the party organization secretary, Senior Lieutenant A. Iyevlev, consider working with the active membership to be such a secondary matter that there are some days when they will not find ten minutes for discussion with them. They look at the party direction of the Komsomol as being administrative. That is why the activists fail to see their place in the collective and do not acknowledge their role in providing cohesion. For that reason, even communists—Sergeant V. Dovgert, for example—are able to see displays of unfriendly feeling here in the mutual relationships among people of various nationalities and, not attributing any significance to it, they remain uninvolved. In the sake of fairness I will note that the position taken by Senior Lieutenants Izgagen, Iyevlev and other communists in the company towards the restructuring and their influence on the effectiveness of Komsomol work was recently discussed at a party committee session. An impartial and, it is felt, constructive conversation ensued, the substance of which amounted to the fact that it was finally time to learn how to work with the Komsomol organization, to influence people not so much by virtue of power held as by force of authority, the power of experience. Over and over I have become convinced that when things are set up in precisely this manner, the active membership does not stay in the background. Here is an example.

Private Ye. Luban was not a shining example of success in combat training. The way he related to discipline also

left much to be desired. But he loved to sparkle with wit in a narrow circle of people and tell somewhat vulgar anecdotes. We did not attach any significance to this at first—don't we have our share of local wise guys? But one day the Komsomol bureau secretary, Master Sergeant A. Peresyppkin, heard Luban and pricked up his ears—the anecdotes were told "with feeling" and in one way or another touched on the exaggerations propagated by anti-Soviet elements in the West, the theme of alleged infringement of rights of people of European nationality supposedly taking place in the USSR. It seemed to have come up by chance, but Aleksandr Peresyppkin took the floor and commented on Luban's stories, reflecting upon where these slanderous concoctions, dressed up in a cloak of keen wit, are fabricated and with what purpose they are spread. He also found an opportunity to speak frankly with Luban himself.

An instance like this confirms once again that the activity of our ideological enemies is not decreasing, but rather growing. Then again, in repeating this famous thesis, just a few years ago we would often calm ourselves in the depths of our souls—yes, somewhere there are people on duty working for the Western "radio voices" but there is no way they could be in our collective... It was simply incredible that one of our co-workers could be picking up information from the flow of lies and slander thrown out into space by these people. It was only in general outline form that we could imagine the targets of these ideological saboteurs in their radio sermons, the kind of poison their arrows were coated with, and for that reason we sometimes overlooked facts which should have put us on our guard. By the way, we are now focusing all kinds of attention on the fact that friendship among the peoples of our multi-national fatherland has become a central target in the psychological war against the USSR. The subversive activity of socialism's enemies, its nature, content and forms, and the counter-propaganda methods used to propagate slanderous fabrications are presently becoming the subject of regular examination and discussion in the school for active Komsomol membership. At one of these sessions the topic was brought up of the petty concerns fostered in the West regarding nationalistic demonstrations taking place in the Baltic region, about who was inspiring these and for what purposes. The information formed a basis for discussion in the subunits. The Komsomol committee directed activists of Baltic nationality to talk with every Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian serving in the same company, find out his attitude toward what had taken place in his native republic and explain the true state of affairs.

I was interested after a while to learn what the Komsomol activists were able to find out. I was convinced that a deep impression was made, for example, by what was said by Master Sergeant M. Krell, a young communist and Komsomol committee member. He had had detailed conversations with Private L. Pakho and other Estonians which did not beat around the bush, went straight to the heart of the matter. Krell used a clearly understandable

line of reasoning to explain the falsehood of Western propaganda assertions as to the supposedly unjust nature of the Tartu Peace of 1918, the falsehood of their fabrications with regard to the non-aggression pact concluded in 1939 between the USSR and Germany—almost the entire set of arguments upon which these newly arrived “defenders of the rights” of the Baltic peoples base their reasoning. MSgt Krell obtained his material for these commentaries primarily in the Tallinn publications GOLOS MOLODEZHI [The Voice of Youth], MOLODEZH ESTONII [Estonian Youth] and GOLOS NARODA [The Voice of the People].

Presently we have begun to subscribe to certain newspapers and magazines published in the union republics, in the Russian language and in the other languages of the peoples of the USSR. We have approached a number of obkoms and gorkoms with a request for assistance through literature which might provide information and reference material on the history, current events, traditions, customs and way of life of other peoples through works of the best loved national authors. Comrades from Tadzhikistan, Latvia, Estonia and Turkmeniya responded to our request. In addition to giving servicemen the joy of reading in their native languages, the selection of books and periodicals they sent also provides excellent support in preparing for the “Union Republic Days” we have begun to observe on a regular basis. These festive occasions characteristically provide not only an ideological renewal, but a way for people to get to know one another better. Each of these days develops into a celebration in honor of the finest military men of the nationality to which the day is dedicated.

I see results springing from the daily attention paid us by the command, the unit party committee and the political section at major unit level in that the initiative exerted by Komsomol activists is directed towards effecting cohesion among servicemen of all nationalities and is leading to specific actions. I do not recall a single instance where a sensible undertaking was met with skepticism or was not examined comprehensively. Experienced commanders and political officers S. Zdornikov, A. Romanov, V. Popov and V. Kozlov are teaching the active membership the sensitivity to be able to perceive

even the slightest negative changes in the moral climate of the collective. They are consistently and perseveringly improving its cohesion, using all available means to imbue our servicemen with a culture of international interaction. They are teaching people to judge the effectiveness of work accomplished not through “gross” indicators, but rather through the specific actions and deeds of one’s comrades, through the disposition they display towards their duty performance, through the way they relate to people of other nationalities and, finally, through the way Komsomol members react to events that stir us up, that illuminate problems in ethnic relations. I remember when the first reports appeared in the newspapers, radio and television concerning the excesses in Nagorno-Karabakh. I wanted to know how servicemen of Armenian and Azerbaijani nationality assessed what had taken place.

Although information on the occurrences was quite meager during those first few days and articles still had not appeared in the central press analyzing the reasons for the mutual discontent of Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and positions were well separated, the sense of replies given by Privates Zh. Dzhaferov, A. Zeynalov, I. Bagirov and others enlisted from the Trans-Caucasus region amounted to the same thing nonetheless: the issues which have accumulated cannot be resolved when people are guided by emotions issuing from selfish interests as opposed to conscience. We must not sow seeds of dissension and hatred, nor encroach on our dearest achievement—the friendship of fraternal peoples.

You must agree that such a view of things is an indicator of maturity, and of the wisdom which is spread generously throughout our military collectives. There is a strong belief in the collective—that no bonds are more sacred than brotherly friendship, than the unselfish comradeship of Soviet citizens of every nationality. Our constant task is to do everything we can to make this belief the conviction of every Komsomol member and every young soldier.

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Chernyshev on Arms Reduction Proposals

LD1208173788 Moscow TASS in English
1634 GMT 12 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 12 TASS—By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev:

The beginning of the implementation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty is regarded in the Soviet Union as the first step towards a nuclear free nonviolent world. The main thing now is to turn disarmament into a continuous process. However they in the West keep harping on the need to preserve nuclear weapons, justifying it by the fact that Warsaw Treaty countries allegedly have superiority in conventional armaments.

The USSR and its allies share the West's concern over the objective fact of the existence of huge conventional military potentials, primarily in Europe, and are firmly convinced of the need sharply to reduce military confrontation in this area. As for the thesis about the "superiority" of the Warsaw Treaty over NATO, it does not hold water. In real fact, there is balance of the sides' general military potentials, but it is at a very high level and should be reduced.

The ultimate goal of the talks on this issue must become, according to socialist states, the achievement of roughly equal collective levels in terms of the strength of the armed forces and the amount of conventional weapons for the states which make up two military-political blocs. These levels should be lower than the current levels of any of the sides. Taking into account the disbalances and asymmetries in the certain elements of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, the USSR and its allies expressed the readiness to remove the disparity, which arose in these elements, through the relevant reductions by a side which has advantage. In practical terms, this can be achieved in the form of a "package" of reduction proposals which will provide for a sort of exchange in the types of armaments, in which the sides have advantages, without violating the general balance of forces. Only such approach can be just and does not prejudice the security of either of the sides.

The USSR also proposed a realistic way of revealing the disbalances and asymmetries: to make a mutual exchange of the relevant base data on the general European and regional (central, northern and southern Europe) scale. Moreover, there is another proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries which is highly important: with the beginning of the talks to hold on-site checks of the official data. This would make it possible to remove the disparities in assessments and avoid the sad experience of discussions over figures, which brought the Vienna talks on reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe to a stalemate.

It would seem that NATO should have seized on such readiness of Warsaw Treaty countries. Instead, however, we hear too vague pronouncements alleging that the

relevant concept of disarmament in Europe is being worked out. Maybe NATO is not satisfied with the exchange of official data and their on-site verification?

The following facts come to attention. Without agreeing to bilateral in-depth analysis of the real possibilities of the armed forces of the sides, to comparing the military potentials on the whole, NATO specialists try to underscore the superiority of Warsaw Treaty in separate elements of conventional armaments. In doing so, they completely ignore the air force and navy, the strongest components of the armed forces in which NATO has considerable advantage. I think that the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES was completely right when it described on July 13 as "hypocritical" the contention of NATO specialists that aviation should be disregarded because it allegedly neither captures nor holds the territory. However, the aircraft are undoubtedly an inseparable part of the armed forces, crucial for an offensive.

It should be added that the NATO navy and U.S. naval bases, situated around the territory of the Soviet Union, pose a real danger to the Soviet Union. In particular, 15 American aircraft-carrying units are in fact powerful naval and air force groups which are capable of delivering strikes at the Soviet Union in the beginning of war. This is an objective reality.

By laying emphasis on land forces only, in particular on tanks and artillery, in solving the issues of removing the disbalances and symmetries, they in NATO obviously aim at weakening the USSR, at preserving the strongest components in their armed forces—navy and air force. It should be put bluntly that such an approach is inobjective and unrealistic. The elimination of disbalances and asymmetries can be carried out on a mutual basis, with the interests of security of each of the sides taken into account.

Analyst Views Prospects for Nuclear Reductions

PM1208131988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Aug 88 First Edition p 3

[Observer Vasilii Pustov "Military-Political Review":
"From Hiroshima to Saryozek"]

[Excerpts] The week ending today is rich in memorable dates and events which are diametrically opposed in terms of their importance for people's destinies. Yesterday, 6 August, was the 43d anniversary of the day the U.S. Air Force used nuclear weapons for the first time in human history, as a result of which the Japanese city of Hiroshima was wiped off the face of the earth. On the other hand, the first act of destroying these weapons was carried out on 1 August: The destruction by detonation of the first batch of Soviet OTR-22 operational-tactical missiles was carried out in Saryozek (Kazakh SSR) in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles in the presence of representatives of the world community. Thus, we are talking about two explosions, separated by

an interval of many years, which reverberated around the world: one of them to destroy, the other one to preserve life. [passage omitted]

Despite official disclaimers, according to THE WASHINGTON POST secret plans for delivering a first ("disarming" or "decapitating") strike were being hatched by U.S. strategists both during J. Carter's presidency and under the present administration, especially during its first few years. These dangerous goals are pursued through the continuing buildup of the latest strategic offensive weapons: MX ICBM's, highly accurate Midgetman mobile ICBM's, Trident-2 (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles, new B1-B strategic bombers, and strategic cruise missiles. Preparations for production of the fundamentally new B-2 strategic bomber are being accelerated. This aircraft, according to its designers, would be undetectable by modern air defense systems and this would guarantee its first-strike capability.

This is tangible evidence of the continuing desire by certain influential circles on the other side of the Atlantic to disrupt the strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States which was established in the early seventies. Our country cannot allow this to happen. We are, after all, talking about equilibrium which, in contemporary conditions, is the decisive factor for preventing a war, about an equilibrium whose maintenance is of interest to all who are concerned about the fate of peace.

Saryozek and 1 August 1988 will go down in history as the place and the date marking the start of the epoch of nuclear disarmament. True enough, this is just a start. After all, under the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles there are about 2 600 nuclear intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (about 1,750 Soviet and more than 850 U.S.) due to be destroyed. Skeptics point out that intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles make up less than 5 percent of all Soviet and U.S. nuclear arms. Be that as it may, there is something else that should not be forgotten. First, it is impossible to underrate the importance of this quantity of even less than 5 percent, because it represents hundreds and even thousands of potential "Hiroshimas" with the possible loss of many millions of human lives. Second, the implementation of the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will represent the first real destruction of two classes of nuclear weapons in world history, which will reduce the risk of a nuclear apocalypse. And last but by no means least: The reaching of accord on the destruction of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles paves the way for further and even more significant actions in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, and specifically for talks on a 50-percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms. Mankind now faces the real prospect of ridding our planet of approximately 13,000 nuclear combat charges, each one of which is many times more powerful than the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima.

Accord has been reached on such a reduction in principle, but the talks are progressing slowly. So far, for example, there has been no success in reaching accord with the Americans on questions of air-launched and especially sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. Referring to the obviously imaginary lack of effective verification systems, they essentially propose the exclusion of sea-launched long-range cruise missiles from the treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. This would turn such a treaty into a work of fiction.

The SDI program which, as many U.S. experts admit, contradicts the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, remains an obstacle to concluding a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms. In this context the 1 August speech by U.S. Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy was hardly constructive. Soviet generals and officers could not believe his words that the SDI program is purely defensive and designed simply to destroy ballistic missiles in flight, or that its implementation would, as he said, help to stabilize the world situation.

Such arguments turn many points upside down, as it were. This could not fail to be noticed in the United States itself. The extraordinary danger of this space venture was figuratively described by E.P. Thompson, vice president of the U.S. Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. The "Star Wars" plan, he noted, is "an attempt by U.S. ruling circles to revert to the dark days of Hiroshima"; in the opinion of these circles, "America must once again be in a position to threaten a world which would be unable to deliver a counterstrike."

Camouflaged as defensive for propaganda purposes, SDI is a program for creating an offensive system involving the launching of the latest types of weapons into space in order to guarantee the United States an opportunity to deliver a first disarming strike from space. The transfer of the arms race to space would mean the destabilization of the situation all over the world by jeopardizing the security of peoples in all countries. This would raise doubts about the expediency of curbing strategic offensive arms on earth.

The way out of the prevailing situation, as the July conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee noted, is through the conclusion of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms with strict observance of the ABM Treaty in the form it was signed in 1972 and nonwithdrawal from it for an agreed period of time.

Another memorable anniversary was marked this week: the 25th anniversary of the day when the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water in Moscow, fell on 5 August. The treaty, aptly described by U.S. Senator E. Kennedy

as "a source of hope for all peoples," has been joined by 114 states, representing the overwhelming majority of states on our planet. A further 14 countries have signed but not yet ratified it.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the Soviet Union expresses the will and aspirations of literally all mankind by its persistent striving over the years to achieve the prohibition and cessation of nuclear tests in the last remaining environment—underground. Our country even went as far as observing a unilateral moratorium on such explosions for 18 months.

Even though the United States failed to follow the Soviet example, there is now what I would call cautious optimism on this issue. An agreement on conducting a joint experiment to monitor underground nuclear explosions was signed at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow. For this purpose a group of Soviet experts are now at the Nevada test site, while a group of U.S. scientists are in the Semipalatinsk region. It is planned to conduct experiments in both places to confirm the possibility of

using existing instruments to establish reliable monitoring of underground nuclear explosions. It is intended to move on to discussions on limiting the number and yield of nuclear tests in the future.

A total and universal ban on such tests, which the USSR has been tirelessly pursuing, is a necessary condition for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons the world over. This would also be a most important measure for curbing the nuclear arms race.

As we can see, there are certain incipient positive changes in the world. But even so, we cannot talk about them being irreversible. Because we can sense the effect produced by forces which yearn for the exacerbation of international tension as in the past.

But an awareness of the danger of relying on strength is growing even in the West. Resolute rejection of such reliance, of the fatal course of escalating the nuclear and other arms race, and of the idea of gaining military superiority, and a joint quest for ways to a better future for all mankind—this is the commandment of the time. This is indeed the goal of Soviet foreign policy based on the new thinking.

Maj Gen Tatarnikov Calls for Enhanced Security Measures

LD1708145288 Moscow TASS in English
1430 GMT 17 Aug 88

["Europe: The Need for Broader Confidence-Building Measures"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 17 TASS—The confidence-building measures, embracing military activity of land forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO in Europe, are being successfully carried out. The activity of land units has become to a certain extent open, verifiable, and, consequently, more predictable, said Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting of the states, parties to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in a MOSCOW NEWS interview.

Naval activity and independent air exercises still remain major "blank spaces" in the process of confidence- and security-building measures. The air and naval forces have an unprecedented striking power, a big range and high target hitting precision.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation and some other European states therefore believe that the time has come to take under control naval and air activity in Europe and the adjacent sea and oceanic areas, to make this activity open and predictable. And this work should begin at the regular stage of the Stockholm conference.

These measures should remind those applicable to land military activity: inclusion of major air and naval exercises into annual plans of the notified military activity, notification about independent naval and air exercises and other actions, exceeding certain ceilings. Observation should also be carried out over air and naval activity in the sea and oceanic areas, the air space, adjacent to the European Continent, and also the landing of big units of troops.

There should be mandatory notification about the transfer of troops and military equipment to Europe by sea-going and air transport and, at long last, it is necessary to consider questions of banning naval exercises in areas of intensive navigation and fishing, limiting of naval concentration in areas of international significance, primarily anti-submarine naval forces.

Discussed undoubtedly could also be other measures pertaining to air force and naval activity, with strict control to be established over these activities, up to inspection with no right to refuse. These and other measures to cover the naval and air force activity, said Viktor Tatarnikov, would be a timely and quite logical step, particularly if one takes into account the Western calls for predictability, verifiability and openness in the military sphere.

Yazov Answers Soldiers on Discipline

PM1708134188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Aug 88 First Edition p 1

[Letter from servicemen to Defense Minister Yazov and reply from Yazov under general heading: "Military Fraternity Is Indestructible, USSR Defense Minister's Reply to Letters From Servicemen of Unit X on Noregulation Relations"]

[Text] To USSR Defense Minister Army General Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov

In response to your demands on enhancing the responsibility of drafted servicemen in the struggle to consolidate military discipline, we guards servicemen of a three order-bearing motorized rifle unit covered in glory during the war want to share our thoughts with you.

Clearly aware of what irreparable harm is inflicted on the cause of combat readiness by violations of military discipline and ugliest manifestations, such as nonregulation relations and bullying, we guards servicemen, under the new conditions of glasnost and honesty to ourselves and our comrades, want to assure you of our resolve not to allow bullying in our unit.

We are serving in the land of the Ukraine, a land which was abundantly covered with the blood of our fathers and grandfathers. Servicemen of our unit fought bravely in the battles against the enemy, as is eloquently borne out by the orders on the unit's combat banner. One cannot help asking: "Surely we could not have won if we had not had unity and cohesion, martial comradeship and combat fraternity, and the firm discipline extremely necessary in those grim times?" Of course we couldn't! And if the hour of trials comes, how important it is that we should have next to us a real friend, a combat comrade capable of carrying us from the battlefield when we are wounded! Surely at such a time we will not stop to count who has served 6 months more and who 6 months less? No, and no again!

We do not want our mothers to be afraid for their sons when they send them to serve in the army. That is why soldiers and sergeants in their third and fourth tours of duty have given their word, to themselves and to you, that they will not allow the humiliation of young servicemen who have recently joined our ranks.

That is our unanimous decision, the decision of the unit's entire soldier collective. We report it to you.

We ask you to send a reply if possible. We wish you success and good health.

With respect, on behalf of the unit's servicemen:

Guards Sergeant Tleuberlin, Guards Junior Sergeant Dedlovskiy, Guards Junior Sergeant Glinskiy, Guards Junior Sergeant Molodykh, Guards Junior Sergeant Blagovidov, Guards Private Glodan.

Esteemed Comrades!

I read your letter with great attention and interest. You raised an extraordinarily important and topical question. Without strong military discipline and firm statutory order, there can be no proper authority for the Army among the people or deep respect for a man in military uniform. Friendship between servicemen of different tours of duty and different nationalities is an essential condition for the combat readiness of the subunit, an indicator of the military collective's moral health. The cohesion of the personnel of the division, platoon, or company is a guarantee of the successful fulfillment of the tasks facing us.

Today, under the conditions of restructuring, Soviet society's long-awaited purge of everything alien to socialism is under way. The positive changes of truly revolutionary dimensions taking place in our people's lives create exceptionally favorable conditions for the qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces and the implementation of the tasks set before them by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th all-union party conference. In this situation, violations of statutory rules for mutual relations between servicemen become particularly intolerable.

I wish you success in your difficult martial labor, persistence and staunchness in the struggle for high military discipline in the subunit, and all that is best in life. I am sure that even after the end of military service each of you will honorably fulfill his duty as a patriot and citizen.

With respect,

USSR Defense Minister Army General D. Yazov, 9 August 1988

Yazov Addresses Military Scientists

PM1308213788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Aug 88 First Edition pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "Increasing the Return From Military Science"—boldface as published]

[Text] The 19th all-union party conference cited military science among the chief components for ensuring the efficiency of our defense organizational development by primarily qualitative parameters. The paths for the practical implementation of the conference's fundamental political guideline and of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee July (1988) Plenum, as well as specific measures to enhance the contribution of military science to the qualitative improvement of the Armed

Forces, were examined at a conference of leading scientists and heads of scientific research and experimental establishments and military academies. The conference took place in the Ministry of Defense.

A report was delivered at the conference by Army General V.M. Shabanov, USSR deputy defense minister for armaments. Taking part in the discussion of the report were Admiral of the Fleet A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; Vice Admiral M.M. Budayev; Lieutenant General L.I. Volkov; Lieutenant General B.V. Zamyshlyayev; Colonel V.V. Panov; Lieutenant General V.G. Reznichenko; Colonel General V.K. Strelnikov; Lieutenant General of Aviation G.S. Shonin; and other comrades. The results of the conference were summed up by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister.

The CPSU Central Committee July Plenum's guideline—to act, and to act decisively, to step up exactingness in order to solve the practical issues which are assuming an even more acute political character—applies fully to military cadres, including those who labor in the sphere of military science and the technical equipping of the Army and Navy. On the basis of a self-critical and exacting assessment of the real state of affairs, it is important to bring to light everything that is impeding movement forward and to create and introduce into work effective mechanisms to accelerate and intensify military science.

It was stated in the report and in the speeches at the conference that in the course of restructuring, which is encompassing more and more fully the various spheres of Armed Forces life, concrete practical measures have been carried out to improve the activity and perfect the structure of the network of scientific-research and experimental establishments. Certain results have been achieved. However, various kinds of stagnation phenomena are still frequently making themselves felt and these are hampering properly productive work. These are, primarily: formal bureaucratic methods of leadership, leveling, lack of personal responsibility, parasitical tendencies, a loss of initiative by some cadres at scientific establishments, and a loss of desire to achieve real results in scientific activity. In a number of establishments irresponsibility and lack of principle have become widespread and certain employees have grown accustomed to not working at full capacity.

All these negative phenomena are interwoven and are hampering restructuring. Their emergence and existence are linked with perfectly specific causes and have their own perfectly specific vehicles. In the time of stagnation, the erosion in responsibility for each assigned sector of work became so deep-rooted that even today attempts are being made to present matters as if everyone is responsible for shortcomings but no one specifically. Naturally, with such an approach there cannot be any

talk of the quality of scientific activity or of its tangible results. Without decisively breaking with the mechanisms of retardation and overcoming the negative phenomena, it is impossible to really enhance the standard of scientific research or the efficiency and fruitfulness of the work of scientific establishments. Neither is it possible to improve, on the whole, the qualitative indicators of military science and increase its return in the interests of improving the Armed Forces' combat capability.

Considerable scientific and technical potential has been created here. The task, as noted at the conference, is to proceed by setting our sights on qualitative indicators and to secure the fullest mobilization and best utilization of this potential with the aid of organizational, economic, and social factors; to establish order, enhance responsibility and discipline, and secure the zealous and truly proprietorial use of available means and resources,

The practice that became quite widespread in past years—whereby from purely localistic, short-term, and sometimes simply careerist considerations the road to what was new was blocked; scientific developments proceeded along a well-trodden path and amounted, in essence, to duplicating what had already been created and gone through; and whereby new and nontraditional solutions in the development of armaments and military hardware were not sought—has nothing in common with such an approach. As a consequence of that practice, flaws occurred in determining the prospects for developing armaments, in the operational-tactical substantiation of particular models, and in ensuring that their quality and reliability conformed with modern requirements. Research frequently was not coordinated with the solution of pressing practical tasks. The results of scientific and technical progress and of pure research, and the latest achievements, discoveries, and inventions were introduced only slowly. The comprehensiveness of research was not ensured, and the real production, technological, and economic potentials of industry were not taken sufficiently into account.

The substantially reduced standard of organizational and scientific-methodological leadership of the activity of scientific-research establishments also took its toll on the quality of scientific work. A negative role was played by serious flaws in planning. One cannot work unsystematically in science. Nevertheless, a situation frequently took shape in which plans under development existed as if they were completely isolated, were not coordinated with the tasks of the troops and naval forces, and did not exert any definite influence on the development of equipment and armaments. A lag was allowed to occur in the development and improvement of the experimental and testing resources of a number of research and experimental establishments.

The formal bureaucratic approach to the **selection, deployment, and training of scientific cadres** which was manifested in many instances could not fail to be

reflected in the actual level of useful returns from military science. As a result of favoritism, untalented people, totally alien to science, began to penetrate the scientific world, and their sole concern was to obtain as much as possible while giving nothing in return. In essence this is the force which is holding back the development of military science, not only by dint of people's own inability to produce anything new, valuable, or useful, but also because mediocrity can exist comfortably only by pulling everyone and everything down to its own level and reducing, by hook or by crook, really creative natures and talents to its own common denominator.

Therefore, one of the prime conditions for improving the qualitative indicators of military science is to purge it of all accretions, to restructure internal relations within it, to create an atmosphere of glasnost, openness, and freedom of creativity and debate, and of businesslike criticism and self-criticism. Of course, it is not a question of fruitless discussions, of empty talk which sometimes supplants real work, but of constructive, committed scientific dialogue geared to the attainment of specific results.

Life confirms the pressing demands for the improvement of our military-scientific potential on the basis of the all-embracing democratization of the situation in military science, overcoming bureaucratism and administration by injunction, secret cliquishness, and favoritism. Only this path provides room for the maximal display of talents, creative initiative, self-management, equitable rivalry, and the competition of scientific ideas and opinions.

Scientific cadres and the scientific-research establishments of the Defense Ministry bear a considerable share of the responsibility for validating the most expedient avenues of defense organizational development along the same path as the consistent line of our party toward the reduction of arms and armed forces on a reciprocal basis, the strict observance of the provisions of Soviet defense doctrine, and the guaranteeing of reliable security for the Soviet state and its allies.

Of fundamental significance is the simple definition and consistent practical application of the **basic criterion** for assessing the work of a scientific-research establishment, or scientific worker—the concrete scientific results which they achieve. This idea was a recurrent theme throughout the conference. We are talking precisely about results which find embodiment in the enhancement of the quality of armaments and equipment, and not the number of pieces of scientific research which are being, or have been fulfilled. An urgent need to be guided by such a criterion arises from the decisions of the 19th all-union party conference, and of the CPSU Central Committee July Plenum at which it was stressed that the time has now come for action, for specific deeds—a time for increased responsibility for the results of one's labor.

In essence all the speakers at the conference spoke of the tremendous significance that the purposeful, well thought out training of young scientific cadres has for boosting military science. This work must be organized taking into account the specific features of the Defense Ministry's scientific-research and experimental establishments, primarily on the basis of the top military educational establishments. It is necessary to seek out and carefully nurture gifted and inquiring scientists. Here it is important to ensure the continuity of the generations and make careful use of accumulated experience, to sensibly combine young cadres with experienced ones, and not to permit the squandering of our intellectual potential. There must obviously be an acceleration of the work to create, at scientific-research establishments and military educational establishments, a system for training doctors of sciences and for expanding the network of internal training systems for advanced military students, and to pay constant attention to bringing topics of research more closely into line with the actual practical tasks of the Armed Forces. An end must be put to the fallacious practice of defending dissertations on useless topics which are devoid of any real, relevant substance. It is no secret that certain dissertation works find no application at all, and no one ever makes any use of them.

Serious attention was devoted at the conference to the active use of the potential of **science as studied at military educational establishments**. It is important to enlist more broadly the scientific cadres of military educational establishments for the implementation of scientific-research and experimental work on military-theory and military-technical topics. It is essential to make skillful use of the pedagogic experience and knowledge of military academies' professors and instructors in resolving the problem of training specialists for scientific-research establishments.

It is difficult to count on serious success in the matter of intensifying military science and of enhancing its quality without improving **the resources for experimental and testing work**. Persistent and specific work is needed to introduce mathematical methods and modeling into the work of scientific establishments, to improve the provision of test areas with everything essential for ensuring a high scientific and technical standard, to expand on-ground tests, and to reduce the time required for the completion and adoption of promising models, complexes, and systems of armaments. Here it is important to improve the coordination of efforts and ensure the comprehensiveness of testing, and not to permit departmentalism, which disunites and fragments efforts and resources and sharply reduces work efficiency. The bringing into play of quality reserves will be helped by a constant and enterprising search for new ways of strengthening cooperation between scientific-research establishments and industry.

Under no circumstances must our scientific establishments and military scientists lose sight of the main objective—**ensuring the high quality and reliability of**

armaments and military hardware. Proceeding from this premise, it is essential to strive persistently and unswervingly to achieve high quality in testing so that with the minimum number of tests, one can attain the maximum practical results and exhaustive assessments of the whole spectrum of parameters that will make it possible to make a decision about the fate of a model or series of armaments.

In enhancing the return from military science, much depends on the standard of scientific and professional training, and the competence of its organizers, **the heads of scientific establishments**. It is they, above all, who are obliged to give thought to how to ensure the best possible use of effort and resources and of the creative potential of scientific collectives so as to achieve high-quality results. At the present time their rights have been considerably expanded and their independence has been increased as regards determining the structure of scientific subdivisions within the confines of the stipulated numbers, in forming and distributing the bonus fund, and in a number of other questions. Unfortunately, some heads of scientific research establishments do not make use of these rights; they work in the old manner because they are ignorant of the new documents which define activity under conditions of restructuring. The new methods of work and the ability to exercise leadership efficiently in an atmosphere of glasnost and democracy are also a science which has to be mastered in practice.

In particular this applies to the organization of business-like interaction and creative cooperation between scientific establishments. Sometimes scientific collectives work for years in allied fields and on solving one and the same problem but, as a consequence of personal ambitions and of unfounded and unnecessary claims to priority, they cannot overcome the artificially created barriers, cooperate in their work, and achieve real results in the shortest possible time. The imperative of the times is to overcome disjunction of this kind and to subordinate every effort to the improvement of the Armed Forces.

A considerable enhancement of quality could be provided by **the improvement of organization, assiduity, and military order** in scientific research establishments. Such order is permeated by a spirit of collectivism and comradeship, respect for the dignity of the individual, and genuine democratism. It rules out self-will, irresponsibility, and dissoluteness, and provides favorable preconditions for the creation of a really creative atmosphere. In this field the thwarting of plans and pledges and of the requirements of contractual, technological, and financial discipline are especially inadmissible. The enhancement of the efficiency of military science and of the productivity of work in scientific-research establishments is served by **the strengthening of their living links with the troops**. Day-to-day practical work of the troops and of the Navy is a kind of tuning fork by which the correctness of the direction taken by scientific research, and by which the true value of the results obtained, can be checked. The entire activity of the scientific-research

establishments must be permeated by a desire to work better in the interests of the troops and the naval forces. Of course, a precise, substantiated program of scientific work directly in the staffs, formations, units, and ships is essential, as is a precise statement and elaboration of the questions which require research.

Figuratively speaking, science must have its roots embedded in practice and grow out of practice. Only then can science bear fruit. The transition of scientific-research establishments and experimental establishments to **economic accountability and self-financing** can contribute a great deal to solving the tasks of enhancing the fruitfulness of military science and improving its qualitative indicators. But the problems connected with the practical implementation of such a transition require serious, thoughtful study, a study of the experience of the scientific research establishments of industry, of higher education, and of the USSR Academy of Sciences in this field.

In the course of restructuring definite improvements have been achieved in enhancing the effectiveness of the **work of the political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations** of scientific-research establishments. On the whole, party-political work, as was noted at the conference, has begun to harness itself better with scientific work. The orientation toward qualitative indicators requires the further buildup of efforts to galvanize the human factor, the consolidation of a healthy political and moral climate in the scientific collectives, the enhancement of the ideological tempering of scientific cadres, and the study of people's moods and reaction to them. Much remains to be done to restructure intraparty life and, above all, to ensure due exactingness toward Communists for the results of their work and personal responsibility for the sector assigned to them. An important role in the democratization of the situation in military science, in asserting the principles of social justice, and in ensuring scope for initiative and creativity is to be played by the upcoming reports and elections in the party organizations and by an attentive attitude toward all critical observations and proposals made by Communists.

Among the indispensable conditions for enhancing the qualitative indicators of the activity of scientific establishments and cadres is the solution of the questions of **social and cultural life**. Many tight spots still persist here. In order to eliminate them, specific, painstaking work and initiative by the heads and collectives of scientific establishments, the correct use of available resources, the active participation by the public, and close cooperation with local party and soviet organs are essential.

It was stressed at the conference that the times require that we **decisively accelerate and deepen restructuring**. Nationwide work to implement plans for the revolutionary renovation of our society and to accelerate its socioeconomic development needs to be reliably protected. Despite the fact that a start has been made on the

positive processes in the military-political situation, there are no guarantees yet of their irreversibility. The imperialist reaction has not abandoned its plans to disrupt strategic parity and to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The USSR understandably cannot and will not permit that. In seeking the mutual reduction of the levels of confrontation while observing the principles of reciprocity, equality, and identical security for the sides, and acting within the framework of a defensive military doctrine, the CPSU and Soviet state will continue constantly to take pains to ensure favorable peaceful conditions for the creative labor of the Soviet people.

The qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces is subordinated to this task. It is impossible to solve it without science. Therefore, an acceleration of restructuring and the attainment of real practical results on a broad scale are required of the scientific-research establishments and higher educational establishments. This presupposes the stepping up of the quest for new methods and means of armed struggle, the relentless improvement of scientific substantiation, the elaboration of ways to enhance military efficiency and the quality and reliability of armaments and military hardware, the reduction of time necessary to develop and test them, and the creation of the necessary scientific and technical groundwork for the long term.

In devising measures whose implementation will ensure the improvement of the Army and Navy, military science must have its own opinion—valid, principled, and firm—and it must articulate it and defend it. True science cannot be unprincipled. It is capable of developing only on a principled basis, creatively processing accumulated experience, absorbing the advanced achievements of theory and practice, and having a clear perspective that stems from the objective course of social development.

A decisive turn by scientific establishments and cadres of the Armed Forces toward the acquisition of practical results, the intensification of exacting demands on specific persons for specific work, effective monitoring of the implementation of decisions made, and the deepening of the processes of democratization and glasnost in military science—all this will guarantee an increase in its contribution to the achievement of a new qualitative condition of the Armed Forces.

Troops' Relations With Host Countries Considered

PM0808090088 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian 3 Aug 88 p 12

[Special correspondent V. Yanelis article: "Not Prohibited in Principle: The Army in the Host Country, or Another Delicate Topic Suggested by the Age of Glasnost"]

[Excerpts] This is a fact: In accordance with allied commitments, Soviet troops are stationed on the territory of a number of socialist states. We have a common

defensive shield and a single military doctrine. It is senseless to search for traits of strong-arm pressure in our military presence. Other times. Other political criteria.

I do not want to evaluate the nature of this phenomenon. I am taking it as read. Let us talk about what life is like for our servicemen and their families over there, abroad. In Czechoslovakia, for instance.

There are not many of our troops there. Their deployment and quantitative—and also, doubtless, qualitative—composition are no longer a secret. In any case, the European NATO headquarters has data on them. They also know why our military presence is needed: to neutralize the mobile NATO formations located in close proximity to the CSSR-FRG border, with powerful strike aviation, paratroop units, and missile weaponry. There is an axiom that cannot yet be broken: The army lives and develops according to the laws of equivalence.

That, to be brief, is the general situation. Now for the realities of army life in a friendly country, but nonetheless on foreign territory.

...A few months ago, during the visit of the Soviet party and government delegation to the CSSR our leader was given a letter. The inhabitants of a little spa city asked for an aviation unit to be transferred somewhere else. Its presence close to the residential zone was causing some inconvenience to the population and frightening off foreign tourists.

Of course, it is not very pleasant to be awakened by the roar of supersonic fighters, but an airfield is not a children's playground. Moving it takes time and considerable resources. All the same, 2 months later the fighters were transferred elsewhere. The helicopters remained. They make less noise. Moreover, the helicopter operators behave very tactfully: They do not fly during holidays, religious services, or funerals. Someone from the local council has only to telephone the headquarters and make a request. Although the military has its own plans, it is dependent on the weather and plenty of other things.

Local circumstances must indisputably be reckoned with. In general, an army abroad is a complex phenomenon; there are many contributory factors and nuances—political, moral, economic—relating to daily life.

When tanks bearing the emblems of the Czechoslovak People's Army race over the test ranges, destroying the undergrowth and plowing up the meadows with their tracks, that is one thing. When Soviet tanks follow the same route, that is another thing. It is naive to expect all Czechs and Slovaks, without exception, to assess such situations objectively. Sometimes an accidentally felled tree or a turkey crushed under the wheels can grow into an incident. So what can one say about the accidental deaths of people? But that can happen, too...

However carefully the activity schedules are drawn up for combat hardware, whatever precautionary measures are taken, accidents happen on the roads. A local resident fails to keep his Skoda close in to the roadside at night, forgets to switch his headlights on, swerves into the lane of the oncoming traffic... And the tragedy happens!

Thousands of people are killed every year on the roads of the world. This is a familiar and sad fact. But the public reaction to an accident taking place abroad involving a Soviet military driver (even if he is not to blame) is many times greater than the reaction to a dozen ordinary dramas on the roads.

Fortunately, the majority of Czechoslovaks view these problems dialectically. They understand the degree of inconvenience and the awkwardness we feel in circumstances that are so disadvantageous to us. But every time the Western radio stations talk about it, dwell on the details with relish, and seek to make people annoyed with the Soviet military presence.

At the same time, for every broken branch, piece of sown land plowed with tracks, or broken fence, not to mention accidental human casualties, we pay fines in hard currency. The group of forces has a special department in charge of nature conservation and the prevention of any kind of damage. Incidentally, a similar service would not be superfluous in the USSR, too.

I discussed this subject with the chairman of the district people's council in the Slovak city of Zvolen. Ladislav Klement, who has held the post of chairman for nearly 20 years, was frank:

"Of course we have people who have a critical attitude toward the Soviet military presence. But they do not set the tone. Any sensible Slovak or Czech realizes that if there were no Soviet troops here, the tasks of defending the country would fall entirely on the shoulders of the Czechoslovak People's Army. That would require enormous additional spending, human resources, restructuring industry. Our strength lies in unity, including military unity... Go and visit the monument to the fallen Soviet servicemen, see how well it is cared for, and you will realize what the liberators mean to the Slovaks."

Ladislav Klement told me about several cases where the local authorities asked Soviet units stationed in Slovakia for help and always received it. Whether it was a matter of rescuing Slovak families trapped by a flood, harvesting potatoes soaked by the rain, or whatever. [passage omitted]

Ladislav Klement put forward arguments in favor of closer contacts between Soviet servicemen and the local inhabitants.

"There is not enough ordinary human contact. The soldiers emerge from the garrison on holidays or in emergencies. But why should they not simply wander around the streets and smile at a young Slovak girl... That would strengthen trust between us."

If only the chairman knew what a sore point he had touched on!

I do not think any other country's troops abroad can be fenced in with such a palisade of regulations as Soviet troops in the socialist countries. Not many Soviet soldiers who have served 2 years in the CSSR can boast that they were even once simply on leave. The concept just does not exist. There are excursions, very rarely and for a very restricted circle. Naturally, the soldiers are not abroad for purposes of study. But is it humane to stifle people's natural curiosity, their interest in the life of a strange country? [passage omitted]

Perhaps the turkey that is run over would not turn into an incident if the population of the host country saw our soldiers close up more often? If, when abroad, we did not only embody the military strength factor, but became approachable, tangible, friendly, as we really are?

People might object (and have objected): Servicemen cannot do anything in the cities without knowing the language, and there is no guarantee that they will not be drawn into contact with hostile elements.

I think the question of what they would do is no problem. They could walk about, look around them, study the architecture, eat ice cream, discover for themselves an industrious, welcoming, beautiful people. Learning 20 Czech phrases so that they do not get lost in a strange city is no problem. As for the second point, for some reason I am not convinced that foreign tourists go to Czechoslovakia exclusively with the aim of making contact with Soviet servicemen and extracting secrets from them. [passage omitted]

Who goes to work with the groups of forces abroad, and why? The reason is obvious: to see the country and improve your material position, after all, there is currency plus wages in rubles. Food in the host country is cheap because of the rations which, I think, everyone receives—officers, members of their families, workers, and employees. The ration includes all the main items: meat, vegetables, fish, groats, and so forth. It costs about R20. If you want delicacies, you spend your korunas. Some people save them, so as to buy luxuries. That is up to them.

Some of the women go there with the secret hope of finding a companion for life among the military. Which is also understandable, in human terms.

Now—who goes? No clear selection criteria exist. For the military, it is understandable. You sweat it out in the home districts—then fate sends you abroad. For the civilians, it is

more complicated. It is they who choose the country. And they too are chosen, more or less on a competitive basis. There are several applicants for every post.

You would think the best specialists should go, the people with strong morality, discipline, reliability. But here is a lamentable figure for just 1 month: 25 workers had their work contracts canceled. The reasons? Alcohol abuse, disorderly conduct, speculation, attempted smuggling, shoplifting.

One of our women, who held the post of store manager outside the garrison's gates, organized an underground trade in Soviet watches and binoculars. Another tried to pass R2,000 through customs in her brassiere...

They also send home those people whose skills do not meet the employers' requirements. How many ridiculous stories I heard! For instance, an editorial office asks for a zincographer from the USSR, and they send a photographer. Or a carpenter arrives instead of an expert in ancient Spanish literature. Or (this happens all the time) they send "highly skilled" typists who have never been near a typewriter before...

Recruitment is organized by the military recruiting offices. One can only speculate as to what considerations they are guided by, if they deliberately practice deception. [passage omitted]

Ludek Dvorak, chairman of the "Dukla" rural cooperative, complained that with the fruit and vegetable harvest in full swing, he is struggling from lack of manpower; he is forced to bring in students to help in the fields, from goodness knows where. It would be more advantageous to him to deal with women's teams from the military camp.

That is not the custom. "It is not prohibited in principle, but it is not permitted either," I was told, "it is not stipulated in any document. Now, if an agreement were signed at intergovernmental level..."

Once, the military themselves took the initiative on this and wrote a letter to the defense minister, but it did not get past the offices. "You should think more about combat readiness," people at the ministry think, "and let the women raise the children." And that is the end of the story.

Of course, no one disputes that they should think about combat readiness. But we should also think about who maintains that readiness. What life is like for people abroad. Finally, we should not forget the concept of socialist internationalism...

It is not only a matter of thinking, of not forgetting. Something must be done, whatever difficulties are entailed.

It is hard to change something, even when it is fundamentally erroneous. However, a time comes when it is simply impossible not to change!

Drunkenness Mars Airborne Troops Jubilee
PM1108101188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Aug 88 Second Edition p 6

[Article signed "PRAVDA Military Department" under the rubric "We Serve the Soviet Union": "There Are Traditions and Traditions"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] On 2 August, in Moscow and other cities, former airborne troops celebrated the "birthday" of the airborne troops. Meetings with front veterans and internationalist soldiers, concerts, and exhibitions—it was all there.

Unfortunately, there were other things as well. Groups of drunken reservists carousing, behaving like hooligans, and insulting passersby. Some 3,000 former airborne troops gathered in the M. Gorkiy Central Park of Culture and Recreation, we were told by TASS correspondent V. Itkin, and many had come to the meeting from Moscow, Ryazan, Khmel'nitskiy, Tyumen, and other oblasts. Unfortunately, the meeting was marred by orgies of drunkenness. They occurred also in other parts of the city.

There were breaches of public order in Moscow last year as well. This year they were repeated there and spread to other cities, Minsk, for example. The bad example was infectious.

In Komsomol committees—from rayon to central—and at the airborne troops political department these facts were given a principled assessment. Quite rightly, too. But last year's assessment of the 2 August events was equally principled.

Evidently it is not just a matter of condemning and fulminating against people on paper. It is necessary to work constantly with reservists. Not only with former airborne troops, of course. There were instances of public drunkenness, albeit on a smaller scale, on Navy Day and on Border Troops' Day. Can party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and leaders of enterprises, institutions, and educational establishments remain indifferent to the behavior of reservists in their collectives? The military commissariats and DOSAAF organizations cannot sit by and watch it happen either. Apart from anything else it must not be forgotten that no one has revoked the antialcohol legislation. There is no point trying to reason with drunks, even if they are wearing "blue berets." You simply have to exercise authority.

Of course, the vast majority of former airborne troops behaved exemplarily in public places on 2 August, as on any other day. They are not the ones we are reproaching, but those who have forgotten that if they are released into the reserves they must not put the honor and dignity of soldier and citizen aside. Under no circumstances!

Finally, perhaps it is worth considering instituting an Airborne Troops' Day? This would increase the personal responsibility and pride of those who are serving and those who have done their stint in the airborne forces....

Officer Less Knowledgeable About Motor Vehicles Than Draftees

18010449a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Major O. Vladynkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent: "There Simply Are No Barriers"]

[Text] The editors received Guards Captain V. Fen's letter which contained the following views. "The overwhelming majority of commissioned and warrant officers today are directly or indirectly involved with operating vehicles during their service. They have to set up and monitor the work and training of drivers and carry out the duties of senior vehicle operator and this demands that every one of them have a high competency level in this area. However, in the opinion of many of my fellow workers, there are many contradictions in this area..."

The author of the letter further raised a number of questions, the essence of which was as follows. The level of automotive knowledge and skills that many officers have is lower than that of the drivers who are subordinate to them. Those who have completed military schools often have a driver's license only for category "A" or "V" vehicles. And there are cases where officers who have been called into the service from the reserves do not have any driver's license at all. It is therefore necessary for them to increase their professional training in this area to the level of their subordinates who, for the most part, are driving category "S", "D" and "E" vehicles. But Captain Fen does not know what possibilities there are for doing this in the units themselves. And whether this type of training is generally allowed?

In looking for answers to the questions contained in the letter, we called the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Automotive Directorate. Senior Inspector Lieutenant Colonel V. Shkuta answered and this how he explained it.

[Shkuta] In accordance with the appropriate documents it is possible to retrain drivers for category "D" transport vehicles during short instructional courses in training units when so authorized by district, group of forces and naval headquarters and also by central and main directorates. Category "E" may be done at short instructional courses in a garrison unit with the approval of the major unit commander.

[Vladynkin] This type of training is useful in training first-term servicemen, but bringing officers and warrant officers in for these short instructional courses involves pulling them away from their immediate responsibilities for an extended time...

[Shkuta] And there is more. Officers have practically no need to know Category "D" since it licenses the individual to drive a bus and officers are rarely responsible for operating these. It is relatively easy to train for Category "E" and as I already said, such short instructional courses are held at one of the garrison units. What happens is that an officer is pulled away from his service duties only for the next exercise on the assigned day. And the unit commander decides who to send to the course of instruction.

[Vladykin] Everything is clear in regard to retraining, but what about those who still do not have a driver's license"

[Shkuta] I first want to point out that there are few such officers, even among those who have been called up from the reserves, because they take the appropriate training in institutes with military departments and obtain driver's licenses. In general, the Army and Navy conduct practically no initial training in driving Category "V" and "S" transport vehicles. This training is set up only in individual cases.

[Vladykin] Then how do these "few" get the right to drive a vehicle?

[Shkuta] They train at their own expense at the local DOSAAF organization and pass GAI [State Automotive Institute] examinations on their own.

After this conversation we decided to contact the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] GAI Main Directorate to find out whether there were special rules that

servicemen had to follow to obtain a driver's license and where they had to take their training. Senior State Vehicle Inspector Police Major Ye. Yereshchenko answered our call.

[Yereshchenko] In principle it makes no difference to us which department does the initial driver training or retraining and how long it takes. It is only important that the training group that has been established be registered with GAI, have the necessary material training base, be under the leadership of qualified instructors and strictly follow the established training program. If, as a result of State Automobile Inspection monitoring, it has been established that these requirements are being followed, those who have taken a training course at this group may present themselves for a GAI examination. If they pass these examinations, they then have the right to drive the category of transport vehicle for which they trained. We are able to give the examinations at any group.

So this is the situation with regards to the problem that is upsetting Guards Captain Fen and other readers. There are many units that still do not know the sequence for increasing the driver qualifications of commissioned and warrant officers and therefore are not involved in this. As was explained, there are no serious obstacles to resolving this problem. True, one would think that it would be advisable to hold initial training for those officers who do not have driver's licenses at the organizational level and not rely only on their initiative. As Guards Captain Fen justifiably noted in his letter, this requires the service to take an interest.

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Officials Commemorate Air Force Day

Yefimov Addresses Gathering

PM2508084088 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Aug 88 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "In Honor of the Holiday"]

[Text] A ceremonial meeting of representatives of Moscow working people, servicemen from the capital's garrison, Air Force veterans, and civil aviation workers was held in the Hall of Columns of the House of the Unions on 19 August to mark USSR Air Force Day.

On the presidium at the meeting were I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, USSR minister of general machine building; A.S. Systsov, USSR minister of the aviation industry; Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; Army General D.S. Sukhorukov, USSR deputy defense minister; Fleet Admiral A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; A.N. Soshinkov, deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee department; Yu.S. Karabasov, secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom; thrice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Aviation I.N. Kozhedub; and representatives of party, soviet, and public organizations.

The ceremony was opened by Colonel General of Aviation L.L. Batekhin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Air Force Political Directorate.

Greetings were delivered to the airmen by N.I. Lukinov, fitter at a Moscow plant; L.I. Shvetsova, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; A.V. Milovanov, helicopter commander of a special air detachment of the Ministry of Civil Aviation; Doctor of Technical Sciences K.K. Vasilchenko; and international master of sports N.V. Sergeeva, world aerobatics champion.

The ceremony was addressed by Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, commander in chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy defense minister.

Defense Minister's Order

PM2508084288 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Aug 88 Second Edition p 1

["USSR Defense Minister's Order," No 291, dated 21 August 1988, Moscow]

[Text] Comrade pilots and navigators, specialists in military and civil aviation, aviation industry workers, DOSAAF aviator sportsmen, aviation veterans!

Today the Soviet people and their Armed Forces are marking USSR Air Force Day.

The country's working people, at a new stage of revolutionary transformations, are persistently implementing the practical tasks of restructuring and creatively implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th all-union party conference, and the CPSU Central Committee July (1988) Plenum.

The party has given clear guidelines to the Soviet people and USSR Armed Forces servicemen for concrete action. In the troops and naval forces the intensification of the training and educational process is speeding up, and the effectiveness and quality of combat training are increasing.

In the conditions of the continuing military danger, great significance is today attached to maintaining the Army and Navy at a level that does not give military superiority to the forces of imperialism. An active part is played in the resolution of this crucial task, alongside servicemen of the other branches of the USSR Armed Forces, by military aviation personnel, for whom the CPSU's principled directive that gives priority to qualitative indicators in the combat training process has acquired programmatic significance. Aviators work purposefully to increase combat readiness and master the new aviation equipment available to the troops (forces), maintain a vigilant combat watch, improve the organization of flight and tactical training, increase flight safety, and strengthen discipline.

Civil aviation specialists are working fruitfully and the DOSAAF aviator sportsmen are adding to their successes.

Workers in the aviation industry are working at full strength. In implementing a radical economic reform, they are seeking additional reserves to improve efficiency and quality in providing aviation with modern aircraft equipment.

I greet and congratulate you on the holiday—USSR Air Force Day!

I wish pilots and navigators, specialists in military and civil aviation, aviation industry workers, DOSAAF aviator sportsmen, and aviation veterans further successes in their service and work, and good health and happiness.

To mark USSR Air Force Day I order:

That today, 21 August 1988, at 2200 local time, festive firework displays take place in the capital of our motherland, the hero city of Moscow, the capitals of the union republics, the hero cities of Leningrad, Volgograd, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Tula, Smolensk, and Murmansk, and the hero fortress of Brest.

I am confident that all the country's aviators will continue persistently to improve their professional skills and strengthen the defense capability of the socialist motherland.

USSR Defense Minister

Army General D. Yazov

Directorate Chief Interviewed

PM2408135688 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General of Aviation L. Batekhin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Air Force, by IZVESTIYA correspondent N. Sautin under the rubric "21 August Is USSR Air Force Day": "Breaking the Sound Barrier"; date and place not given—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] Military aviation today. What is it like? We are used to hearing that the planes are the fastest, the airmen the most courageous.... All that is true. But the times require us to look more closely at the airmen's life and service, their place in the motherland's defensive formation. Restructuring is taking place in the Air Force. This renewal, as everywhere, is not following a smooth, well-worn track. The holiday is an opportunity not only to talk about successes—this is also the view of the IZVESTIYA correspondent's interviewee, Colonel General of Aviation L. Batekhin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Air Force Political Directorate. "We have begun the biggest reform of military aviation in recent years," Leonid Lukich says. "It accords with our military doctrine, which is strictly defensive and aimed at lowering the levels of military confrontation. But the desire for peace does not mean unilateral disarmament. As was stressed at the 19th party conference, reliable security can only be ensured through the qualitative development of defense building. And here the Air Force has come up against considerable difficulties."

[Batekhin continues] In the late seventies and early eighties a complacent mentality prevailed in aviation. Training flights, bombings, and training missile launches took place according to a simplified plan, far removed from real combat. Aircraft systems improved, but by no means everyone managed to "squeeze out" of them what the designers put in: The competence of flying and technical personnel fell behind the standard of equipment. Accidents also caused concern. Students at the academies were mastering yesterday's technology.

And another thing. Work in the air is difficult. There should be compensation on the ground, in the form of special concern for airmen. Their social and living conditions, however, caused justified complaints. Frankly, the prestige of our profession fell, and discipline among the troops fell.

That was the "bouquet" of minus points we had 3 years ago. After deciding to renew the Air Force, we thought we would put things right quickly. Yet although our instructions were apparently correct and our directives were stern, we did not achieve the anticipated result.

Then the time came to abandon our illusions: Apparently the central apparatus was working flawlessly, and the main brake on restructuring was being applied elsewhere, among the troops. We started restructuring ourselves. It is hard to believe now: Generals and senior officers were spending 80 percent of their time doing paperwork. What was left for working among the troops, with people? We stopped the flow of orders and instructions hampering the operational autonomy of regimental commanders. We cut through the knots of overcautious coordination. We abandoned formalism in party political work in favor of people's needs and the development of their inner potential. And only then did things begin to get moving. People in the units and formations began to believe that Moscow felt respect for and confidence in their bold initiatives.

[Sautin] One of your directives to the troops called on them to learn to work with reduced numbers of personnel. Did the central apparatus set an example here?

[Batekhin] Why should the Defense Ministry be an exception? We too have suffered cadre "losses." Some of the officers managing the Air Force have retired. Some have exchanged service in the capital for garrisons, nearby or far away.

[Sautin] The restructuring of the Air Force does more than provide for a new management structure and the abolition of superfluous components. What is being done today to ensure flight safety? After all, this too is a criterion of the quality of our defense.

[Batekhin] First, the reliability of the equipment the troops receive. Here we have complaints. We hope soon there will be fewer. The suppliers are preparing to go over to economic accountability. It follows from this that the financial prosperity of the manufacturers of equipment will depend on how the client—us—assesses a new machine.

Second, it is not only mechanical failure that leads to accidents. The pilot's individual qualities are equally important. Modern aircraft systems make far tougher demands on the officers' intellectual and physical capabilities. Sometimes they are carrying out missions where the nervous and psychological strain literally reaches the limit of what a human being can take. Especially with in-flight refueling, extremely low-altitude flights, and target interception. Take this example: During a night flight in clouds, the airmen have to consult piloting and navigational instruments about 200 times a minute, fixing their eyes on each instrument for no more than 0.3-0.9 seconds...

The new stage in the development of aviation is no less exacting for the pilot. The Air Force reform takes account of this. In a few years we will be admitting to the flying schools only those young men who have studied helicopters, planes, and gliders at DOSAAF flying clubs and have made solo flights.

[Sautin] How far into the future of aviation does the Air Force reform look?

[Batekhin] Supersonic systems are with us today. Tomorrow, the next generation of combat machines could appear. That is the dialectics of the development of aviation. But the new planes still have to be "incorporated" effectively into the country's defense system. A search is under way for improved forms of Air Force organizational structure, combat training, rear services, and aircraft engineering support.

[Sautin] How can we ignore the history of our Air Force on the aviators' holiday! They say only airmen were Stalin's pets....

[Batekhin] Yes, he did indeed show partiality toward the Air Force. He was on first-name terms with many Air Force commanders, but even "Stalin's falcons" were not protected from repressions by the leader's love. All the military districts Air Force chiefs were declared "enemies of the people." The chief of the Air Force Main Directorate, the 30-year-old General P. Rogachev, was arrested a few days before the war. He was shot on 6 October on Beria's orders.

There were many criminal mistakes.... On the first day of the fascist attack the western front lost 738 planes, 40 percent of all it had.... Only later, through a colossal effort by the entire country, was the series production of 25 new types and modifications of planes launched. And what planes! [passage omitted]

[Sautin] In the West they write that "Stingers" have accelerated the Russians' departure from Afghanistan...

[Batekhin] It cannot be denied that "Stingers" are dangerous weapons. But they did not influence our airmen's fulfillment of their duty as internationalists. Alas, there were casualties. [passage omitted]

The Afghan experience has perfected tactics in the use of planes and helicopters. And of course, it is not the "Stingers" that are sending the airmen back to the Soviet Union, but strict compliance with the Geneva agreements. [passage omitted]

Air Force CINC Speaks on Air Force Day, 1988

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["Speech by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yefimov, commander in chief of the Air Force, USSR deputy minister of defense, twice hero of the Soviet Union, and marshal of aviation," on the occasion of USSR Air Force Day, 21 August—live or recorded]

[Text] Dear comrades, the Soviet people have been marking USSR Air Force Day since 1933. It has entered

our lives as a brilliant nationwide holiday, a review of achievements in the development of the wings of the people, which is how Vladimir Ilyich Lenin described aviation. His name is linked with the entire history of the emergence and development of the Soviet Air Force. Born in the heroic days of the Great October Revolution, it has traveled a glorious combat and labor path. Today it justifies with honor the multifaceted purpose for which it was destined. The first air detachment, which founded the Red Air Fleet, was formed on 28 October 1917. In the process of its emergence, our Air Force proceeded along the same stages as the Red Army. In a 20-year period—which was exceedingly brief, historically speaking—military aviation became a mighty means for the armed defense of the socialist fatherland. In the 1930's, our homeland earned fame as the leading air power in the world. Contributions to this were made, in particular, by the first landings in world aviation history of aircraft at the North Pole; the extralong-distance flights of the legendary crews of Chkalov and Gromov; the combat deeds of internationalist fliers in the skies over Mongolia, Spain, and China; and the regular flights of Aeroflot, which was established in 1923, not only on domestic routes, but also to a number of countries of the world. Responding to the party's call to fly farther, faster, and higher than anyone else, Soviet fliers won 37 percent of world aviation records in the prewar period. Every such breakthrough in speed, distance, and altitude also raised, on the wings of the airplanes, the prestige of our country.

The creation and development of Soviet aviation was not a chain of uninterrupted victories and triumphs, however. There also were difficulties, shortcomings, and tragedies on this path. The Soviet people surmounted them and tirelessly strengthened the Air Force. The farsightedness of Soviet aviation technology policy—the accelerated development of military aviation—was convincingly confirmed by the Great Patriotic War. Having overcome the unfavorable situation and failures in the initial period of the war, the Soviet Air Force subsequently fulfilled its operational and strategic tasks successfully, both independently and jointly with the other armed services. Resolute massed air operations exerted a great influence on the progress and outcome of frontline and strategic operation, and played an important part in victory over Hitler's Germany. Of 77,000 enemy aircraft destroyed on the Soviet-German front, 57,000 were scored by our airmen in combat operations. They inscribed many vivid and heroic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. I would say that for airmen, the war has become a sort of performance standard. Soviet airmen boldly joined battle with the superior forces of the enemy. They carried out ramblings, pointing their burning planes at concentrations of enemy troops and combat equipment. A total of 2,420 airmen were invested with the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Sixty-five of them received the title twice. The whole world came to know the names of the Soviet flying aces Pokryshkin and Kozhedub, three times heroes of the Soviet Union.

Along with the airmen of the Air Force, air defense, and naval aviation, a considerable contribution to routing Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism was made by civil aviation. Many subunits of the Civil Air Fleet were made guards units or received honorary titles. The combat friendship of Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and Romanian airmen was born and grew in strength in the skies of the front line. This friendship continues today in the combat formation of the airmen of the Warsaw Pact countries. French airmen of the illustrious Normandy-Neman regiment flew on combat missions with us, wing to wing. All generations of airmen will remember with gratitude the feat of the workers of the home front, whose lives were dominated by the single thought: everything for the front, everything for victory. They supplied aviation with everything necessary in the most difficult of circumstances. In the war years, our industry produced more than 112,000 military planes, and the peoples of the union republics gave the Air Force more than R2.5 billion in private savings, which was used to build 2,565 aircraft. Such were the wings of the truly great multinational friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

The country's Air Force came out of the war even stronger and more battleworthy. Since the Great Patriotic War, Soviet aviation has made an enormous qualitative leap in its development. Today, it is an aviation of supersonic speeds, of great ranges, as well as a broad range of altitudes. The Air Force is equipped with the most modern technology. One example of this will be presented at the international air exhibition in England in September—the modern frontline MiG-29 fighter, which is in no way inferior to the best U.S. fighter models. The present generation of Soviet military airmen, who are continuing the heroic traditions of the frontline servicemen, has inherited their profound love for the sky and for flying, and their lofty sense of responsibility for the security of our motherland. The equipment and techniques of airborne battle change, but there is no change in the creative and intense nature of the Soviet air fighters' service, which requires tremendous personal performance and sometimes genuine heroism as well. The names of peacetime aviator heroes are well known in the country. They include airman Yeliseyev, the first man in the history of jet aviation to ram a violator aircraft in a high-speed fighter; Air Force Major General Antoshkin, who was in charge of actions by military airmen in the sky above Chernobyl; Lieutenant-Colonel Raelyan, who was recently awarded a hero's star for courage and valor in performing his internationalist duty in Afghanistan; and Air Force Major General Pavlov, a delegate to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

The growth of the Air Force's role in guaranteeing the country's defense and the fact that it is armed with modern aviation systems inspire airmen to storm new heights, enhance their professional training, and maintain constant readiness to conduct active and decisive combat actions. The situation in the world also obliges

them to do so. Although there are obvious positive changes in that situation, guarantees of their irreversibility have yet to form. Creating these guarantees is the goal of the activity of our Communist Party and the Soviet state, which are establishing the new political thinking and a policy based on it in the international arena. This process was further developed by the new and sweeping proposals on reducing troops and armaments in Europe and on reducing military-political tension in the world, expressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev during his recent visit to the Polish People's Republic. The socialist countries' readiness to continue a peace-loving and constructive course in international affairs was demonstrated by the Warsaw conference of the Political Consultative Committee.

The danger of human civilization being annihilated, however, has not yet been overcome. Imperialist reaction has not renounced its strong-arm military policy. It is natural that all this is taken into account in our defense construction, including in the state of the Air Force. It must be ready and able to fulfill the combat tasks entrusted to it at any moment and in any situation.

This year, Soviet Air Force Day is being celebrated at a time marked by a great creative upswing and by tremendous responsibility for the implementation of the decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The main task set before us at the party conference was to insure that priority is given to qualitative parameters, both in technical equipping and in the training and education of personnel. Proceeding from this and in an atmosphere of truthfulness, glasnost, and increasingly severe evaluation criteria, Air Force personnel are currently seeking the most effective ways to a qualitative solution of all existing tasks. In the process of making the restructuring more profound and of renewing all aspects of life in Air Force units and formations, a new moral and psychological atmosphere is taking shape. The policies of the July 1988 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee have entered airmen's lives as a combat program. Having armed themselves with partywide experience, military councils, commanders, political bodies, and party and Komsomol organizations are persistently holding a course of developing the personnel's creative activities and of refusing to tolerate stagnatory phenomena and violations of flight safety requirements. A reassessment is being made of the activities of military cadres and their ability to successfully solve complex combat-readiness tasks and to work in an atmosphere of democratization and glasnost. A tried and tested means of improving the quality of combat training and the education of Air Force personnel and of developing initiative and creativity is socialist competition, which is being held this year under the slogan: Selfless martial labor, exemplary service, and the very highest discipline are our contribution to the cause of defending the motherland. Its initiator was the air bomber regiment commanded by Colonel Moskayev. Words of praise also are deserved by the Air Guards unit under the command of Guards Colonel Gribeynikov; on the eve of the holiday that regiment was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Today, while noting the positive changes in the life of many military collectives in the Air Force and making exacting assessments of what has been achieved, one cannot fail to mention the omissions and shortcomings we have not yet managed to eliminate. It is not yet everywhere that we are acting in the spirit of restructuring; that words are backed up with vigorous, concrete, and practical deeds; and that the inertia of old approaches and habits is being resolutely overcome. The tasks of making the restructuring and democratization process more profound and of raising the role of the human factor in all our affairs lie ahead. Over its more than 7 difficult decades, the Air Force has accumulated rich and priceless experience which is used actively in reinforcing its combat potential. Possessing enormous strike power and the ability to reach any point on earth, the Soviet Air Force has never been used, nor ever will be used, as a weapon for intimidation or blackmail. If, however, an aggressor attacks our fatherland or our friends, an inevitable and hard-hitting blow awaits him in retribution.

Dear comrades, on behalf of the military council and the political directorate of the Air Force, I cordially congratulate you, aviation veterans, air servicemen, toilers of the aviation industry and of Aeroflot, amateur fliers, and all Soviet people on the splendid traditional holiday of Soviet Air Force Day. I wish you and your families sound health, happiness, and new successes in renewing and perfecting Soviet society. On this festive day, airmen, navigators, engineers, and all aviation specialists assure the Central Committee of Lenin's party, the Soviet Government, and our people that they will spare no effort to ensure the necessary level of combat readiness, that they will fulfill their patriotic and international duty with honor, and that they will reliably stand guard over the gains of socialism and the sacred boundaries of our great motherland.

Air Force Official on Pact, NATO Strengths
LD2008154088 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 20 Aug 88

[Report on interview with Colonel General Valentin Pankin, chief of the USSR Air Force General Staff, by unidentified correspondent on the occasion of Air Force Day; date and place not given—Pankin remarks recorded in Russian fading into superimposed English translation]

[Text] The Soviet Union marks Aviation Day on Sunday, 21 August. Our reporter has interviewed the chief of the Air Force General Staff, Colonel General Valentin Pankin. One of the questions concerns Western claims that the Soviet Union has a supremacy in combat aircraft, described as one of the imbalances between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

[Pankin] It's easy to notice that the West is biased in estimating the strength of the air forces of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. It focuses on those components in

which we do have superiority, but ignores others in which the United States and NATO have an advantage. The structure of the air forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries stems from the purely defensive purposes of our military doctrine. Under the basic provisions of that doctrine, we have formed a force in the western areas of the Warsaw Treaty countries that ensures a parity in aircraft. We have maintained that parity mostly by fighter planes, which are a defensive component. As for attack aircraft, NATO has a major advantage. Besides, one must also keep in mind NATO's army aviation, which is twice stronger than ours [as heard].

[Correspondent] The Soviet Union has said that it will withdraw part of its forward-deployment aircraft from Eastern Europe if NATO agrees not to deploy its F-16 fighter bombers in Italy, earlier rejected by Spain. Our reporter asked General Pankin how important that would be in military terms.

[Pankin] If carried out, this measure would significantly reduce both the nuclear and conventional attack potential of each side. Secondly, it would ease tension in the Mediterranean.

[Correspondent] And why then did the Soviet proposal meet with a negative reaction from the United States and some other NATO countries, we asked the general.

[Pankin] I am confident that some high-ranking Western leaders have paid lip service to promoting early arms reductions and a better situation in Europe. They haven't taken any practical steps along these lines. On the contrary, they've been trying to compensate for the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles by bringing attack aircraft closer to the borders of the socialist countries.

[Correspondent] There was an upsurge in Soviet-American military contacts lately, for instance those between the air forces of the two countries. Last month General Pankin visited the United States. What impressions does the Soviet military pilot have of that trip?

[Pankin] During my visit to the United States, I met with people representing various sections of American society. I was greatly impressed by the meetings we had with our American counterparts, Air Force pilots. They are strong and bold people. It's my impression that they want peace, friendship and cooperation with Soviet Air Force pilots. We have some experience of cooperation with pilots of other countries, and we're always ready to meet our partners half-way.

Aviation Day Coverage

Yefimov Interviewed on Air Force Day
LD1808225388 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2012 GMT 18 Aug 88

["Interview With Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr Yefimov"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Aug (TASS)—"The Soviet Union is a resolute opponent of any arms race, including an aviation arms race," said Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr

Yefimov, commander in chief of the USSR Air Force and USSR deputy minister of defense. He gave an interview to a TASS correspondent in connection with USSR Air Force Day, the festival of Soviet airmen, celebrated on 21 August.

"Our country has favored and continues to favor complete and universal disarmament. However, as long as imperialists are fanning tension in the world, the Soviet Air Force, in close cooperation with the other branches of the USSR Armed Forces and the fraternal armies of the socialist countries, will be reliably guarding the gains of October," he said.

"The Air Force today is equipped with the latest technology. Missile carrier aircraft form the basis of its might. They are armed with multipurpose combat vehicles, variable sweep wings, and flying apparatuses with vertical ascent and descent. The military air transport forces are qualitatively new. They are equipped with the Il-76 jetliner, the "Antheus" and "Ruslan." Modern helicopters are a powerful means of combat.

Aleksandr Yefimov went on to say that at an international exhibition in Great Britain the frontline fighter plane, MiG-29, a modern warplane, is to be shown for the first time. "We are convinced that our plane will be fully able to compete in the latest aviation technology market. It is also an excellent chance to show the world the level of development of technology in the USSR. Nor are we hiding our readiness to deliver the MiG-29 to other countries. Our craft is in no way inferior to the U.S. F-15, F-16, and F-18 fighter planes."

Concluding his conversation, the commander in chief of the USSR Air Force underlined that Air Force personnel are capable of performing any task set before them.

Notes Stalinist Purges

LD1808220988 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2000 GMT 18 Aug 88

[Text] Interesting new information has been revealed about the Soviet Air Force on the eve of Air Force Day. Our Moscow correspondent Jozsef Barath reports:

The reason one of the most modern fighters in the Soviet Air Force, the MiG-29, was entered in the Farnborough

air show near London is that the USSR is willing to sell it for a decent sum. The MiG-29 is regarded as no worse in any of its combat characteristics than the craft of the F-series—the fighting falcons—manufactured by General Dynamics. This was stated on the eve of Soviet Air Force Day by Air Marshal Yefimov.

It also emerges from the interview that the years of stagnation did not pass without leaving their mark on the elite corps of Soviet pilots either. As the marshal said, there was a need here as well for restructuring, for an improvement in professional preparedness and an enhancement of a sense of responsibility.

Yefimov, commander of Soviet military aircraft, said there are serious problems in preparing new officers in the Soviet Air Force, which could be explained primarily by the fact that the career of a fighter pilot is no longer attractive and does not have as much prestige as before, so recruitment standards cannot be set as high as they ought to be.

The role of Soviet pilots during World War II has been raised once again, but the tone is much less triumphant than was customary during previous Air Force Days. According to Yefimov, the Germans had an overpowering air superiority in the early stages of the war. The reason for this was that the Stalinist leadership was late in mass producing new aircraft models, although the designs for the craft, which were later to prove victorious, were available in time. Nevertheless, there were virtually no offensive air units. The majority of pilots had not been trained for the new technology before the beginning of the war.

The Stalinist purges also caused great damage to the Air Force, whose leading officers fell victim to the bloodbath. Soviet pilots were therefore commanded by new, inexperienced officers in the first air battles of World War II. This was stated by Air Marshal Yefimov in an interview with TASS marking the forthcoming Soviet Air Force Day.

Selections from Kuznetsov Memoirs

18010270 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by R. Kuznetsova, under the rubric "PRAVDA Fridays": "Sudden Changes"]

[Text] From the Memoirs of Flt Adm SU N. Kuznetsov

"Lose property and you don't lose much, lose honor and you lose much, lose courage and you lose everything." Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov repeated this saying by Goethe many times.

He had his share of very difficult ordeals. In 1956, Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov—in the past a people's commissar, minister, commander in chief, and fleet admiral of the Soviet Union—having endured Stalin's "court of honor," was forced to go into retirement. He was excommunicated from his favorite job and stripped of the highest military rank.

N.G. Kuznetsov did not lose courage. He found a new life in writing his memoirs. He worked daily and much. The brisk tapping of the typewriter was heard from his office early in the morning. In the 18 years of his new life he had time to do much: he translated four works of British and American authors, wrote four books and dozens of articles...

The admiral's memoirs undoubtedly have historical value. Among them is the manuscript "Krutyye povoroty" [Sudden Changes], bequeathed to his wife Vera Nikolayevna with a note: 17 September 1973.

"Sudden Changes" is a confession. N.G. Kuznetsov remarks that he tried to be impartial in assessing people and events. "I would like," he says, "with regard to what I wrote, that tongues not only wag at the dinner table... I think I have said some things which should be pondered."

The First Ordeals

It was a matter of fate, owing to a number of objective reasons, first "to hold me high," then to fling me down and force me to start my service all over. Proof of this is literally the unique change in my ranks. During all my years of service I was a rear admiral twice, a vice admiral three times, wore four stars on the shoulder-boards of a fleet admiral, and twice held the highest military rank in the Navy—Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union.

As fate willed, through a wave of forced transfers and without any special personal desire, by the start of the Great Patriotic War I ended up at the top of the scale of rank in the Navy—people's commissar [narkom] of the Navy—in the rank of admiral.

So, after 8 years of serving on cruisers, duty assignments to Spain and a command in the Pacific Ocean Fleet in 1937-1939 responsibility for preparing the Navy for war

rested on my shoulders. I was left to my own resources in operational questions. It was not always simple to catch Stalin. No one else wanted to take responsibility.

But already in the summer of 1939 it was obvious that "war was already near," and as soon as I was narkom I did everything possible to see that it did not catch the fleets unawares.

I remembered well the lessons of the old tsarist navy, when the Japanese sunk Russian ships on the outer roadsteads of Port Arthur, and I knew from personal observations in Cartagena, Spain, how aviation can strike suddenly and what damage it can inflict.

In addition, I knew that replacing lost ships, particularly large ones, during wartime is a difficult matter. Therefore, it was easy to convince all my deputies and leaders in the fleets of the need to have detailed elaborations and to conduct numerous training sessions to increase fleet readiness in the shortest period of time. In November 1939, the first basic directive of the Narkomat [People's Commissariat] regarding this was issued; it was in effect and updated in practice right up until the fatal dawn of 22 June 1941.

As we know, the fleets did not lose a single ship on the first day of the war, although the enemy sought to strike them at bases in Sevastopol, Kronshtadt, Polyarnyy, Izmail and other places.

I did not receive any great blame during the war, although I admit that enough mistakes were made. Whereas during the first months of the new duty in Moscow I felt that I had ended up in this chair too soon, I gradually came to believe that I could handle the job in this responsible position. Possibly there is some exaggeration here. Obviously, a person is more likely to overestimate his capabilities than to underestimate them. However, that is how it seemed to me, and I admit this.

I do not think I was conceited and I always understood that a career under Stalin—what now during a period of prosperity is called the "cult of personality"—was quite unsteady, and presumption could turn out most unexpectedly.

I must admit that in time I became confident in myself, defended the interests of the Navy more stubbornly, and even dared to object to Stalin himself when I believed it necessary for the cause.

Strictly speaking, this is where I broke my own neck. Outwardly, it seemed there were no sudden changes to suggest I should "be more careful so as not to tumble out." Here is what I remember. On a spring day in 1946, I had a telephone conversation with Stalin. He suggested dividing the Baltic Fleet in two. At first, I requested, as always, time to think it over. Then, a day or two later, I replied that I thought this was wrong. The theater was

small and from the operational standpoint was indivisible. As it turned out later, Stalin was dissatisfied with my stand, but hung up the phone without saying anything. I still did not guess that "there would be a storm."

Just what was taking place behind the scenes, as it is known now?

A.I. Mikoyan decided—whether on his own initiative or at Stalin's direction, I do not know—to discuss this topic with I.S. Isakov. He, having learned of Stalin's position, believed it more prudent to agree with Stalin, although this was not at all in keeping with the admiral's normal point of view; he was well trained in the operational respect. With all his wonderful individual qualities, I.S. Isakov always feared for his job. Moreover, he was ambitious and, "violating his conscience"—in his words—spoke out against me during those days so as not to go against the current. Later, he burned the notes pertaining to the meetings with Stalin (when Khrushchev was in power) or declared in the press that aircraft carriers were "deceased," but, embarrassed, told me that it was the doing of the editorial staff. Nonsense!! Isakov knew how to deal with editorial staffs.

Stalin, who was informed of Isakov's point of view, ordered the Naval Council to consider this matter. He sent Zhdanov and Mikoyan there. All the seamen, other than Isakov, agreed with me, although he just "abstained."

Summoned to Stalin's office the next day, we informed him of our opinion. I stuck to my position, firmly convinced I was right. Isakov was silent. Mikoyan alluded to him and said that Isakov supported Stalin's proposal.

Stalin began to criticize me severely, but I could not contain myself and replied that "If I do not suit you, I request I be removed." That cost me dearly. Stalin replied: "When it is necessary, we will remove you," and this was the signal for his preparations in this direction. True, I was removed from office nearly a year later, but it was at this ill-fated meeting that the matter was predetermined.

Later, my point of view was recognized as correct, and the two fleets in the Baltic were again united, but my head was already "cut off" (for the first time). As a consequence of that, with Bulganin's help, in 1948 I was even brought to a court of honor, convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, and reduced in rank to rear admiral. It is with sadness that I again recall this "sudden change," primarily because three admirals in addition to me received more severe punishment and were imprisoned.

From this example, one can see how under conditions of autocracy of the "cult of personality" and fear of stating one's opinion, anything coming from Stalin grew like a snowball and ultimately was accepted as a deformed, incorrect decision...

What Will the "Boss" Think?

As we know, I.V. Stalin was the actual head of state, and V.M. Molotov was his immediate assistant. Cautious, he decided many issues, but without fail reported most of the important matters to Stalin. He and A.A. Zhdanov were instructed to "be patron" of the Navy, and to some extent they helped me in resolving problems, but most often suggested I "write to Comrade Stalin." The "patrons" refused even to "push forward" such matters without knowing how "the boss" would react—they were afraid to end up in an awkward position due to the Navy if it turned out that Stalin had a different opinion than the Navy people had. It also sometimes happened that they promised to support me and changed their opinion "on the way" into Stalin's office after determining which way the wind was blowing, but I could not act that way.

When it is a question of my position (digressing from overall naval matters), it can be said that I had as my direct superior the highest figure in the state and at the same time did not have a "boss" to whom I could on any day talk in detail and inform him of our Navy's needs. When I began pestering Molotov or Zhdanov with my requests, they became angry and said frankly that my job as narkom was to see Stalin and ask him to resolve these problems. But the close war came, the further Stalin removed himself from routine naval matters. "Every cloud has a silver lining"—a wise saying goes. This trained me to be independent and in individual instances forced me to make crucial decisions independently. Perhaps this obliged me to make a number of decisions on increasing fleet combat readiness on the eve of the war without waiting for orders from above.

One way or the other, I had an opportunity from the top of the Navy scale of rank to deal with high political figures and statesmen. Being around Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov, naturally, willingly or unwillingly, I became familiar with the system of working in the upper strata and the "machinations" in solving various problems.

"Comrade Stalin"—it was customary to call him this both in the office at at his home. Only Voroshilov and Molotov often called Stalin by his old party nickname—"Koba." Even those close to him, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Malenkov and others, just like we sinners, called him "Comrade Stalin."

Although I saw him and talked with him many times in his office and at his home, the distance between us always remained so great that an opinion was formed at

a certain distance, occasionally, without considering the fine points. And they now are not necessary. You see, this is my personal opinion, with no claim to historical objectivity.

There are some explanations for all of Stalin's illegal actions. They are hidden in his character (possibly sickly), cases of hostile activities, and the harmful influence of his surroundings and particularly of influential individuals involved in the repressions.

I began with Stalin's guilt for the repressions because they are without a doubt the greatest evil in his activities, which historians may explain after comparing many facts and taking into account not only Stalin's will but also his sickness. All this will be done not to accuse or justify what has already lost meaning, but to explain and objectively identify the causes.

Working in Moscow and meeting with I.V. Stalin, for a long time I still remained under the earlier impression about Stalin's infallibility. But I did not remain convinced of everything to the end.

Of course, I.V. Stalin had an outstanding mind. He was highly educated and well-read. He had a strong will, which under the influence of the environment (and possibly, I repeat, the illness) sometimes turned into obstinacy. It was precisely this, in my opinion, that played a negative role in the question of whether or not Germany would attack us and when.

Talking with many party and military leaders, I heard a fully legitimate reproach for the extremes in repressions, but never heard anything about his stupid decisions or incompetent proposals, regardless of what sector they affected. Some who are still alive could shed light on this "mystery." Why did Stalin have this obsession, when it was a question of fighting the "enemies of the people?"

Concerning V.M. Molotov. Back before working in Moscow, I became accustomed to the idea that Molotov was the number two man in the state. The military knew Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov better than anyone. They personified the highest level of our state.

From the first days of duty in the People's Commissariat of the Navy, I had to meet with Molotov more often than with Stalin or Voroshilov. When the new, large shipbuilding program was approved, Molotov was instructed to monitor the cooperative deliveries of all people's commissariats. Actually, he was the day-to-day supervisor of the construction of the "Big Fleet." He was the one who had to resolve for me questions of shipbuilding as well as other naval matters. Molotov considered it his duty to act as patron over the Navy and avoided only operational questions. He was sure to consult Stalin on all naval questions.

Molotov was in fact the first deputy head of state. One would rarely see Stalin in his office without Molotov. That is also how he sticks in my mind, always sitting to the left of Stalin (Voroshilov always sat on Stalin's right) with folders for papers and reporting something to Stalin. That was also the way it was during the war.

He was, without a doubt, a person devoted to Stalin, carrying out all of his instructions. I never heard him object. Two or three times I happened to be present during harsh dialogue between Molotov and Voroshilov, when Stalin reconciled them, and, as I remember, he always supported Molotov and valued him highly. "You stop talking about Molotov in that way," Stalin said, I do not remember on what question, trying to reconcile Kliment Yefremovich [Voroshilov] and Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich [Molotov] at the table in his quarters.

I got the impression that in his relations with Stalin, Molotov never had his own specific opinion, but just obeyed his orders. It is possible that I am wrong and that this only concerned naval matters, in which he clearly did not want to interfere and limited himself to the role of executing decisions made.

Molotov shared Stalin's point of view during the years of the repressions and, it seems to me, changed it and doubted the rightness of the repressions only after his wife, Polina Semenovna, was arrested. Of course, he believed her, and I saw how he abstained in voting on her expulsion from the party at the 18th Party Conference in 1940. This and a number of other similar facts indicated that he was not blindly subordinate to Stalin, but their opinions were almost always the same, and he was firm when he had to defend his position.

By nature he was a dry and sullen person. Even when watching some movie comedy with Stalin and guests, he was formal, rarely smiled, and permitted no "familiarities."

In short, Molotov was a splendid executor of Stalin's will, and it seems Stalin could not have had a better assistant. However, during the 19th Party Congress and later, Molotov went into the background, and influenced by his peculiar surroundings Stalin began suspecting Molotov of usurping power. As I recall, he clearly stated this at the Central Committee Plenum after the 19th Party Congress, alluding to something he had read from foreign sources. But these were already the years of Stalin's illness. At that time someone was already playing solitaire in the event of his quick departure for "a better world," and Stalin was becoming increasingly suspicious.

I still remember how one day members of the Politburo and I (for naval affairs) went to his nearest dacha after being summoned there. I was struck by the darkness in which the entire area of the dacha was submerged. Knowing us by sight, we were allowed to pass, but we traveled over the dark paths illuminated only by the

headlights of the vehicles. At the entrance stood two short posts with blue lanterns. This was already in 1952. I was told that Stalin had a habit of checking for tracks near the fence. Perhaps this is idle talk, but there are sufficient grounds for such information.

Being a military man, naturally I had known Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov for a long time. His name was still associated with a song about the Red Cavalry, which "on clear nights and rainy days" under the leadership of S.M. Budennyi fought during the Civil War.

Voroshilov was certainly a close friend of Stalin, and even the portraits which I remember were Stalin and Voroshilov standing side by side...

I learned from authoritative sources that he was in his own time a strong-willed and independent people's commissar. Khrulev, Shtern, Khmel'nitskiy and others knew him as such. But after the repressions of 1937, decisive changes occurred with him. He somehow softened, lost face, and feared more for his position than he should.

I more than once pondered the reasons for this change. They are understandable! By nature Kliment Yefremovich is a good person, incapable of hurting another. (I remember how in 1940 he signed one death sentence and told us who were in his office: "Here is the first sentence which I am signing, and I am having a hard time, although I also know that it serves him right.") The numerous arrests of military leaders also reflected on his character. He felt morally responsible, but could not oppose Stalin's will. He also feared for himself. Moreover, the years took their toll. His will weakened, and he gradually became afraid of making any crucial decisions. This is precisely how I saw him during the Finnish Campaign, during the Great Patriotic War, and later when he was deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and I had to go to him on naval matters.

Stalin for some reason treated him without the proper respect during the last years of his life. I do not know the reason. It is possible that the same thing happened with him as with Molotov: the "young Turks" were rubbing out the old ones from Stalin's surroundings, and the latter feared rivals.

I think, not without reason, once Stalin said in response to my reference to Voroshilov: "What does he know about naval matters! To him ships were only given full speed so that the sand would fly from under the propellers." The thing is that Kliment Yefremovich led fleets for 15 years. Stalin, unfortunately, was right to a certain extent.

"How the Machinations Are Cooked Up..."

In the matter of "sudden changes," N.A. Bulganin was my evil genius both in the first instance (being taken to trial) and in the second (being retired). Why? When he actually replaced the people's commissar of defense

under Stalin, I had a rather unpleasant conversation due to the accommodations for the People's Commissariat of the Navy. He brazenly ordered several of the naval directorates moved from one building. I asked him for replacement facilities—he refused. I could not agree and informed Stalin. Stalin took my side and reproached Bulganin: How could you move them without giving anything in exchange? Bulganin became furious and, coming into my office, promised to remember this when the opportunity arises. Soon there a campaign on cosmopolites, and a number of cases were investigated in the people's commissariats. A certain V. Alferov, sensing the situation (set-up), wrote a report that they say Kuznetsov had an admiration for foreigners, and cited the case with the parachute torpedo. Bulganin picked up on this and, inspired, did everything he could to "fan the incense." Under those conditions it was not hard to do this. It personal opinions, not logic, facts or justice that ran and decided the case. Moreover, Bulganin was a person who did not look into military matters much, but had learned well the usefulness of listening. He also carried out all instructions without having his own state position—he was a poor politician, but a good intriguer.

Summoned from Leningrad together with L.M. Galler, I did not know what was going on. I remember that on the train Lev Mikhaylovich [Galler] and I were guessing about the reason for the summons and could not figure it out. It turned out, we had to explain why authorization was given to turn over designs of a parachute torpedo to the British. The designs were not classified...

It was decided to try us by a "court of honor." Marshal I. A. Govorov was made head of the court. He was an honest person, but did not dare to "have his own opinion," and at Bulganin's bidding, where possible, he laid it on thick. We have found the enemies of the people! All four admirals fought fairly—and here, please, to the "court of honor." But it did not end with this. It was decided to transfer the case to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. This astonished not only us, the "offenders," but also everyone in attendance. To this time I can hear the voice of the prosecutor, N.M. Kulakov, who, already calling us all kinds of obscene words, demanded the strictest punishment possible.

We left the hall with thoughts of possibly being arrested right there, and I remember listening for the elevator all night. Nerves were tense. However, we were not arrested. Several days later, the trial by the Military Collegium chaired by Ulrikh was held. Ulrikh—a blind instrument in the hands of higher bodies—presented nothing that was convincing to us, and the collegium quickly left for deliberation. I understood that there was really no need to deliberate: they would report to Stalin and would be told how to deal with us.

We waited tediously until 0200 hours. We were given food and drink thanks to the People's Commissariat of the Navy, but were no longer allowed to go out on the

street. "This is a bad sign," V.A. Alafuzov told me, trying to keep a sense of humor. Laughter through tears! We smoked continuously. I also began smoking, a harmful habit I had broken earlier.

Indeed, like the after the calm before the storm, there was action in the hallway. The guards appeared, then people previously unknown to us. I saw a nurse with a "first aid" chest. "It smells like a funeral," I thought, but the status of being the senior made me restrain myself and even cheer up my admirals.

For some reason I thought "it is a hunt for me"—that is precisely how Alafuzov expressed it the day before at my apartment, and I had reason to believe that the verdict would begin with me.

Whereas earlier we entered the hall in an unorganized manner and took our places on the dock, now we were summoned and escorted by guards to our places by seniority. I was in the first row. Galler was with me. Admirals Alafuzov and Stepanov stood in the second row. We were already past the "sitting on the dock" phase. Now we were standing between docks and flanked by guards with rifles. To this time I do not know how, but 5-6 people ended up in the hall who were not there earlier. Apparently, they were supposed to attend this final "presentation."

Alafuzov's case was read first. A streamlined charge and the sentence—10 years. It occurred to me that if they were going in ascending order, I could receive "capital punishment." Be patient, Kazakh! Next was Stepanov—he was also given 10 years. The puzzle was still unsolved. Next came Galler—he was sentenced to 4 years. That means 10 years for two of us and 4 years for two of us, I decided. That is what the careerist Alferov's note and Bulganin's dirty tricks have done. But I was wrong. They "dismissed" me from the court, but recommended a reduction in rank to rear admiral.

After the command to the commandant to "carry out" the sentences, they left me in the courtroom, and led the others away to dress. I strained to say good-by to them, but was not allowed...

Amidst the quite bitter recollections of this episode, I was satisfied merely with the fact that I always shouldered the blame myself and did not blame any of my admirals. I talked about this with them (Alafuzov and Stepanov) when they were released after rehabilitation in 1953. We dined at my apartment and when asked what I was guilty of before them, the admirals replied: I conducted myself not only with dignity but with utmost courage, risking my own head.

For a time I went around without a job on the rights of an "untouchable" and began asking to be used in some kind of work. But only Stalin resolved this problem personally. He sent me to Khabarovsk as deputy commander in chief for the Far East to R.Ya. Malinovskiy.

Running into me by chance in the Kremlin (I remained a member of the Central Committee), Molotov allegorically said that "he had to go there for a short trip."

Several years later, when I was again minister of the Navy, sitting at the table at his nearby dacha, Stalin as if by chance remarked: Abakumov suggested that he arrest me—"supposedly, then he would prove that we are spies." Stalin did not agree and replied: "I do not believe that Kuznetsov is an enemy of the people." I did not know that I was in such danger.

When I was again appointed minister of the Navy in the summer of 1951, I began thinking about how to help my comrades who were still in trouble. I wrote two letters. As Alafuzov and Stepanov later told me, they knew about my steps, but it seems the only relief was being transferred from solitary to a common cell. (L.M. Galler died in prison in 1950—R.K.)

They thanked me, but I told them frankly that events of a higher order did not permit them to sit out their term. We bid a fond farewell, but I was overcome by anguish, as if I was to blame for something...

Nevertheless, I believe that there are more good people than bad. If I were to conclude differently, then by logic the argument would have lost the basis for what is worth living and for what is worth fighting. Furthermore, there must be limits one should not cross so as not to end up a simpleton, at whom even those to whom you are kind and in whom you believe laugh. Any extreme, they say, borders on stupidity.

I think that any person involved with politics must be particularly cautious and careful. Politics is ruthless and if, as they say, even war is politics only by other means, especially since it does not take into account individual people, as the interests of politics require.

What seems a little offensive, but apparently inevitable in our stern and stormy age, is the fact that those who depart are quickly forgotten: new replaces all the old, and that which honest people work on to leave behind as a "visible trace" of themselves is not realized. Their trail is quickly covered, and no one should be blamed for this—such is life.

The Death of Stalin

After the 19th Party Congress in 1952, at the Party Central Committee Plenum Stalin suggested he be relieved from work on the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers for health reasons. The decision was made only to relieve him from duties of people's commissary of the armed forces.

It is hard to say whether it was his sincere desire to shift the heavy work to a younger and healthier person or to be convinced that everyone preferred him.

In conversations in his office, he more and more often complained about old age and half-jokingly and half-seriously said that he still had to be nervous and swear. He appeared in the office less and less frequently. During the last half a year I saw him twice. Management of affairs was reassigned to his deputies. It was decided that the more major issues would be resolved by groups of "three" or "five." The draft decisions were sent to Stalin for approval; later, simply a long list of questions was compiled and sent to him at the dacha. His endorsement served as approval of everything listed.

Bulganin acted as patron over the Navy. He did not like naval matters. It was not hard to run into trouble with the seamen. Therefore, everything major and fundamental was put off "until better times." Even questions such as those concerning major shortcomings in the Navy, which I raised, for the sake of formality were examined and then driven into a corner from which it was impossible to expect a decision.

Such a fate befell my report of 31 July 1952. In it I wrote what major shortcomings we had in shipbuilding, for which billions of rubles were being spent. All this was buried in Bulganin's lobbies.

Only skillful formal replies existed. Sending papers addressed to some minister formally removed responsibility from one and did not place it on another, and everything quieted down "until better times."

Everyone understood that something abnormal was going on in the state. Some kind of "center stop," in Stalin's own words, was formed, but no one undertook or could change the situation.

The leaders of the ministries began to adapt to this haphazard "system."

Stalin's physical weakness remained unknown to the people; therefore, his demise made a stunning impression. But already after several months that which seemed unlikely began to be overshadowed by new people and new events.

Those around Stalin and the leading workers of the governmental machinery regarded his death somewhat differently; they more than once had pondered the decrepitude of their leader and saw the approach of that which is inevitable for all mortals.

I saw Stalin for the first time in 1932 in the Kremlin at a reception for graduates of the Naval Academy. Then in 1938 during a session of the Naval Council I had a brief conversation with him—I informed him in detail of the major accident of the destroyer *Reshitelnyy*. The destroyer was cast ashore by a powerful storm during steering from Nikolayev to Vladivostok. I had a conversation with Stalin in mid-March 1939 at the 18th Party Congress at the end of the debate. During the break,

Stalin came up to me and gave me a sheet of paper, saying—read it! It was a report from People's Commissar of the Navy Frinovskiy requesting that he be relieved of duties.

Those were the years when Stalin still guided the party and the state with full energy.

Thus, I had the opportunity to observe him at a different age, to see the transformation of the leader into an "incontestable authority," which grew into the harmful "cult of personality."

When I was confirmed as people's commissar of the Navy in April 1939, Stalin already did not like objections. A sort of dense formed around him, comprised of bootlickers and those anxious to please him, which prevent people who needed to see him from getting to him. We young people who were raised by the waves of the "uneasy period of 1937-1938" and who tried, from inexperience, "to have our own opinion" had to be convinced quickly that it was our lot to listen more and speak less.

In regard to me personally, at that time I bowed to Stalin's authority, not assuming that something coming from him could be subjected to doubt.

But after I began working in Moscow and began to looking into naval matters, I was perplexed by some of his decisions. Thus, in response to my report in which I expressed my conviction in the importance of anti-aircraft weapons for modern ships (as I was taught in school and at the academy), Stalin stated that "we do not plan to fight near America," and rejected my proposals. Knowing that we could lose ships equally from aircraft at 1,000 km from our shores and at some 50 km or at bases, I did not consider the reasoning of the great leader to be correct.

At first I tried to ascribe all the misunderstanding to my inexperience in reporting. I began using various techniques. But this did not achieve the desired results either. With chagrin I concluded that Stalin did not wish to go deeply into naval matters and therefore was making incorrect decisions. I made these conclusions only for my own naval department. This "lack of understanding" of naval affairs took place against a background of a good attitude towards the Navy in general. I painfully endured this lack of understanding.

During the years Stalin was able to work, I developed a specific system for pushing questions through. On all matters which required a decision by the government, I wrote a report addressed to Stalin and sent a copy to the deputy who was in charge of the Navy at that moment. As a rule, I did not receive a reply. Without instructions from Stalin, no one wanted to give any direction to the report. After sending the report, I usually made a copy for myself and kept it in my briefcase, just in case I came across Stalin and the situation was favorable. At times I

would have five or six of these copies, sometimes more. I arranged them in order of importance, kept reference data in my head and, when summoned to the Kremlin, brought them with me. Usually there were several people from his entourage in Stalin's office; they were always in a rush. When the problem has been resolved, leave, do not linger. I chose the moment and requested authorization to see him on other "urgent and important" matters.

Stalin usually agreed to hear me, and those seated next to him began looking askance at me—as if to say you are sneaking in with some naval matters of little importance. After taking the copies, I briefly reported on their content. Stalin heard me out and put his visa-resolution right there on the copy of the draft. That is when everything went without delay. It was worse if instructed someone to look into the matter, which meant it would take the long path of coordinations, shakedown...

When I was transferred to a different job in 1947, Stalin was still personally overseeing meetings of both civilians and military. But when I returned to work in Moscow again in 1951, the situation was quite different. Even at the meeting in the Central Committee on naval matters he was there only two times, and then instructed his deputies to conduct it. Malenkov and Beriya stood high in his esteem at that time. Bulganin tried everything he could to become part of the "all-powerful troika," but it did not work out.

Stalin's activeness decreased before our eyes, and the state machinery operated less and less efficiently.

Pondering this, I recalled many times his remarks after the Parade of Victory with respect to the "forced" departure from running the country, and it seemed that it would have indeed been right if he had left the helm of such a huge state.

12567

Naval Cadre Policy: Sea vs. Shore Duty

18010428 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jul 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by Res Capt 1st Rank N. Remizov: "To Exchange the Office For the Cabin"]

[Text] *Few shore officers decide on this step. Why?*

The question with which I came to the cadre department of "N" unit clearly perplexed my co-discussants: Are there many who desire to exchange shore duties for ship duties? "There are as many candidates as you like for leaving the ships," they answered me, "but the other way around—it is necessary to take a look." It turned out that there are such instances. But they are rather the exception to the rule than a system.

Capt Lt D. Mikhryakov was named as among the best officers of the training ship Gangut. It was noted that previously he had served in a communications center, and now had acquired experience of working, so to speak, on both ends of the radio bridge, the shore and sea.

Other examples are also known of when an officer, who for some reason ended up on shore since his youth, or rather early left the sea, again requested sea duty. My close acquaintance, Capt Lt A. Vorobyev did so in his day. He worked in the cadres department, and reports about him were of the best: accurate, attentive, inclined toward analysis and initiative. And he repeated over and over again: "I want ship duty..." Finally the officer was met half way, and Albert Varsonofyevich in a short period of time grew from an assistant commander of an escort ship to a destroyer commander. Having sailed a good deal, Vorobyev agreed to staff duty and soon became one of the best officers in the directorate. I recall when Capt 2d Rank N. Derkach, already not a young man, left shore duty (due to a reduction in the table of organization, it is true) to command a ship's department at sea. Later he said that on the ships his spirit became young and he gained a sense of really doing something. And his blood pressure even stopped "jumping."

I have repeatedly discussed this topic with Capt 1st Rank A. Bobrakov, chief of staff of a task force of surface ships. He, a competent seaman, and a keen and original thinker, had long been concerned with these issues, back before the discussion of the problems of the authority of shipboard personnel in the press, and was amazed at the desire of some officers to seek out a quiet duty on shore as soon as possible. At one of our latest meetings, Aleksandr Vasilyevich complained that there were two commanders subordinate to him who openly dreamed about an office job. In principle he could get rid of them, but where was he to get replacements? You see, today there is almost a line forming for office positions. Lines for ship vacancies remained only in the historical novels of Valentin Pikul. This is understandable. After all the ship is the front line, and the shore for the navy is the rear just the same, where, say what you will, it is quieter.

Lately, Aleksandr Vasilyevich believes, more attention has begun to be paid to shipboard personnel, which is having a favorable effect on that service. But, obsolete tendencies are still retained, and the lines for replacement of duty positions continue to stand with their face not toward their sea, but toward the land.

Of course, on shore there is also plenty of hard work, and there are exercises and alert duties. And someone has to serve there. The headquarters and directorates cannot get by, no doubt, solely with people who are up in years, who have given to the sea everything that they could.

Again, for some reason the practice has developed, that if an officer, even a relatively young one "got a toe hold" on shore, he would no longer be ordered to return to sea

for some tour of duty. He would be transferred to a headquarters, rear or school, and there already, as a rule, will complete his service. In former days (and Bobrakov and I reflected on this) cadre policy was more flexible. In the 1960s officers and warrant officers "exchanged land for water" several times. Staff specialists were named to command positions. Now, of course, a naval officer is not so universal, but nevertheless it is necessary to root out the existing "foredoom" of an officer to serve only at sea or only on shore.

Is this possible? Undoubtedly. For example, I can offer the following cadre progression. Let us say that an officer serves as a division commander in the engineering department. Later he is transferred along the line of engineering service to headquarters on shore, so that he gains experience in administrative work. Several years of such activity will significantly expand the field of vision of the officer, and then in the position of commander of VCh-5 [engineering department] he will easily be able to handle the increased volume of work.

Such movements are also possible for other specialties. Such practice exists in many foreign navies. And it is rather successful. So, readiness for transfer not only from ship to shore, but the other way around as well, must become a moral law for our officers and warrant officers as well. In the interest of the service it is possible and necessary to get away from the settled scheme, and this will to some extent strengthen the entire system of "ship-shore" relations.

It is also necessary to discuss this aspect of the issue. There are few who desire to go from shore to shipboard service mainly because the social protection of shipboard personnel is substantially lower than for other categories of military personnel. Take simply shore liberty. Every one who has served on ships knows from his own experience how many unjustified prohibitions "on liberty," and various organization periods take place, the goal of which at times are not clear even to the initiators of such measures themselves.

Sometimes it reaches the point of being funny. One time the wives of some officers of a cruiser on which I was then serving arrived at a temporary basing point to

spend New Year's. I also prepared to go on shore, but two hours before midnight the assistant ship commander met me and stated that I would have to go on duty immediately. The assistant commander himself did not know the nature of this duty, which someone had thought up impromptu. The entire fleeting instruction amounted to "go the wharf and act, using good sense."

The captain 3d rank did not desire to get involved in my plans and experiences, and there was no longer any time to explain, and I set out for the wharf in a foul mood. To my good fortune, Capt 2d Rank M. Likholetov, the senior assistant, came up to me. Having learned that not far away my wife and son who had arrived that morning were "quartered," he ordered me to immediately hurry to them, expressing bewilderment about the unnecessary detail: This provincial cut-off wharf to which the cruiser was made fast could be watched excellently from the poop deck by the watch detail.

I remembered that deed of Mikhail Vasilyevich my whole life. And when I meet the former assistant commander, today Capt 1st Rank (Ret) Vsevolod Gorbatyuk, I remind him jokingly how intrepidly he then sent me to stand an overly cautious detail.

No doubt there are no "sacred sacrifices" that could knock out of the saddle officers and warrant officers who love the navy. However, unnecessary "additions" to the real difficulties of shipboard personnel, and inattentiveness of various types to human needs and requirements, does not work to the authority of ship duty, but is harmful to it.

You see, one cannot seriously think that if an officer or warrant officer during an anchorage at base goes on shore unnecessarily to solve some everyday problems, that this will lead to an emergency situation in his element. If one has complaints against a man, one can speak about the overall style of his work, and defects that are not compensated for by denying shore liberty. To the contrary, if the sailor's family rear area is stable in all respects, his service will also give more joy.

Moscow MD Work After 4 June Explosion at Arzamas

18010427 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Unsigned Article: "When the Calamity Came"]

[Text] As has already been reported in the press, on 4 June an explosion of three boxcars, loaded with industrial explosives, took place near the Arzamas-1 railroad station. As a result, a large housing area and station structures were destroyed. Seventy-three people are believed to have been killed, and there are 229 wounded in hospitals.

Presently a governmental commission, headed by G. Vedernikov, deputy chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, is at work in this industrial center of Gorky Oblast. Efforts to eliminate the consequences of the calamity are led by the oblast civil defense headquarters, headed by oblast ispolkom chairman A. Sokolov. Owing to the efforts of emergency repair teams train traffic has resumed. Medical personnel from the oblast and Moscow are struggling to save the wounded. The internal affairs organs have organized strict control over order in the city and protection of material valuables.

Our correspondent, Col V. Zhitarenko, got in touch by telephone with Maj Gen Oleg Sidorovich Komlev, Moscow Military District deputy commander for civil defense, who is located in Arzamas and is currently fulfilling the duties of chief of the operations group for elimination of the consequences of the explosion. Here is what he stated.

"Composite mobile subunits got to work already on Saturday. They operated essentially around the clock, for people remained in the rubble of the residences. For this reason they worked mainly by hand, although we also have special equipment for eliminating rubble. Thus, more than 70 destroyed houses have already been removed, and more than 60 more have been carefully inspected. Many houses that received varying degrees of damage are being repaired.

"Military medical personnel are assisting the victims. The personnel of our subunits are hauling furniture and the personal items of the residents out of the damaged houses. Along with the militia they are maintaining order on the streets of the city.

"On Saturday already Arm Gen K. Kochetov, military district commander, arrived in Arzamas. Immediately the soldiers were assigned their missions of eliminating the consequences of the accident. This fact, I believe, indicates the effectiveness: The subordinates of officers A. Chusin, P. Kushkin, and V. Bulutskiy on Saturday were still many kilometers from Arzamas, and some were carrying out missions of fighting forest fires, but they required only a few hours in order to accomplish long marches here, in order to be included immediately in the work.

"I cannot fail to name those who are selflessly clearing rubble, extracting wounded, and rendering them first aid: captains I. Mitropolskiy and K. Titov, senior lieutenants A. Kirpiy and A. Pavlov, and privates S. Fateyev, V. Rulko, S. Bykov and S. Lazarev. Yes, strictly speaking, all the soldiers are working without sleep or rest.

"The efforts will continue for many more days yet. You see, we not only have to clear away the rubble. A large amount of work is associated also with repairing the buildings that are to be restored. Military personnel will also take part in the construction of new houses, including prefabricated."

9069

Non-Military Formation Finds Purpose in Disaster/Recovery Work

18010447 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
10 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by N. Korchagina: Civil Defense: Using the Best Variation"]

[Text] Georgiy Vasilyevich Shchepetkov became a civilian worker for the Civil Defense unexpectedly. He had served in the army for many years and had been discharged into the reserves from the position of senior instructor at a military academy with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He had to begin a new life and the suggestion was made that he go to Orbita, a factory in the city of Gorkiy

Shchepetkov was fortunate there. His mentors there, General Director L. Kuranov and Civil Defense [GO] Chief of Staff S. Ignatyev, were skillful and enthusiastic people. They resolved all urgent problems in a thoughtful and business-like manner and demanded the same from their subordinates. Under their leadership Georgiy Vasilyevich also began to set up and conduct various measures in civil defense, initially in the third shop and then, six months later, throughout the entire factory.

Shchepetkov tells us, "It is no secret that some workers do not take civil defense seriously. Why? Because they have had only one mission for a long time—to be prepared for a surprise enemy attack. And if there is no attack? After turning it over in our minds, the former director and I decided to develop the factory workers' civil defense skills under realistic conditions. And when a highway near the factory tourist base washed out because of the spring thaw, we raised the alarm for the non-military formation. It was assigned the mission of repairing the road and reinforcing the river bank. The people successfully completed this mission and operated in a cohesive and skillful manner."

Deputy GO Chief of Staff Yu. Spiridonov reminds us, "This was the first exercise that was conducted for the sake of the enterprise. This is the fourth year since then

that Georgiy Vasilyevich has also stipulated that every comprehensive exercise include practical disaster and recovery work in addition to the specific measures defined in the GO plan."

The warriors in the non-military formation laid 450 linear meters of pipe while repairing a main water pipe. They disassembled an open junction and cleared a site for the construction of a new building. One winter when hundreds of people were left without heat these warriors took part in clearing up the after-effects of an accident in Leninskiy Rayon.

After thoroughly studying the technological process in the enterprise and the business activity level of the workers and employees, Georgiy Vasilyevich found the optimum variation for getting the formation involved in special tactical exercises and practical activities. In doing this he developed a special schedule for the workshops, one that took production interests into account.

Shchepetkov was able to prove that the factory should have an accident-rescue group in case of urgent, unforeseen work on holidays and days off. When a team is on duty (as assigned by a schedule) all seven individuals who make up the group do not leave home. And when a water pipe broke on a Sunday evening the commander of the accident-rescue group notified his personnel using a specially developed plan.

The rescuers who arrived at the factory eliminated the problem in an hour. And when called they have also cleared snowdrifts, unloaded urgent loads...

Today Orbita is one of Gorkiy's best civil defense sites. Civil defense training for leaders of major enterprises as well as the oblast's rayon and city leaders is regularly held at its training classroom. The factory does not prepare to receive these regular commissions ahead of time. And, for example, they can always show that any shelter compartment is constantly ready to protect the workers and employees. Stands are up-dated in six special classrooms.

Shchepetkov tells us, "We have very limited GO responsibilities at our headquarters. For example, Yuliy Grigoryevich Spiridonov is responsible for all training. Andrey Dmitriyevich Rozhkov is responsible for maintaining the shelters. Aleksey Mikhaylovich Ananyev is responsible for intelligence, communications and evacuation issues..."

Shchepetkov, along with his assistants, gets the leaders of social organizations involved in resolving various civil defense problems. For example he is inviting the chairman of the local DOSAAF organization, O Yelkin, and the chief of the training point, Hero of the Soviet Union

D. Aristarkhov, to be intermediaries at exercises and take GO tests and normatives. All of them design classes, give lectures, conduct exercises...

Factory GO headquarters workers regularly meet with the secretaries of local party organizations and formation deputy chiefs for political indoctrination and resolve current problems. And no one divides the concerns into "theirs" and "ours".

The factory's Union Committee Chairman A. Shulepov explains, "The GO headquarters takes the initiative in many of our joint ventures. And the fact that we annually hold the review and competition for the best accomplishment of civil defense missions and that the points of the civil defense socialist commitments are evaluated at the same level as production commitments is credited to the headquarters.

Chief of the GO site, A. Ovchinnikov, has led the factory collective for eighteen months. Yet he has already run a comprehensive exercise and has taken part in city training.

Anatoliy Fedorovich says, "You can best characterize a man by his attitude to the task that has been assigned to him. The distinctive traits of a chief of staff, conscientiousness, a heightened awareness of personal responsibility, a love for order... were manifested during preparations for the exercise."

At this exercise workers and employees had to rapidly take shelter at the signal "Air Attack". They could certainly have managed this without repetition, but the people at Orbita decided beforehand to hold workshop training. This was also preceded by a lot of explanatory work. And shortcomings were discovered. Too many people streamed into one of the compartments of the shelter. There were some who did not precisely know their assigned place. But then during the exercise itself even the workers from the most remote workshops were able to take cover in the shelter within the established time.

The GO Headquarters is a real guiding center for the many-thousand man collective. Subunit chiefs of staff meet in it every month to plan subsequent measures, review what they have accomplished and get methodological recommendations and copies of documents. The schedule that Shchepetkov developed to accomplish the civil defense plan, a clear table that visibly shows which service must be involved in what at a specific time, has been of great help to them.

The GO chief of staff has an exacting position. They had just conducted objective exercises and already had to prepare the formation to work as part of a rayon composite mechanized detachment. And it was impossible to put off the trip to the pioneer camp—it had been decided to finish building an anti-radiation shelter there. Yet what about current concerns? A speech on the factory radio, preparations for subsequent exercises... But Georgiy Vasilyevich admits that he loves this work. This means that these troubles are not a burden.

12511

Article Explores Need for 'Disarmament Economics'

PM2308133188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Aug 88 Second Edition p 4

[Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Kireyev article under the rubric "The 19th Party Conference and the Problems of Peace": "Disarmament: Quest for Ways"]

[Text] Ernest Hemingway's foreword to his famous novel "A Farewell to Arms" contains the following lines: "I believe that all who grow rich from war and who help launch it should be shot on the very first day of military operations by trusted representatives of their country's honest citizens whom they are sending to fight."

These words are a painful echo of World War II, in which mankind was embroiled by fascism. Where is the guarantee that the worldwide slaughter will never be repeated? E. Hemingway offers a radical method for solving the problem, which boils down to destroying the merchants of militarism and their bloody business at the same time. But are there any other ways?

The process of disarmament which has begun in our time has raised most urgently the problem of dismantling the productive forces of war and creating not only political and legal but also economic guarantees against the resumption of a large-scale arms race. The USSR was the first of all UN member countries to come up with the proposal to draw up and compare national plans for conversion—the reorientation of the economy's military sector to peaceful purposes—which would constitute an important step along the path toward the strengthening of international trust.

So far not a single country has drawn up such a plan and approved it at the state level; not a single government has officially submitted its program for action in the economic sphere in the event of the start of large-scale disarmament. There are even doubts: Is it not too early to raise this question?

The studies in conversion, which have been carried out mostly in the West, and the initial experience in disarmament testify that it is not too early. The signing of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which surprised many people, proved that under the conditions of the growing dynamics of world development, disarmament does not always lend itself to forecasting. The economy's unpreparedness to switch from a militarized to a nonmilitarized model of development is fraught with serious political and social shocks. Therefore, the majority of research workers agree that the planning for conversion, especially as regards its strategic avenues, must be done in advance and on a strictly scientific basis.

It is not hard to find in history's baggage considerable experience in the planning and implementation of conversion which might be suitable today. The postwar

demilitarization of the economies of the USSR, the United States, a number of West European countries, and Japan proved that it is possible to painlessly dismantle the military sector, hypertrophied during the period of combat operations, and to adapt it to peaceful goals. Some aspects of postwar experience—prompt planning, the establishment of enterprise working groups to study opportunities for their peacetime use, state support measures—are of interest today.

But the experience of the past can be reproduced only to the extent to which past conditions recur or repeat themselves.

Today's conditions are different. A diversified peacetime war economy has been created with thousands of international production and technology links. The high demand for military output, guaranteed by the state, creates quite a few jobs. The fear of job losses through cutbacks in military orders has a far more convincing effect on very large groups of the population in the West than government assurances that their security would be consolidated under conditions of disarmament.

Attempts were made in the United States throughout the sixties and seventies to pass a conversion law which would regulate implementation of conversion at state level. Even though the bills failed to get through Congress due to opposition by the military-industrial lobby, they do contain interesting approaches to the shaping of a state mechanism to ensure conversion.

Facing the threat of dismissal, workers from Britain's transnational "Lucas Aerospace" military-industrial company developed under trade union leadership a plan, which has since become a textbook model, for transfer from military production to the manufacture of civilian output. It was based on what is still the highly promising idea of the "social utility" of alternative commodities and their ability to satisfy man's daily needs. Even though this plan was not adopted by the company management, it became a model for the development of conversion plans by workers from many other military-industrial contractors in West Europe and the United States.

Can a capitalist economy develop without militarization? At this point one recalls the "economic miracle" in Japan, West Germany, and Italy. True enough, when the "miracle" was over they turned again to militarism. It is nevertheless necessary to investigate the extent to which this turnabout was conditioned by substantive laws governing the functioning of modern monopoly capital and the role that was played by attendant circumstances—the "infectious example" of the U.S. military-industrial complex, the "cold war" conditions, the considerations of prestige, the need to have their own "military clout" so as to be able to talk to competitors in a language understandable in those circles, and the desire to back their economic invasion of the "Third World" by a strongarm policy.

In the early sixties the USSR carried out a unilateral reduction of armed forces and the corresponding combat equipment. By virtue of a special party and government resolution, all demobilized servicemen were guaranteed jobs and they were offered advantages in learning new civilian trades. Finally, invaluable experience in conversion is being accumulated at present in the course of implementing the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles: Production capacities are being readapted, missile operating bases are being refitted, and the missiles themselves are being dismantled and destroyed. But every now and then one sees in the press signs of alarm about the future of the military cadres who operate these missiles.

This is already a case of obvious lack of work by scientists. Over the past decades economic science has been dealing primarily with studies of the causes and consequences of the arms race and the militarization process. The onset of a process that is its reverse in form and essence—the process of disarmament and demilitarization—has to a certain extent caught economic science unprepared. While political and legal scientists have long been pondering the prospects of disarmament and have produced numerous elaborations on this topic, specialists in international economics have hitherto failed to offer a comprehensive concept of building an economic model of the world in conditions of disarmament; this was proclaimed by the Soviet Union as one of the most important landmarks in the world economy's restructuring on fair and democratic principles, as a substantial element of an all-embracing system of international security, and finally as the goal of the "disarmament for development" process. We are in fact talking about developing a scientifically substantiated economic mechanism for disarmament.

After all, as it was said at the 19th all-union party conference, the ensuring of states' security will switch increasingly from the sphere of correlation of military potentials to the sphere of political collaboration and strict fulfillment of international pledges, while the colossal growth of scientific and technical potential will be utilized in a more civilized manner for the joint and universally beneficial solution of global economic, ecological, energy, food, medical, and other tasks.

Individual components of such a mechanism have already emerged in a sufficiently clear outline. These are the balanced and proportional reduction of military budgets, the implementation of the conversion of military production, the restriction and banning of the international arms trade, and the transfer of resources saved as a result of disarmament to development purposes.

Under these conditions, it would be legitimate to raise the question of the need to shape a new avenue in Soviet economic science—disarmament economics—whose

purpose would be to explain from positions of new political thinking the positive changes already occurring and likely to occur in production forces.

For many years now, most of the economic problems of disarmament have been discussed at various international forums and primarily in the United Nations. The key role of conversion among them is determined by the fact that it provides the basis for dismantling the war economy and creating a peace economy, and guarantees the adaptation of manufactured output to meet social needs.

It is of course impossible to revive this neglected sphere of economic research with a single stroke, especially in view of the fact that, for many years past, Soviet economists were totally without openly published data about the economy's military sector. Consequently, deliberations about the mechanism for its demilitarization proved to be nothing more than theoretical exercises far removed from reality.

The present course of greater glasnost and openness in defense building on the basis of the introduction of legislative procedure, whereby all departments engaged in military and military-industrial activity would be monitored by the supreme nationwide elected organ of power, cannot fail to make public the military budget and the plans for defense building. It is clear that steps in this sphere must be very well balanced, since we are talking about the country's security.

The study of past experience in conversion could be supplemented by modern experience: the planning and public implementation of conversion at a specific defense enterprise, such as one of those named in the protocol to the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Social security guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution and implemented in the course of conversion would be the best way to combat doubts and misinterpretations.

Public organizations, primarily the AUCCTU and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, could organize a union-wide and maybe even an international competition for ideas about the alternative use of military capacities, combat equipment, and armed forces for civilian purposes, and it could be named after E. Hemingway's universally famous novel.

The beginning of movement along the path of conversion is that much more important now that an initial boost has been given to implementing the military-political program of disarmament outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress materials and the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. If it were to be supplemented by a related economic program of disarmament, this

would bring lofty strategic goals more closely in line with the interests of every individual and would encourage people to take a more active stance in the struggle against the arms race.

By virtue of the global nature of the problem of mankind's survival in the face of military danger, such a program would affect not only national economic structures but also the world economy and international economic relations, revealing to everyone the specific material benefits of universal disarmament and the priority of universal values over the narrow, selfish interests of military monopoly groups.

Housing Construction, Improvements in Transbaykal MD

18010405b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by V. Safonov, USSR People's Control Committee inspector, under "People's Control" rubric: "How to Accelerate House Warmings?: The USSR People's Control Committee Checked What Has Been Done to Resolve the Housing Problem in Transbaykal Military District"]

[Text] This check showed that definite measures are being taken in the district to resolve the housing problem. In the assignment of housing, the role of the public is being raised, glasnost is expanding, and the principle of social fairness is being observed more strictly. During the last 2 years, most families of servicemen received apartments and living conditions were improved for almost 2,000 families.

At the same time, the housing problem remains acute. In the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the number of military personnel with no apartment declined by only 900 families, which is one-third of what was foreseen. As of 1 January of this year, there were about 3,700 such families, of which more than 1,500 live in dormitories and hotels and an equal number live in private apartments. Two-thirds of servicemen without apartments have been waiting less than 1 year for housing, one in ten up to 2 years, and one in seven up to 3 years or longer. More than 1,000 families are in need of improved housing conditions.

The most unfavorable situation with respect to the provision of housing developed in the air force units. Maj V. Sherstnev and Capt V. Bogaychuk, who served many years in the army, are living in their offices. In some inhabited localities, the families of officers are living in broken-down and uncomfortable houses built in the 1930s.

Over a number of years, as the analysis shows, inadequate attention was paid to the search for vigorous measures in the district. In addition, even the foreseen

planning targets for the introduction of housing were not fulfilled in many cases. In 1986, for example, the overall fulfillment of the plan for construction was only 83.7 percent.

According to reports, last year's plan for the introduction of housing was fulfilled 100.4 percent. But two apartment houses were accepted essentially unfinished. Thus, construction, sanitary engineering and finishing work did not continue for even a single day after the 75-apartment house in Chita was put into operation on 30 December 1987. In the other, a 60-apartment house at one of the garrisons, unfinished work and defects were eliminated by February.

The delayed reconstruction and development of a production base are having a negative impact on the deadlines and quantity of housing construction. The capacities of industrial enterprises are not being fully utilized. Thus, at the construction combine where V. Kozin is director, the production of components of large-panel housing was only 60 percent of the plan in the last two years. As a result, construction projects in the district received about 10 units of dwelling houses too few. And this is some 750 apartments. The losses of working time in this enterprise last year because of violations of technological and production discipline and shortcomings in the provision of material resources exceeded the level of the previous year by a factor of 1.3. The losses from substandard production amounted to about 160,000 rubles and there was an excessive consumption of 1,300 tons of cement and 737 tons of metal.

The collective supervised by Maj A. Vinogradov is working unsatisfactorily. They have expended about 1.2 million rubles for reconstruction here during the last 7 years. And what was the yield? Last year the plans for the production of brick and keramzit [clay concrete fill] were underfulfilled by one-fourth. And the quality of output leaves something to be desired: almost 12 percent of the brick is defective.

An important reserve in the resolution of the housing problem is an efficient and cautious attitude toward what exists. The slow transfer of housing to the balance of the local soviets and the shortage of manpower and resources allocated to the agencies operating apartments complicate the repair of housing. It is no accident that the plan for the major repair of dwelling houses for the last 2 years has been fulfilled only by half. In this way, the available housing is aging unjustifiably rapidly and is becoming unusable.

To a considerable degree, the slow reduction of the number of families of servicemen without apartments is also the result of the fact that from year to year some ispolkoms of local soviets are not fulfilling the established plans for the allocation of housing to the needs of the district and are not transferring persons who have

lost their connection to the army out of military towns. In 1986-1987, only 37 such families were transferred out, whereas they number about 1,500 in the district.

It is especially important in the existing situation to observe strictly the principle of social fairness in the assignment not only of each apartment but also of each square meter of housing space.

Meanwhile, some unit commanders and chiefs of garrisons and rayon apartment management units do not always follow this rule. And sometimes they take the path of violations, taking advantage of the absence of control, and permit deviations from housing legislation and various liberties. "Overall" this is reflected in the following facts: more than 500 apartments in the district were occupied without orders and 250 apartments without decisions of housing commissions. Many apartments were occupied by persons having no connection to the armed forces. About 1,500 square meters of housing space were utilized as offices and dormitories and more than 80 apartments were not occupied over a long time.

One must be especially intolerant toward such facts and place strict disciplinary and party demands on culprits. The main conclusion is that the housing problem in Transbaykal Military District requires the daily attention of the command, political organizers and construction and lodging authorities. In short, more energetic measures. Only in this way is it possible to resolve the housing problem in the district.

9746

Illegal Transfer of Chemical Materiel to Civilian Economy

1801040Sc Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Ladin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under "Following up on Letters" rubric: "Under the Appearance of Initiative"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Central Asian Military District—Maj N. Stokov, former director of a chemical materiel depot, sent to the editor's office a letter, having attached to it a decree of the Alma-Ata garrison procurator's office on the suspension of the criminal charge against him.

"I appealed to all instances, party as well as administrative," he writes. "Everywhere I tried to show that my actions need to be regarded as an initiative.... I think that they removed me from my position illegally...."

It is well known that there is much in military units that can be used in the national economy after being written off. Indeed, why should property be wasted? Meanwhile, not everywhere do they manage such property efficiently. In some places, they simply destroy it or at best treat it as scrap material.

In his letter, Major Stokov stated: "...To resolve the tasks set for the unit, I turned over to civilian authorities written-off chemical materiel, which, according to the instruction, must be destroyed. It cannot be used for military purposes but it could find an application in production. In exchange, I received building materials...."

In this way, they obtained cement, paint, reinforced concrete and tubing. All of this, in the words of Stokov, went for the construction of storehouses, the repair of the heating duct and the sewage system, the building of a refuelling station, and other vital needs of the unit.

Initially the garrison procurator's office in the persons of Capt of Justice A. Pustovalov and Sr Lt of Justice A. Lugovskiy believed these words. But soon the chief of the district financial service Col I. Shapran reported quite different facts to the procurator's office. The auditors investigated the chemical materiel that Stokov turned over to the Alma-Ata Oblast administration "Med-tekhnika," a number of enterprises and the Kapchagay Repair and Construction Administration and became convinced that prior to the exchange it had not been used by anyone and was often in sealed boxes.

In due course, Stokov presented information that this was written-off materiel given to him from the units. But it was verified that these documents were "fake." The officer G. Krivtsun, director of the chemical service of the Alma-Ata Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, Lt Col V. Paramonov, directorate of the district chemical service of the air force, and Maj A. Yukhimchuk, head of one of the units, prepared the documents to save their colleague.

All of these facts forced the procurator's office of the Alma-Ata garrison to continue the investigation. To be sure, Lt of Justice V. Yefimenko soon had to check out everything again....

It turned out that Stokov loved to give gifts. Once he exchanged two automobile radio-tape recorders. He put one in his own vehicle and gave the other to the officer of the superior directorate. A diesel electric generator worth about 1,000 rubles, a gift from Major Stokov, was discovered at the recreation base of one civilian organization. They say that at a local porcelain plant he was even able to order vases with portraits of people celebrating an anniversary of some other festivity. Is this not the reason why those who were supposed to control him were the first to rush to his aid when a large shortage was discovered in the storage departments? The ticklish situation became known to all, all the way up to Maj Gen V. Chucharin, chief of the district chemical forces.

In the chemical service, they immediately wrote out several orders for a large quantity of different minor and major materiel. Here you are, Nikolay Borisovich Stokov, they were saying, take all of this and use it. He, of

course, was glad to oblige and signed the orders. But those who were supposed to pretend to take all of this from Stokov refused to make a deal with their conscience. The financial service had no difficulty discovering this.

The main organizer of this "initiative," Lt Col V. Ryabchenko from the district chemical service, and his superiors could not fail to know that the exchange operations being carried out by Stokov with civilian organizations are illegal. In essence, he had nothing to exchange. For what is in storage is intended for the supply of the troops and for the support of their combat readiness. At the end of a set time, of course, some things are withdrawn. But written-off material values can be realized only through the district's material stocks department with the approval of its director and not at the will of Major Stokov.

Thus, there was no reason to include him among innovators. He not only allowed himself to discount the demands of legal norms but he did not even try to understand where he is acting correctly and where he is trampling on the existing order.

I believe that Major Stokov decided on this, if I may say so, "initiative" because of the unusual mismanagement prevailing in the chemical materiel warehouses. Nor had substantial changes taken place there at the time of my arrival. There are imposing stacks of boxes with protection means in open areas, some of which are not even covered by tarpaulins. And certainly many boxes have already been lying in the open for years.

They told me that the higher superiors know about the warehousing difficulties. That there are not enough storage areas, means of mechanization and working hands—the warehouse is loaded to three times capacity and the construction of access roads has been delayed. The unloading of the incoming cars also requires a great deal of manpower and time. So-called "heating points" in the industrial grounds have long since been turned into garbage dumps.

In short, Lt Col V. Savelyev, the new warehousing director, encountered management difficulties. It is enough to say that there is no dependable protection at the warehouse and it is not difficult to get in the area. Equipment is still being stolen. And today one item or another is in short supply in the warehouse.

In short, the punishment of Major Stokov in a disciplinary as well as party sense was fully deserved. For some reason, however, the actions of those who indulged the violations and sometimes made their own personal contribution to the squandering of property have remained outside the field of vision of command and party organizations. It seems to me that it would truly be unjust to close our eyes to this.

9746

Proposal for Civilian Transport in Training Convoys

18010405a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 May 88 p 2

[Article by M. Sabanov: "Mutual Advantage"]

[Text] Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR—Periodically, that is, on a precise schedule, military columns with more than 20 powerful unladen "Ural's" pass through our village. We already know that drivers going through final training are completing a trip of many kilometers. It is not difficult to calculate how much gasoline is consumed in the process. It is consumed, of course, but not in vain: the better the training of drivers, the greater is the army's fighting capability. But I believe that much more benefit for the army as well as for the national economy can be derived from these long trips.

It is no secret for anyone that many enterprises, especially small ones, with a poor repair base are experiencing serious transport difficulties. In addition, their already rather small motor vehicle pool is under a starvation fuel ration. Is it not possible to organize things so that the military unit preparing to carry out such a training trip of many kilometers would enter into an agreement with civilian organizations and enterprises on the transport of incidental loads? And perhaps even the route can be planned taking into account supply points?

Such an approach could help us resolve many economic problems. And the money earned in this way would not harm the military unit either. A new source of revenue would appear for the provision of services and amenities in officer housing, the improvement of the nourishment of soldiers, and the resolution of other tasks in everyday social and cultural life. And still another very important result of such interaction is that of the increasing practical ties between the army and the people.

9746

Seminar for Officer Candidates in Armenia
18010426b Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
16 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by S. Makaryan, KOMSOMOLETS stringer:
"An Exam for Commanders"]

[Text] In the aim of high-quality recruitment, training and sending of applicants to the superior military schools of the nation, the Central Committee of the Armenian Komsomol, the Armenian Ministry of Education, the Armenian Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, DOSAAF and the Armenian Military Commissariat conducted in Yerevan a republic review-seminar of candidates being admitted to the superior military institutions of learning of the nation.

The buses began arriving at the military unit early in the morning. Around 300 juveniles from Aparan, Kirovakan, Stepanavan and Leninakan—from all the towns and rayons of the republic—began assembling in the Yerevan suburb. The average age of the fellows was 16-17 years. Many of them immediately after the assemblies will return to their schools, return to their desks and will take their graduating exams.

The older young men have been appointed deputy platoon commanders, as they say in the army, junior commanders. They were all divided into two companies and six platoons, some 300 candidates of young graduates who are to enter the nation's superior military schools.

For exactly 5 days their lives will follow army laws, almost like real army life. In the morning is reveille and in the evening taps. The word of the commander is law. And, of course, discipline. Their first exam of tenacity awaits them. Have they made a mistake? Have they chosen the wrong path? It is precisely these questions that the young fellows must answer. And they themselves must provide the answer, they must weigh everything, draw conclusions and finally each must decide whether he has the right and can really become a true officer. Can he be a Soviet officer, a true commander, a simple courageous man.

"I have decided to enter the Poltava Higher Military Antiaircraft Missile School," said Grisha Ulikhanov from Kirovakan. "My brother is an officer in the construction engineer troops. Upon his advice, I have also decided to become a military man, a defender of the motherland. In my opinion, this is a real man's profession."

Our conversation was interrupted. There came the command: "Fall in!" And a minute later on the drill field, a precise formation of two columns had formed up.

The opening ceremony of the republic assembly-seminar was held on the second day after the arrival of the applicants. Even in a day it had been possible to some

degree to teach the fellows army commands, marching, saluting and the carrying out of drill exercises in columns. The most difficult thing, as the fellows said themselves, was to learn to march in formation and keep step. A formation marches by and from the side you can see two legs and one figure.

Now the time had come for the opening ceremony of the assemblies. The military applicants were greeted by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Armenian Komsomol G. Akopyan and the Hero of the Soviet Union, Maj Gen (Ret) A. Amatuni. Giving a demonstration program were school children from the Ordzhonikidzevskiy, Leninskiy and Sovetskiy Rayons of the city of Yerevan, the Young Border Troop Club and the Gaydarov October Club. But probably the most interesting was the performance by young men and women in sailor's vests, camouflage cloaks and blue berets. The procedures of hand-to-hand combat were demonstrated by members of the Young Assault Troop Club under the SPTU [secondary vocational-technical school] No. 26 of the city of Yerevan. For almost a year now this club has existed under the leadership of Levon Gevorgyan and it is already familiar to many residents of Yerevan for its demonstration performances in the sports parades of the capital. In the conclusion of the opening ceremony of the assembly-seminar, platoons of future officer candidates marched by the rostrum in ordered columns.

Last year of the applicants sent to the higher military schools from our republic, only 23 percent were admitted. This figure speaks for itself. Here a role was played by a low level of physical preparedness and poor general educational knowledge. But the number-one problem still is, unfortunately, the level of mastery of Russian. And among the participants of the assembly are young men who are unable to express their elementary ideas in Russian and answer questions completely.

I was able to meet with Karen Gevorgyan and Araik Martirosyan, workers from the Komsomol Central Committee responsible for the assemblies in the soldier club, in a group of the young men in conversation. The fellows were asking various questions. They were interested in literally everything. "How do you become a general?" "Who will take the exams and where?" "Is it possible to transfer from one school to another?" The conversation could have gone on for a long time. But time also follows army laws. And according to the schedule it was time for dinner.

It was a cafeteria in the soldier mess. They had their meal and then picked up after themselves. There were six men at a table. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that our applicants received an officer ration. Just like future officer candidates.

But here there were also complaints.

"I have thought it over and want to go home, my body doesn't stand the food here," complained a young man from Kirovakan. Unfortunately, such misfits are at times encountered at the assemblies. And in the place of this young fellow another more worthy applicant could have come. Here the fault lies with the local military commissariats who do not pay proper attention to the selection of candidates for the military schools. There were also those who arrived at the assemblies a day late or even two. "My military commissariat did not send me on time," said an applicant from Stepanavan in justification. But it must not be forgotten that all this lack of organization is an infraction of discipline. And in the army this is tantamount to an infraction of the law. "So you are late, now to the detail," said Karen Gevorkyan in an angry voice.

The evenings were spent watching training films and at concerts. A dance ensemble from the railroad workers club paid a visit.

A meeting of deputy platoon commanders was called. There was also an instruction session at the firing range. Many did not make their first shots and there was miss after miss. But one must learn to shoot. Sr Lt A. Rasulov, the deputy commander for political affairs at the assemblies, was able to effectively correct the automatic weapons and demonstrate how to aim. And we were surprised why there were so few shooters always at our ranges. From the ten or so fellows questioned, just two of them had fired at a range recently. And hence the results.

The exercises in Russian, mathematics and physics were conducted in individual groups in various "classrooms" including in the club, the library and the barracks. To study, to prepare for the exams with all seriousness and to go through the work again—this was the aim of the daily exercises on the subjects of the entrance exams for the applicants.

Yes, there were difficulties at the assemblies. Particularly for yesterday's school child. But a choice is a choice. The officer profession is a difficult one. As they say, it is heroic and for real men. And those who have seriously decided to devote themselves to serving the motherland at these assemblies again took an exam for tenacity and demonstrated to themselves that they had not been wrong.

The command was given "Fall in on the drill field!" The passing of the standards of GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] and physical training are also an exam. A competitive exam. "To the starting line! Attention! March!" In the distance were the future officers.

DOSA AF, Komsomol Excluded From Predraft Training in Sovetskaya Gavan

18010426c Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
12 Jun 88 p 1

[Article by St. Tiro, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent from Sovetskaya Gavan in Khabarovsk Kray: "The Gorkom on the Sidelines"]

[Text] Sovetskaya Gavan is a handsome town lying on tall hills along the shore of the Tatar Strait.

The town is growing and is widening its limits. It is expected that by the year 2000 here there will be at least 200,000 persons. New industrial enterprises, schools and social-service facilities are being built.

But, how at present are they training inductees for entering military service and what part are the Komsomol and DOSAAF committees taking in this? I turned with this question to the section chief of the Sovetskaya Gavan City Military Commissariat, Capt Ye. Fokin.

Yevgeniy Nikolayevich [Fokin], taking a labored breath, replied:

"It is only a question of basic military training for the student youth in the general education schools and the SPTU [secondary vocational-technical school] and which is carried out by the regular military instructors. Things are not going well in training specialists for the Armed Forces. Last year, for instance, we were only able to send two young men to the Khabarovsk DOSAAF Naval School. And even one of these was not admitted."

The Komsomol and DOSAAF gorkoms are virtually not involved in preparing young men for active military service. The poor work of the social organizations with the youth can be judged from just the following fact. Last year, we were unable to induct over 30 young men into active military service because of various criminal records. The army has thus been deprived of an entire platoon.

In a word, it is a far from happy picture. And it is surprising. Certainly in terms of the results of last year, Khabarovsk Kray in the area of preparing youth for army service held, as is known, one of the leading places.

I took a look at the personal files of young men who under all sorts of pretexts had avoided military service. The youngest men, as was explained to me at the city military commissariat, are nowhere to be found. For example, Eduard Panchenko. He has been avoiding army induction since 1985. He is unemployed, drinks, is a hooligan and has a criminal record.

Sergey Kazantsev differs little from him. He was convicted twice. He drinks and is registered with the drug outpatient clinic....

But there was a time when these fellows were doing not badly in secondary school and were involved in sports.... Hence, at some stage the pedagogues and teachers lost sight of them and were unable to instill in the young men a feeling of social responsibility for carrying out the honorary constitutional duty of the Soviet citizens.

Of course, there are not many such fellows in the town and Sovetsko-Gavanskiy Rayon. But their "bumpy" civil and moral maturing shows serious omissions in the military patriotic indoctrination of the youth. The rare discussion at the Komsomol and DOSAAF committees of the problems related to the indoctrination of young people and the preparing of young men for military service still does not bespeak the absence of such. And there are many of them.

For example, take the physical plant for basic military training. The town has 11 general education schools and SPTU. But only 6 of them have obstacle courses. In the schools there are just four shooting ranges. Sovetskaya Gavan has only one swimming pool.

Hence need one be surprised that in inspection drills at the city military commissariat many inductees demonstrate poor knowledge of the principles of military affairs. Only one out of every three young men can meet the standards of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense Complex] in shooting.

The training level of the military instructors (they are also the chairmen of the DOSAAF committees in the schools and SPTU) is still low. Only eight military instructors have a higher education. And the Khabarovsk State Pedagogical Institute for several years now has had a faculty which trains specialists with a higher military pedagogical education.

...As was already pointed out, the city military commissariat held a discussion of the problems of preparing the youth for military service. I discussed this question at the Komsomol and DOSAAF gorkoms.

"The fact that the percentage of Komsomol members among the inductees is dropping does not alarm us," said the secretary of the Komsomol gorkom, Yuriy Lomov. "We have now made admission to the Komsomol ranks stricter. We are not dragging fellows by the ears into the Komsomol. As they say, better less but better. We, of course, have thus not been able to handle the construction of the town shooting range and map range...."

I recalled a recent city DOSAAF report-election conference. At it Lomov stated that the Komsomol members by their own hands in 2 years would build the map range and the town shooting range. This youth initiative was also supported in the party gorkom. Enough time has passed but nothing has been done.

The chairman of the DOSAAF gorkom, L. Tislenko, informed me:

"We have been eliminated from work with inductees...."

"How is that?"

The chairman of the DOSAAF gorkom pulled out a file with documents. It turned out that by a decision of the gorispolkom of 15 March 1988, a city induction commission had been set up. The town military commandant G. Lesnichiyy had been appointed commission chairman and its membership was given. The commission did not include representatives of the DOSAAF gorkom, the town war veterans council and certain other public organizations.

But how could this serve as pretext for the DOSAAF gorkom to remove itself from work with the induction youth? Of course, it could not. But Tislenko had viewed the situation as if it could.

It was a strange situation. And is this not the reason that many problems in preparing inductees for military service have still remained unsolved? No, the DOSAAF gorkom should not overlook the future soldiers. It is essential that the workers of the DOSAAF gorkom visit the inductees at enterprises and schools as well as the induction office in order to better know the youth of today and their problems.

10272

Kirghiz Party CC Discusses Military-Patriotic Education

*18010426a Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 11 May 88 p 1*

[Unattributed Article: "At the Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party"]

[Text] The Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party has discussed the question of carrying out the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 5 February 1988 "On the Results of the All-Union Assembly of Young Reserve Personnel." The adopted decree pointed out that young men discharged into the reserves are taking an energetic part in the sociopolitical life of the labor collectives. The most active are proving to be the young men who carried out their international duty in Afghanistan. The establishing of councils, clubs and associations of internationalist soldiers has become the basic form of involving the reserve personnel in military-patriotic work. There has been good work experience for such councils and associations in the cities of Frunze, Osha, Issyk-Kul Oblast, Kantaskiy and Sokulukskiy Rayons. The activities of the Future Soldier Military Patriotic Club in Ak-Suyskiy Rayon and the Motherland Military Patriotic Association based at the garrison officers club in the city of Frunze have made it possible to involve over 200 reserve personnel in active work.

At the same time in a whole series of rayons and towns the mass defense measures are being carried out on a low organizational and ideological level, they are irregular and are usually timed to jubilee dates. There have been shortcomings in realizing the benefits and advantages set by the state for the internationalist soldiers.

It has been recommended that the party and soviet bodies, the trade union, Komsomol and other public organizations support in every possible way the development of the young soldiers' activities in military patriotic work among the youth and focus their efforts on participating in carrying out specific tasks. It has been proposed that the Kirghiz Ministry of Education, the Kirghiz State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, the Kirghiz Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, the Kirghiz Military Commissariat and the Central Committee of the Kirghiz Komsomol examine the opportunities for more widely involving the young reserve personnel who have carried out their international duty in the work in institutions of learning, the military-sports health camps as leaders of basic military training.

The party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms must improve the coordination of activities by all departments and organizations involved in military patriotic and mass defense work and see to it that the required organizational and material prerequisites are established for carrying this work out.

The Military Commissariat, the Kirghiz State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports, the DOSAAF Central Committee and Kirghizsovprom [Kirghiz Trade Union Council] must provide aid to the republic Komsomol in preparing and conducting in May 1988 a republic assembly of young reserve personnel on the questions of further activating their involvement in the military patriotic indoctrination of the youth and juveniles at their place of employment, study or residence.

The Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party drew the attention of the party, soviet, state, trade union and Komsomol bodies to the inadmissibility of instances of a formal, indifferent attitude toward the former internationalist soldiers who sustained wounds and were maimed or to the families and memory of deceased personnel. It is essential unconditionally to realize the benefits and advantages set for them by the state. The initiative has been approved of the republic Komsomol to open an account at the Kirghiz Division of the USSR State Bank for collecting funds for building a memorial in the city of Frunze to the men who perished in carrying out their international duty.

It was proposed that the editorial staffs of the republic and local newspapers, television and radio broadcasting more widely take up the experience of the joint work being carried out by the Komsomol, soviet, state, the public organizations, the creative unions and the troop units in the area of the military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the coming generation.

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Excerpt from Volkogonov Book Discusses Stalin's Role in Beginning of War

18010438 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jun 88 p 3

[Excerpt from book, "Triumph and Tragedy," by Dmi-triy Volkogonov: "On the Eve of War..."; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] We invite the reader's attention to this excerpt from a book on Stalin by Colonel General D. Volkogonov, "Triumph and Tragedy," in which he discusses the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

The canopy of the shortest night covered the capital. Working Moscow slept uneasily. Only in some places—in the buildings of the People's Commissariat, the General Staff building, the huge frame in Lubyanka—did weak patches of light penetrate the shaded windows. Like always the Politburo, the people's commissars and the military leadership kept vigil. After several conferences with the military, I. V. Stalin left for his dacha earlier than usual, somewhere around two o'clock at night. Prior to this he had once again discussed the situation on the border with Molotov. The situation was threatening; nonetheless, both were hoping that the worst would not come to pass.

In the last two months on the eve of war, a great deal of information, many communications and signals on Germany's direct preparations for an attack on the USSR had reached Stalin. The warnings came through intelligence lines, from diplomats and friends of the Soviet Union. When at last the disjointed bits of information were lined up in a threatening sequence, Stalin conferred with Molotov, then decided to check Berlin's reaction to these facts. It was decided to prepare a TASS statement of veiled reproach with respect to Germany's observation of the pact terms as a means of probing. On June 14th the statement, which in fact called upon Germany to enter into new negotiations on questions of bilateral relations, was published.

On the same day Hitler, already aware of the statement, conducted a final conference with his army group and army commanders regarding practical implementation of the Barbarossa plan. It was reported to Hitler that on May 22d, Germany's railroads had shifted to an accelerated transportation schedule, that troop concentrations would be completed on June 19th, that major, first-strike air force units were stationed at airfields west of the Wisla and that, towards evening of the 21st, they would redeploy to airfields in the vicinity of the USSR border in flights of single aircraft at low altitude... After checking out preparedness for the attack and clarifying the details, only one minor change was introduced into the plan: the time at which the attack would begin was shifted from 3:30 to 3:00 on the 22d of June.

Stalin and Molotov thought that if Berlin would agree to negotiations they would be able to delay the Germans a month, month-and-a-half, and that this would in fact

remove the question of attack that year. Stalin had reason to believe that Hitler would not decide to initiate a war at the end of the summer, much less in fall. This would mean that the USSR would gain another seven-ten months to prepare the country for a repulse. In the document TASS had stated in peacemaking fashion that "Germany was observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as unswervingly as the Soviet Union. In view of this, it is the opinion in Soviet circles that rumors of Germany's intention to break the pact and carry out an attack against the USSR have no grounds whatsoever..." Later, after the war, an official tried to explain the appearance of this strange "statement," presenting it as an ordinary "diplomatic probing." Let us accept this as such—a probing of a potential enemy. But millions of Soviet people, the entire army and navy, read the statement as well! If such a probing was necessary, why would we not use official channels to apprise the leadership of the military districts on the border?

In Moscow they awaited Berlin's reaction. But the coded telegram messages arriving from the Soviet Embassy stated that official circles were completely evading any response to the statement. A note was sent regarding a violation of state borders by a Luftwaffe aircraft. Berlin had not reacted. The Soviet People's Commissar then invited the German ambassador to explain Berlin's orientation towards the questions raised by the TASS statement. At the same time the Soviet ambassador tried to get an audience with Ribbentrop in the German capital. In vain! The choice had been made in Berlin. Day "X" had arrived. Neither Stalin nor Molotov, attempting in vain during these last days before the terrible invasion to hear from Berlin that this was a "misunderstanding," knew that on the evening prior to the invasion, Hitler had written a secret letter to Mussolini "on plans to liquidate Russia." Here is an excerpt from the letter:

"Duce!

I am writing you this letter at the very moment when, after months of meditation and endless, nervous waiting, I have made the most difficult decision of my life... As far as the struggle in the East is concerned, Duce, this will definitely be severe. But I do not doubt for a second that it will be a major success. Even if I were forced by the end of this year to leave 60 or 70 divisions in Russia, all the same that would be only a portion of the forces which I must now constantly maintain on the eastern border.

Having arrived at this decision, I feel free again inside..."

The door to war opened more and more as the time grew nearer. By the time the invasion began it was wide open—from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. It was already impossible to shut it closed but Stalin was relying up until the last moment on his sagacity and prophecy. One month prior to the outbreak of war he had said to a small circle:

"Possibly in May of next year a conflict will become unavoidable."

Relying on his certainty that he would succeed in postponing the war, Stalin nonetheless devoted the lion's share of his time to military issues during the final months. In accordance with a special directive issued by the General Staff after convening with Stalin, movement of major units was begun from the interior military districts to those adjoining the border (16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d armies). In accordance with a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) dated 21 June 1941, most of these units would be used to comprise a reserve group of the main command. But it was already too late.

Considering the dangerously explosive situation, Stalin approved early release of the military academies. The young commanders and political officers received their promotions and went immediately, without leave, to troop units which were far from up to strength. After a long period of hesitation Stalin decided to undertake another large-scale action—he called up about 800,000 reservists. This brought 21 divisions in the border districts up to strength. Unfortunately, these steps were taken only two-three weeks prior to the outbreak of war...

By order of the People's Commissar for Defense of 19 June, troop units were ordered to camouflage airfields, depots, bases, warehouses, and concentrations of aircraft on airfields. But the order was just beginning to be carried out...just as army field command posts were beginning to move out—on the very eve of the attack. The necessary measures were late. But even here Stalin was moving very reluctantly, often stressing an idea he was obsessed with: "these steps may provoke the German forces." At times Timoshenko and Zhukov had to report back to him two and three times, obtaining approval for measures of an operational nature. Agreeing with his military leaders, Stalin was hoping somewhere in the depths of his soul, even believing, that Hitler would not decide to wage war on two fronts. Adhering to obvious, single-dimensional logic, Stalin was deeply mistaken. It was as if he was thinking that, since he was not prepared for war, they could not stick him with it. Stalin had sensed we were not prepared when, after the 18th Party Conference, he heard special reports from several people's commissars on the state of rearmament of the army. When he was told, for example, that in order to bring new large-scale armor units up to strength it would require 12,500 medium and heavy tanks, 43,000 tractors and 300,000 vehicles, he did not believe it. The same was true of aviation assets. As with the tanks, numbers of aircraft amounted to not more than 10-20 percent...

The nature of the errors lay not simply in inaccurate calculations, unjustified predictions and the malicious will of the aggressor. All of that was true. The main reason for the miscalculations, errors and unforgivable blunders was rooted in dictatorial, autocratic power. Many decisions with far-reaching consequences were

made personally by him alone. It would be difficult to blame the people's commissars or the Main Military Council when the status of "wise and infallible leader" had already been established. Any basic disagreement with one concept or another or point of view could be quickly regarded as "lack of understanding," "opposition," or "political immaturity," with all the consequences flowing therefrom. Still fresh in everyone's memory were the political processes to which all were subject: position taken in the signing of the Brest Peace; familiarity, let us say, with Peterson, the Kremlin commandant and—consequently—with preparation for the "palace revolt"; a meeting abroad with some official representative might be taken as "a transfer of espionage information," etc. The intimidation people felt, affirmation of the genius stereotype in one individual alone, and the absolute necessity for decisions to be approved by Stalin narrowed and robbed of vitality the opportunities for dialectical analysis of the actual situation, for seeking realistic alternatives and making genuinely collective decisions. By virtue of his autocratic power and the peremptory nature of his conclusions, the General Secretary blocked channels for obtaining objective information, original ideas and unconventional decisions. As a rule, he was told exactly what he wanted to hear. People often attempted to guess his wishes.

A cult of harmonious views forms the roots of one of the deepest sources of a whole series of miscalculations which had their effect on the entire course of the war, especially on its beginning.

How was this manifest?

The German-Soviet treaty on friendship and USSR-Germany borders concluded on 28 September 1939 was, in our opinion, a great political miscalculation. After signing the Non-Aggression Pact one month earlier, apparently as a necessary measure, we should have stopped. Resolutions of the Komintern, decisions of the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), the party orientation delivered to the Soviet people—all of these said that fascism was the most dangerous order of world imperialism, a regime of terrorist dictatorship and militarism. The world-view tenets of the Soviet people showed fascism to be the embodiment of the class struggle in concentrated form. Now, suddenly—"friendship" with fascism?!

It is difficult to explain how Stalin and Molotov could be lowered into such a vindication of fascism. One can understand a striving to reinforce the effect of the Non-Aggression Pact through trade agreements, fiscal ties, economic relations, etc. But to factually disavow all our preceding anti-fascist ideological precepts—this was too much! Personally participating in negotiations with Ribbentrop, Stalin tried to exclude any expression of our attitude towards Germany's plans of annexation. And an entire series of statements by Molotov simply introduced turmoil into the consciousness of the Soviet people and our friends abroad. For example, how could one assess

this assertion by Molotov sanctioned by Stalin: "It is not only senseless, but criminal as well to wage a war for the 'destruction of Hitlerism,' hidden under the counterfeit banner of the struggle for 'democracy'..."

This kind of erroneous political and ideological re-orientation confused people and changed the shape of class precepts in social and individual consciousness. Many comrades in the Komintern failed to understand the reasons behind such a swift ideological evolution. Again, the sharp points of arrows of criticism were directed not at fascism, but at social democrats as "accomplices of militarism." Is it by chance that following ratification of the Non-Agression Pact Hitler announced in the Reichstag: "The pact was ratified in Berlin and in Moscow. He, Hitler, can endorse every word uttered by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov in this regard."

In view of Stalin's exceptionally suspicious nature, the events in Berlin did not put many on their guard. The Germans refused to sign the so-called "Economic Agreement" to cover a long period, for example, limiting it to a framework extending until 1942 (even though it was signed in January 1941!). It was reported to Stalin that, on the eve of concluding the treaty concerning the Soviet-German border, official German representatives compromised willingly, did not "argue over every little paragraph."

In Moscow people noted joyfully (instead of being put on their guard) that "the treaty concerning the border was drawn up in an extremely short period of time, something not seen in international practice." The thought had to occur to Stalin and other responsible officials that the Germans were not devoting their usual attention to the border because for them the borders were temporary. Stalin lacked the genuine statesmanlike wisdom to assess accurately these and other similar facts. He had already become a prisoner of his own erroneous calculations with regard to timing of the attack.

The error of Stalin and Molotov is evident. The understandable striving to protect oneself at any cost from the scourge of war was accompanied by a fundamental ideological concession which brought turmoil not only into the minds of our friends abroad. Propagandists in the country and in the army were placed in an extremely difficult position. When Mekhlis was with Stalin on the eve of the treaty-signing and heard the report of the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on political work in the troop units, he interrupted:

"Do not tease the Germans..."

Then he clarified his comment: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA often writes about fascists and fascism. The atmosphere changes. Hitler should not form the impression that we are doing nothing except preparing to go to war with him."

Presently it is difficult to establish at whose initiative the concept of "friendship" was to be "built in" to the Soviet-German treaty. If this was done by the Soviet side, then at best it expresses profound political thoughtlessness. If by the German side—a finely calculated diversion in the social consciousness of an entire people. In either case Stalin was not up to the situation. Although Molotov would later say that Stalin "figured out the insidious plans of Hitlerism in time," it is difficult to believe.

Another major miscalculation—this one in the operational-strategic sphere—is related to the adoption of the plan for the country's defense and for mobilization deployment of its armed forces. In the fall of 1939, soon after the treaty on friendship and the German border was concluded, Stalin issued a personal directive and the General Staff set about drawing up documentation under the leadership of B. M. Shaposhnikov. The main architect was Major General A. M. Vasilevskiy, who would later become a celebrated marshal. His main concept consisted of being ready to wage war on two fronts—in Europe against Germany and its allies, and in the Far East. It was assumed that "the Western theater of military operations would be the main theater." It was predicted that the enemy could concentrate his main forces along Western and North-Western operational axes of advance. Examining the plan, the People's Commissar did not approve it, considering that our potential actions for defeating the enemy were insufficiently decisive.

By August 1940 the defense plan had been reexamined. Now in charge of its preparation was the new Chief of the General Staff, K. A. Meretskov (working under whom, as before, was A. M. Vasilevskiy). He also believed it would be advisable to concentrate our army's main forces on the Western front, keeping in mind the enemy's potential concentration of forces in the Brest area. On October 5th they presented Stalin with the defense plan. Stalin listened attentively to the People's Commissar and to the Chief of the General Staff, several times went up to the map, fell silent a long period of time, walked alongside the table. Finally he said:

"I do not understand the provision of the General Staff to concentrate forces on the Western front. If you say that Hitler is trying to inflict the main strike along the shortest route to Moscow... I think, however, the Germans consider the bread of the Ukraine, the coal of the Donbass especially significant. Now that Hitler has established himself in the Balkans, it is all the more likely that he will prepare the main strike along the South-West axis. I ask the General Staff to think it over some more and report back to me with a plan in ten days..."

At the same time that the General Staff was reworking the plan according to Stalin's directive, they were also preparing a conceptual document: "Considerations on the Fundamentals of Strategic Deployment of the Armed

Forces in the West and East for 1940-1941." The following were proposed as doctrinal tasks: to employ a persistent defense on the border based on field fortifications, thereby preventing enemy incursion onto our territory; to gain time for completion of mobilization, then repulse the enemy attack with a powerful counterstrike, shifting combat operations to his territory. It was assumed that the major forces would enter combat action no sooner than in two weeks time. However, neither the "Considerations" nor the "Plan" under preparation devoted sufficient attention to a strategic defensive operation. Provisions and parameters were not determined for it. The possibility of major enemy forces penetrating to a great depth was factually excluded. When such a variant was used during a strategic exercise, Stalin noted with venom:

"Why cultivate a disposition of withdrawal? What are you doing—planning to retreat?"

The "Considerations" and "Plan" envisioned a uniform distribution of troops: 57 divisions in the first echelon, 52 in the second, 62 in the reserve. With the outbreak of war, this resulted in the major units entering the conflict sequentially, and it turned out the enemy was given the opportunity to destroy them unit by unit.

At this time Stalin ordered the new set of Red Army Field Regulations to be delivered to his personal library. Its pages are marked up with underlining showing that the General Secretary attempted, on the eve of the war, to enhance his elementary level of knowledge in the military art. However, his comments and rejoinders to the Main Military Council and at conferences with the military leadership indicate his grasp more of common sense mixed with circumspection than of notable operational and strategic competence. Stalin approached the threshold of war as a careful and at the same time self-confident politician, not as a military strategist.

On October 14th the reworked defense plan was again submitted to Stalin. His "wishes" were taken into account entirely, a fact which signified a radical re-orientation of the main effort of the armed forces. In accordance with the plan, we began to await the main strike along the main axis of advance of the German army in the South-West. Here it was planned to deploy about 100 divisions. Later events show this was an erroneous decision.

In April 1941 the General Staff received a communication through intelligence channels from the People's Commissariat for State Security: "Germany's advance against the Soviet Union has been definitively decided and will begin soon. The operational plan of attack provides for a blitzkrieg strike into the Ukraine to be followed by forward movement to the East..." In the beginning of June 1941 the decision was made, approved by Stalin, to reinforce the South-West axis with another 25 divisions.

Stalin had a great deal of information at his disposal, which would flow to him through various channels, but in no way did he always pass it on, even to the General Staff. For example, he considered Churchill's telegrams on German preparations for attacking the Soviet Union as attempts to push him more quickly into contact with Hitler, and these communications never reached the desk of the Chief of the General Staff. There was a great deal of additional information to which Stalin essentially failed to attribute the significance it deserved.

Once during a discussion with Academic B. N. Ponomarev, former Central Committee secretary and long-time Komintern official, I heard, for example, about the following incident.

"Some time in the spring of '41—I think it was around the end of May—I met with two Austrian communists who had arrived from 'over there.' They were talking excitedly about the vast military preparations in Germany, about the endless military echelons with tanks, artillery and vehicles heading day and night in an eastward direction. They believed this could only be happening in preparation for a military attack. I passed the thrust of this information on to Georgiy Dimitrov, who had a special conversation with Stalin. The next day Dimitrov told me:

"Stalin reacted calmly to what the Austrian communists had to say. He said this was not the first such signal, but that he does not see any reason to become overly alarmed. Yesterday, for example, over at the Politburo they looked over the leave schedule—most of the Politburo members and candidate members are being granted vacation time in the summer. A. A. Zhdanov, in particular, is the first to leave for the south—and he is a member of the military council of a district on the border..."

At the beginning of 1941, when the flow of information on the concentration of German troops in Poland had become especially heavy, Stalin wrote Hitler a personal letter informing him that the impression was being created he intended to wage war against the USSR. Hitler wrote Stalin in reply, also a personal letter and, as he underlined in the text—"confidential." In this letter the Fuehrer stated that major troop units were indeed concentrated in Poland but, being certain this information would go no further than Stalin, he should explain that "his concentration of troops in Poland is not directed against the Soviet Union since he intends to strictly abide by the pact they concluded and in which his honor as a head of state is pledged." In his letter to Stalin the Fuehrer had found an argument which, as Zhukov said later, Stalin apparently believed. For the territories of West and Central Germany "were subject to heavy English bombardment and being well observed by them from the air. He was therefore required to move large troop contingents to the East..."

Although he was receiving alarming and, as it turned out, basically accurate signals and communications, Stalin did not decide to effect emergency military measures in conjunction with plans for operational and strategic deployment. Had necessary operational and mobilization measures been taken energetically and in good time, the beginning of the war might have been different. Could anyone even imagine at that time that one week after the outbreak of war Hitler's forces would be in Minsk? I think Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy made quite an accurate appraisal of Stalin's actions during this period: "Stalin's rigid policy not to allow anything that could be used by Germany as a pretext for unleashing war is justified in the historical interests of the socialist Motherland. But his fault lay in that he failed to see, could not delineate that boundary beyond which such a policy becomes not only unnecessary, but dangerous as well. We should have crossed that boundary courageously at maximum speed, brought the armed forces to a state of full combat readiness, implemented mobilization and turned the country into a military camp..."

It is difficult not to agree with these arguments, but...if only they were presented before 1978! Unfortunately, none of Stalin's political or military advisers tried to convince him of those kernels of truth which Vasilevskiy expounded so wisely, but so late. Several conferences of the Main Military Council were held on the eve of the war. Speeches by G. K. Zhukov, I. V. Tyulenev, D. G. Pavlov, P. V. Rychagov and A. K. Smirnov were heard at one of them. But, again, most of the attention was devoted to the conduct of offensive operations, and a very interesting presentation by little-known Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov went completed unnoticed, which gave special treatment to "the possible nature of the initial period of war," when the enemy attempts to disrupt our mobilization and operational plans.

Trying to penetrate Stalin's spiritual world based on an analysis of the specific facts of that time, we can see that the obstinacy of the "Leader" was being fed by excessive self-confidence, a lack of courage to admit erroneous decision-making, and overrated significance attached to his own analyses. In a particular situation, such obstinacy corrodes the will itself. At the very end, a maximum degree of self-confidence paralyzes the will, binding it with the shackles of doubt and indecisiveness which have suddenly appeared. As a result, the individual has no ability whatsoever in deciding to take an especially significant step. This is exactly how Stalin appeared during the final days before the war, especially in the decisive hours. Having turned into stubbornness, will does not accept arguments of the intellect. This, according to the Engels, is the "blind stubbornness" that conflicts with the arguments of the mind.

To all of this we will add that Stalin did not possess the gift of foresight, the ability to lift slightly the curtain which covers the future and glance over the horizon. His many long-term predictions turned out earlier to be

mistaken. Stalin possessed a "practical" intellect. He adhered essentially to a dualistic concept—"peace is possible, but war is likely." Then when there was no longer any dilemma, Stalin remained under the hypnosis of his own imagination of what was desired.

If we innocently term the errors in the foreign policy and operational-strategic spheres "Stalin's miscalculations," then his deeds in the area of personnel were simply criminal. Repression on such a vast scale became possible because the "Leader" provoked the social inertia of violence, giving birth to denunciations, unscrupulousness, slander, the big lie. Such a lie does not have a chance when it is confronted by the truth allied with conscience. Today we know that if conscience was often silent during those years, this is primarily because there was no truth standing nearby.

At the end of 1939 Stalin demanded reference material giving a qualitative analysis of command personnel in the army and navy. He spent a long time delving silently over the charts and tables with meager figures describing his people, age-wise very "green." About 85 percent of army and navy command personnel were under the age of 35. Not speaking a word, Stalin leafed through the pages of the report. Perhaps he recalled that, except for three marshals and a group of army commanders of the first and second ranks, the other capable military leaders had disappeared by his will? Some of them had been appointed here to his cabinet... Perhaps he remembered Voroshilov's speech at a session of the Military Council with the People's Commissar for Defense on November 29th 1938? At that time the commissar reported, as if concerning a grand achievement: "During the course of a purge in the Red Army in 1937-1938, we have cleansed it of more than 40,000 men... In ten months of 1938 we promoted more than 100,000 new commanders. Of 108 members of the Military Council, only 10 of the old body remain." What feelings did the Leader have, looking at the gaps in his officer corps? Hardly anyone would comment on this. It is known only that, having seen the "uncultivated plots" in personnel composition, Stalin proposed increasing the number of academies and establishing new institutions.

The very next year, in 1940, 42 new military institutions were established, the number of students at military academies was almost doubled, numerous training courses for young lieutenants were introduced. Stalin rushed and rushed... Catastrophically little time remained, however, prior to the hour of ordeal. Six months of training can prepare a platoon leader. But—a military district commander, or an army commander?

Finally, in the first half of 1939, the wave of seeking out "enemies of the people," "confederates" of Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, Uborevich and other innocent military lead

ers who perished began to subside. But as late as June 14th 1939, V. Ulrikh, who just simply could not stop, reported to Stalin:

"A great number of cases remain presently unsettled involving participants in rightist-Trotsky, bourgeois-nationalistic and espionage organizations:

In the Moscow Military District—800 cases. In the Northern Caucasus District—700 cases. In the Kharkov Military District—500 cases. In the Siberia Military District—400 cases.

We propose in the interests of secrecy that defense lawyers not be permitted into the judicial proceedings. I request instructions.

Army Military Lawyer V. Ulrikh"

Perhaps for the first time Stalin did not affix his usual "Agree" to the report, but ordered that these cases be checked for the purpose of "discovering errors." No, Stalin did not cease the madness. The senseless, bloody terror went right up to the limit, threatening the functioning of the system itself, threatening at the gateway to the terrible ordeal. Two years prior to the outbreak of the war that approached the doorstep of the Fatherland, the country was rendered powerless.

No, the smokestacks of plants and factories continued to billow, trains ran along their tracks, students went to the universities, people retained the hope for a better tomorrow. But the "powerlessness" came not only from the overflowing camps, from the obscurity of hundreds of thousands of people who had disappeared, thinning out the military ranks, but primarily from outrage over the "great idea." Having completed the physical act of criminal outrage against the people, Stalin then committed a crime against their thoughts.

The tremendous dearth of military experts which had come about during these years could not be reconstituted in less than five-seven years. By summer of 1941, about 75 percent of commanders and 70 percent of political officers had occupied their posts less than one year... Stalin was hardly tormented by pangs of conscience and remorse for what he had done. He was not burdened by "virtue." But one thing was clear—in the last year, year-and-a-half prior to the war, the "Leader" had attempted feverishly to do everything possible to eliminate, or at least reduce the hunger in the personnel ranks. This motive sounded clearly in his speech at the graduation ceremony for Workers' and Peasants' Red Army military academy students on May 5th 1941 in the Kremlin. Who could know that the speech would be given a month and a half prior to the start of the horrible war and could change very little?

Stalin, who was soon to take on the responsibility of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in the war, had no knowledge of military theory. Nor did Voroshilov, who spent a long time as People's Commissar, "favor" theory or theoreticians. But that is what the Red Army always had—and prominent ones at that. These would

have to include first and foremost the murdered Tukhachevskiy, who as early as 1936 warned prophetically in his speech at a session of the Central Executive Committee USSR that we must be ready for a sudden attack by the German army.

From the middle of the thirties, at the insistence of Tukhachevskiy, Yegorov and Shaposhnikov, the "Commander's Library" began to be published. It must be said that this unique publication, in several dozen volumes, included the original works of Soviet as well as foreign military theoreticians. But prominent in this "Library" by virtue of its volume and apologetics, is the book of K. Ye. Voroshilov, "The Defense of the USSR." In it the People's Commissar calls Stalin the "first marshal of the socialist revolution, the great marshal of victories on the civil war fronts..." He is a true "marshal of communism," and "knows like no one else what must be done today in order to be victorious tomorrow and forever..." It is inevitable that we will be victorious in a future war, Voroshilov asserted, and we will conquer "with little loss of blood, with minimal resource expenditure."

After the war it became known that Hitler knew about the repressions sweeping across the Red Army from 1937-1939 and asked his intelligence agencies for a report on the quality of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army officer corps. A month and a half prior to the outbreak of war the Fuehrer received his report, based on information provided by Colonel Krebs, German military attache to the USSR, and other data—the Russian officer corps had been weakened qualitatively as well as quantitatively. "It presents a poorer impression than in 1933. Years will be required for Russia to achieve its former level..." Not without justification the enemy included in the number of factors exceptionally favorable to Germany the actual replacement of entire echelons of the military system with new leadership. It would be difficult to find in world history a precedent for this where, on the eve of mortal combat, one of the sides would enfeeble itself to such a degree. It did not simply encourage Hitler—it pushed him directly into speeding up events.

The concentration of political power in the hands of one man can lead to moral defects, to flaws in the will and intellect which in a simple, ordinary man will merely appear as his personal weakness, but in a leader on the scale of Stalin, will grow to reach destiny-bearing proportions. Although, when all was said and done, the Soviet people and their army were able to "correct" the political and strategic military miscalculations committed by Stalin on the eve and during the course of the war only by paying a colossal price in terms of casualties, we are accustomed, however, to say that once again we see the decisive role of the popular masses being brought to bear in the historical process. Significantly less frequently we analyze the cost of establishing this role.

In his dealings with Hitler, Stalin's extreme caution yielded, in the final analysis, opposite results. In the grand political game Hitler did in fact outwit Stalin with

regard to timing of the attack and his near-term intentions. So persistently had Stalin struggled against the possibility of "provocations" that this was noted in Berlin and conclusions were drawn. His caution and the absence of proper reaction to Germany's numerous violations of the concluded agreements spurred Hitler on—he became more insolent with each passing day and more convinced of the USSR's weakness. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army command was constrained in its freedom to choose defensive measures. Caution as a quality necessary for policy turned into an over-watchfulness, and at the same time into a maniacal confidence in the feasibility of his own desire—not to allow war. In the final analysis this self-assuredness was punished severely.

Even in the final hours, when the springs of the German military machine were compressed to their limit in readiness to inflict their fatal blow, hope still glimmered inside Stalin that he would succeed in averting a terrible clash. But Berlin was silent. It had been decided there that the time for diplomatic speeches had come to an end.

Hardly had Stalin begun to drop off to sleep, having laid out his bedding on the office divan in his dacha where he both worked and relaxed, when there were cautious knocks at his door. The knocking was felt painfully in his heart—Stalin was never awoken. It had to be that the very worst had occurred. Could it be that he miscalculated?

Slipping into his pajamas, Stalin went out. His chief of security reported:

"General of the Army Zhukov requests you come to the phone on an urgent matter, Comrade Stalin!"

The General Secretary went to the phone.

"Yes..."

Zhukov, as he would recall after the war, reported the enemy air raids on Kiev, Minsk, Sevastopol, Vilnius and other cities. After his report, the Chief of the General Staff asked Stalin again:

"Do you understand me, Comrade Stalin?"

The General Secretary breathed heavily into the phone and said nothing. A paralyzing, colossal weight of fantastic proportions lay on his shoulders, and Zhukov's question was not properly reaching Stalin's consciousness. Perhaps the text of a congratulatory telegram Hitler sent on the occasion of Stalin's 60th birthday flashed through his mind:

"Mr. Iosif Stalin.

Please accept my most heartfelt congratulations on your 60th birthday. To this I add my best wishes. I wish you

good health personally, and I wish a happy future to the people of the friendly Soviet Union..."

Stalin was silent.

"Comrade Stalin, do you understand me?"

He understood, finally. Earthly gods make mistakes, and the cost of their mistakes is fantastically high.

It was four o'clock in the morning, the 22d of June, nineteen hundred and forty-one.

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Tukhachevskiy's Career, Contribution, Purge Under Stalin Recalled

18010421 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by Aleksey Khorev under "History and Fates" rubric: "Marshal Tukhachevskiy"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] One of the brightest figures in the glorious galaxy of commanders in the civil war was Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy. He showed great organizational abilities and military talent in the commanding of armies and fronts. A number of operations were successfully carried out under his command. He also had outstanding merits in the technical rearmament of the Red Army, in the improvement of the organizational structure of the forces, in the development of aviation and mechanized and airborne forces, and in the training of command personnel. Being an outstanding military theoretician, Tukhachevskiy dealt with forecasting the nature of future warfare and made a contribution to the development of strategy, operational practice, tactics and the theory of operations and combat in depth. His ideas had a significant influence on the development of military thought and practice in the prewar wars.

As a result of Stalin's despotism and repression, Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevskiy perished innocently in 1937. The Great Patriotic War took place without his participation. But Tukhachevskiy's ideas, being brilliantly confirmed on the fields of battle, brought our victory closer.

1.

Stalin called him a projector. Perhaps he actually considered Tukhachevskiy's ideas unrealistic or perhaps he was trying harder to come up with a word to express his dislike for this young and untiring army commander. Perhaps Stalin himself would have had a hard time saying precisely when he began to have this unpleasant and growing feeling. In the civil war, he knew Tukhachevskiy as a talented and successful military leader,

whom Lenin trusted and appreciated. In January 1920, finding himself in the staff of the Southern Front, Tukhachevskiy reported to the Revolutionary Military Council that he had nothing to do. Lenin found out about this. In a memorandum to Sklyanskiy, he did not fail to raise the question: "Where is Tukhachevskiy? How are things on the Caucasian Front?"

And things were not going so well on the Caucasian Front. In connection with the unsuccessful offensive of our forces, the question of the replacement of the front commander was raised. In talking with Voroshilov and Budennyi over the direct line, Stalin then reported from Kursk: "Eight days ago, when I was in Moscow, I achieved the resignation of Shorin and the appointment of Tukhachevskiy, the conqueror of Siberia and Kolchak, as the new front commander. Just today he arrived in Saratov and in a few days will take over the command of the front." That is saying quite a lot about Tukhachevskiy, is it not? Stalin personally sought his promotion. And suddenly—a firm dislike....

Neither Stalin nor anyone else could say anything definitely negative about Tukhachevskiy. But one could sense the watchfulness and reserve in the relations of some leaders with him. This became especially apparent to Tukhachevskiy himself after the death of Lenin and Frunze, whom he greatly loved. That was the beginning of a new period, as it were, in his life. He grew and advanced almost steadily in his service but he experienced more and more difficulties with the introduction of his proposals aimed at raising the military might of the army. It seems that great possibilities opened up to him in this connection with his appointment to the position of chief of staff of the Workers and Peasants Red Army. But Frunze, who recommended him for this post, died and things began to slow down... In December 1927, he wrote a letter to Stalin on the rearmament of the army. In May 1928, he received a new appointment as commander of the forces of the Leningrad Military District.

He worked 3 years in Leningrad hand in hand with Kirov and had his active support. He did much to improve the combat training of the troops and tirelessly sought and affirmed what is new. This is what Maj Gen D.N. Nikishev, then chief of the operational section of the district staff, wrote in his memoirs about the work of Tukhachevskiy in Leningrad Military District:

"...His creative thinking worked tirelessly and his imagination was truly limitless. At the initiative of Mikhail Nikolayevich in the 1930 winter exercises, entire divisions were put on skis and large-caliber cannons and howitzers on runners. In the naval exercises of that same year, pontoons were used as landing resources for infantry with tanks.

"Tukhachevskiy also started mobile winter camps for forces intended for actions in wooded and marshy-wooded areas....

"Mikhail Nikolayevich could not stand triviality in the combat training of troops, had no patience for the mindlessness of commanders, and did not allow them to assign tasks to subordinates without taking into account the possibilities of the enemy.

"Tukhachevskiy knew how to influence the entire district, from the district directorates to the company. Precisely to the company! He spent many hours and even days in the companies. He taught people and also learned from them."

And here is the testimony of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. Meretskov:

"The creative interests and practical actions of M.N. Tukhachevskiy were broad. He had a special sense for everything new and advanced and demonstrated particular enthusiasm in promoting these new and advanced ideas in the forces. Extending through all of his diverse activities is a great interest in the problems of the technical rearmament of the army and in the establishment of strong aviation, powerful armored formations and a mobile infantry. He followed the foreign technical literature, was personally involved in the testing of new models of arms, and was an unfailing participant in experimental exercises in the forces.... Mikhail Nikolayevich made the organization, tactics and the entire system for the training of forces directly dependent upon the emergence of new and the development of old models of armament."

In his concern for the development of the latest types of military technology and equipment, Tukhachevskiy provided every possible support to designers, many of whom he knew personally. He delved deeply into their work and needs and contributed to the expansion of old design bureaus and the establishment of new ones.

Mikhail Nikolayevich paid great attention to the development of rocket engines and reactive arms. He initiated the establishment of a unified science center—the Reactive Scientific Research Institute.

Tukhachevskiy energetically verified and reinforced his own bold theoretical views in practice.

A combined jump and disembarking of an air commando was carried out in maneuvers near Leningrad in 1930. Tukhachevskiy called it the first stone in the formation of airborne troops.

In 1931, he reorganized the May Day parade at Dvortsovaya Square in Leningrad. The troops participating in the parade reached the square in mobilized vehicles. Airborne troops from the special air chemical forces [osovaviakhimovtsy] also followed in vehicles. This was a kind of demonstration of the prospects for the technical rearmament of the army and for its transition to mobilized forms of waging battle. This affirmed the idea of reducing the role of the cavalry in a future war.

The technical rearmament of the army required, of course, more material resources from the country and they were in acute short supply. Nevertheless, this problem could have been solved more quickly in that situation if they had not greatly underestimated it. Tukhachevskiy's ideas ran into the decisive opposition of several military leaders. Among them was Trotsky with his adventurist and superficial views on the organization of the military. Some cavalry commanders and superiors did not demonstrate the appropriate far-sightedness.

"The war of motors, mechanization, aviation and chemistry," said, for example, the well-known cavalryman Shchadenko, "were invented by military experts. The horse is still the main thing. The cavalry will play the decisive role in a future war. Its task is to penetrate into the depth and destroy the enemy there...."

Such a view was not espoused by Shchadenko alone.... Even at Tukhachevskiy's trial, Budennyi remembered his sabotage—the fact that he sought to accelerate the formation of tank units by reducing the size of the cavalry and expenditures for it. In this connection, one recalls the wonderful lines of Sergey Yesenin:

Did you see How the train on cast-iron paws Runs across the steppes, Hiding in lacustrine fogs And snorting with its iron nostril? And how behind it In the deep grass As in a celebration of desperate races, Throwing its thin legs head high, Gallops the red-maned colt? Lovely, lovely, funny fool, Where now, where is he headed? Does he really not know that living stallions Were conquered by the steel cavalry?

These lines were written in 1920.... What a paradox: for the subtle lyricist grieving for a disappearing Russia, for the resonant peasant poet whose sympathies since birth were on the side of "our little brothers," the outcome of the dispute between the living horse and the iron horse was already abundantly clear by that time. But some military and political figures were still drowning in a glass of water.

2.

The personal case of Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevskiy is kept in the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. It is a brief copy—there is neither an autobiography nor a single testimonial.... Nevertheless, as first-hand information, it is an interesting document. The responses to one of the questionnaires were written by Tukhachevskiy himself by his own hand in red ink and in fine uneven handwriting. Here is this questionnaire:

"Education—Secondary school and 1 year of the cadet corps.

When did he begin military service—In the military school in 1912.

In what units did he serve—In the Semenovskiy Regiment as a platoon leader and company commander.

Last military post and former rank—Company commander in the old army, recommended for captain.

Participated in which campaigns and where—War against the Germans 1914-1917.

Suffered wounds or shell shock—No.

Current state of health—Healthy.

Political conviction or party status—Communist.

What elected positions held and when—Elected company commander.

Army Commander-S. M. Tukhachevskiy. 4 July 1919."

And here is some brief information from other questionnaires attached to this file.

Year of birth—1893.

Nationality—Great Russian.

Foreign languages—French and German.

Social background—Member of the gentry.

Military education—Aleksandrovskoye Military School in 1914.

Party status—Member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) beginning 5 April 1918. Party membership card No 50136.

What party and political work was performed from the February to the October revolution—Imprisoned.

Yes, there was such a stage in the biography of the future marshal. He was held prisoner by the Germans for 2 and a half years. He conducted himself steadfastly and courageously. He tried unsuccessfully to escape several times, for which he was locked up in a fortress. But there as well, under the strictest prison regime, he did not resign himself to the position of prisoner. Risking his own life, he helped a French officer escape from the fortress, who told about this with gratitude many years later.

Soon Tukhachevskiy himself was able to flee and return home. He called the time spent in prison lost years. This, of course, was true from the point of view of the military perfection of the officer. But Tukhachevskiy's stay in prison was not in vain for the formation of his civil self-awareness, for his understanding of the nature and objectives of the imperialist war, and for his perception of the impending revolution. The words of Lenin and the Bolsheviks addressed to the Russian prisoners of war

and appealing to them to take the side of the people after their return to Russia certainly did reach them. In this situation, people like Tukhachevskiy themselves could not fail to think about the fate of the Fatherland and about their own place and role in the fight for its liberation from the czar and the capitalists. In this connection, one cannot fail to pay attention to this eloquent chronology: in October 1917, Tukhachevskiy returned home from prison and in December of that same year he was chosen company commander in Semenovskiy Regiment. On 5 April 1918, he joined the party of the Bolsheviks and on 26 June of that year he was appointed commander of the First Revolutionary Army of the Eastern Front. Even for such a harsh and dynamic time, such turns in the fate of an individual were not usual. It was necessary to be prepared for them in a political and military sense.

Tukhachevskiy's comrades in prison remember how even then, behind the barbed wire and burning with impatience to return home quickly, he spoke about following Lenin.

And he did. Initially he worked in the political section of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and later was military commissar for the defense of Moscow Rayon. When the rebellion of the Belochekhi flared up on the Volga, N.N. Kulyabko, one of the members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, reported to Lenin about Tukhachevskiy. Vladimir Ilyich showed interest in the "lieutenant communist," invited him to visit and asked him to state his views on the building of a new socialist army. Apparently Tukhachevskiy had something to say about this matter. Being a military person to the marrow, as they say, he could appreciate the problems of the army, its discipline, organization and militant service and was quite familiar with them.

Lieutenant Tukhachevskiy was involved in combat for a relatively short time—6 months. During this time, however, he fully demonstrated the fighting valor and maturity of a commander. It is enough to say that his feats were distinguished through six fighting awards—three steps of the Order of Anna, two steps of the Order of Stanislav, and the Order of Vladimir Fourth Step. This was the crown of true heroism.

The high posts that Tukhachevskiy held in the Red Army demanded not only personal courage of him but also extensive knowledge, organizational talent and the ability to lead large masses of troops. And here he completely justified the trust and hopes of Lenin. The personal case of Tukhachevskiy includes the text of the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic dated 22 May 1920 on his transfer to the General Staff. This order signed by Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E. Sklyanskiy and the commander in chief of all armed forces of the Soviet Republic S. Kamenev states, in particular: "The Commander of the Western Front M.N. Tukhachevskiy, having joined the ranks of the Red Army and possessing

natural military abilities, continued without interruption to increase his theoretical knowledge in military science. He skillfully carried out planned actions and did an excellent job of leading forces both in the structure of the army as well as in commanding the armies of the fronts of the republic and gave the Soviet Republic brilliant victories over its enemies on the Eastern and Caucasian fronts...."

Tukhachevskiy's military biography included more than just victories. Under his command, the troops of the Western Front suffered misfortune in the Warsaw Operation of 1920. Touching on the reasons for our defeat near Warsaw, Lenin wrote: "Doubtless a mistake was made in our offensive and excessively rapid advancement almost to Warsaw.... This mistake was caused by the fact that we overestimated the superiority of our forces." Tukhachevskiy honestly admitted the shortcomings without pointing to others, although there were those with whom to share the blame (in particular, with the command of the Southwest Front that failed to carry out in time the directive of the commanding officer on the transfer of the First Cavalry Army into an operational subordination of the Western Front. Stalin, who personally opposed the execution of the directive, was a member of the Revolutionary Military Commission of this front. Could this be the reason for the enmity?). Lenin did not change his attitude toward Tukhachevskiy and continued to keep him in mind. Precisely Tukhachevskiy was later entrusted with leading the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion and the routing of the Antonov forces. The military merits of Mikhail Nikolayevich in the civil war years were distinguished with the Order of the Red Banner and the Honorable Gold Revolutionary Weapon. In 1918, he was awarded the Order of Lenin for "exceptional personal merits for the revolution in the organization of the defense of the USSR on the foreign and domestic fronts during the period of the civil war and subsequent organizational measures in strengthening the power of the Workers and Peasants Red Army."

At the 17th CPSU Congress in 1934, he was elected candidate for membership in the Central Committee. In 1935, he was awarded the highest military title—Marshal of the Soviet Union. And he still did not feel that he had the full confidence of Stalin.

3.

In speaking about the Stalinist repression against military personnel in a conversation with the editor of his book "Vospominaniya i pazmysleniya" [Recollections and Reflections], Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov noted:

"I feel particularly sorry for Tukhachevskiy, a person of tremendous military talent. A clever fellow, well-educated and strong, he lifted weights and was very handsome." (He suddenly leaned back in his chair, seemed to glance to the side and repeated: "He was remarkably handsome.")

People who knew Mikhail Nikolayevich well note in him the harmony of his external appearance and internal world. And it may be that the clearest manifestation of this was Tukhachevskiy's interest in military science. It proceeded from the striving to comprehend the changes taking place in military affairs and to find the most expedient forms of troop organization and operational proficiency and was not a service obligation but a requirement of his extraordinary intellect. Even during the course of the civil war, he began to work on the study "National and Class Strategy." After that, being director of the Military Academy, and later, in presenting lectures on this subject, he surprised senior professors and generals with the depth of his thoughts. Tukhachevskiy's works "Strategiya nacionalnaya i klassovaya" [National and Class Strategy] and "Voyna klassov" [Class War] found a place in Lenin's personal library in the Kremlin.

In 1964, Voenizdat came out with the two-volume "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works] of Tukhachevskiy. The mere listing of the titles of several works gives a graphic idea of the purposefulness of his scientific interests: "War As a Problem of the Armed Struggle," "New Questions in War," "Nature of Border Battles," "Military Plans of Present-Day Germany," "Maneuver and Artillery," "Questions in Contemporary Strategy." In some of his works, one encounters ideas that today, after many years, cannot be called other perspicacious foresight.

"We must prepare ourselves for a lengthy war," wrote Mikhail Nikolayevich, for example, in "Questions in Contemporary Strategy" issued as a separate brochure in 1926. "If war was lengthy in the clashes of the imperialists, then there is no doubt that the struggle between our Soviet Union and the surrounding capitalist powers will be lengthy, tenacious and fierce.... Our Soviet Union does not represent a nebulous coalition of capitalist states but we will also expand into a socialist coalition when new socialist revolutions flare up or when we are obliged to take some region or other under the rule of capital."

As a true Soviet military leader, Mikhail Nikolayevich was not limited in his efforts to questions of a particularly military and military-technical nature but he paid much attention to the morale factor and the political training of warriors. "Only political maturity," he wrote, "can give a Red Army man the will to victory, determination and endurance, without which neither line nor tactical training can be intelligible to him."

The high scientific, moral and other qualities of the personality of Tukhachevskiy are wonderfully noted in the description written by the party bureau of the Military Academy of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, which was headed by Mikhail Nikolayevich in 1921-1922:

"...Shows a high degree of initiative and is capable of considerable creativity and impetus. He is persevering in

the achievement of goals. He combines current work with intensive self-education and a deepening of scientific erudition. He is sincerely tied to the revolution and lacks any external ostentatious peculiarities (does not like obsequious deference to rank, etc.). He is frank and trusting in his relations with the Red Army soldiers and commanding officers, which does much to win them over. He is irreproachable in party-ethical relations. He is capable of performing major organizational work in prominent military positions of the republic."

Here are a few more lines in the portrait of Tukhachevskiy from the remembrances of his sisters Yelizaveta Nikolayevna and Olga Nikolayevna:

"All of his life, Mikhail Nikolayevich devoted himself unreservedly and with enthusiasm to military affairs. But he could not get along without music, painting and systematic reading. His rich spiritual world had a place for Beethoven and Bach, Schumann and Moussorgsky, Mozart and Scriabin, Chopin and Mendelssohn, Tolstoy and Shakespeare. Everything new in science, technology and art interested him. He was interested in astronomy from childhood."

"A clear head," "an honest and sincere character," "a person of extraordinary oratorical abilities," "did not permit himself what he forbade to others"—this is by no means a complete list of the flattering comments of Tukhachevskiy's friends and comrades-in-arms about his human qualities. Much has already been said about his practical qualities. And with all of this, he was surrounded by enmity, hostility and intrigues. According to Zhukov, People's Commissar Voroshilov felt antipathy toward his deputy because he envied his talent and broad education. Along with Stalin, Voroshilov was skeptical and even hostile toward some of his proposals on the reorganization of the army. In his conclusion on one of Tukhachevskiy's reports, Stalin asserted that the adoption of his program would supposedly lead to the elimination of the building of socialism and to its replacement with a system of "red militarism." Voroshilov divulged this caustic Stalinist formulation at the expanded meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council. Tukhachevskiy was deprived of the possibility of teaching strategy at the Military Academy of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, where he had successfully taught this subject for several years.

Despite all kinds of opposition and intrigues, Tukhachevskiy, being deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and armaments chief of the Workers and Peasants Red Army since 1931 and deputy people's commissar for defense since 1934, was able to do much to strengthen the fighting strength of the army. He could have done very much more to repel Hitler's invasion... But on 11 May 1937, unexpectedly and with reasons

given, Tukhachevskiy was released from his duties as deputy people's commissar for defense and appointed commander of the forces of Volga Military District.

4.

"No one every heard him complain about the difficulties or unfairness," relate the sisters of Mikhail Nikolayevich. "Not until the winter of 1937, sensing evil, did he say to one of us":

"Just as in my childhood, when I asked for a violin and papa could not buy me one because of his chronic lack of money. Perhaps I would have become a professional violinist...."

In a very bitter moment, no doubt, such a person could regret the path that he had chosen, on which he did so much for the Motherland. He, of course, wanted to continue to live and work on this path with inspiration but apparently matters were approaching a tragic end. People were being arrested in the country and army. In such a situation, sensing the heavy glance of Stalin on himself, Tukhachevskiy could not help but be tormented by an alarming presentiment. Having learned of the arrest of Corps Commander B.M. Felman, with whom he worked in Leningrad and to whom he gave a brilliant recommendation as chief of the district staff, he said:

"This is some kind of grandiose provocation."

Meanwhile, however, the provocation was continuing. He himself was arrested on 26 May and his trial took place on 11 June. That very day (what was your hurry, citizen judges?!), the court announced a death sentence against Tukhachevskiy and seven other major military workers—army commanders first rank Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich and Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir, Army Commander Second Rank Avgust Ivanovich Kork, and corps commanders Vitaliy Markovich Primakov, Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna, Robert Petrovich Eydemann and Boris Mironovich Feldman. They were all shot to death.

For what?

A special judicial office of the USSR Supreme Court found them guilty...of treason against the Motherland, espionage and sabotage....

Twenty years later, the USSR Procuracy examined this case and presented to the USSR Supreme Court its conclusion on the setting aside of the verdict in relation to all the condemned and on the abandonment of the case through the procedure of the absence of the elements of a crime in their actions. Through a ruling of the Military Cases Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court on 31 January 1957, the sentence was set aside and the case abandoned.

This falsification began in May 1937. The first testimony on the existence of a military conspiracy in the Red Army supposedly led by Tukhachevskiy, Yakir and others was obtained on the 8th and 10th of May 1937 from Mikhail Yevgeyevich Medvedev, former chief of the staff directorate of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, who by that time had been arrested by authorities of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs [NKVD]. In an interrogation of 8 May, he testified that he found out about the conspiracy from the words of a colleague in August or September 1931. Later he supposedly learned that the leaders of the conspiracy were Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, Putna, Primakov and others.

Back in 1939, A.P. Radzivlovskiy, former chief of the Moscow Oblast NKVD Directorate, stated in connection with the way in which this information was obtained:

"The instruction given to me by Yezhov was to proceed immediately to interrogate the arrested Medvedev and to obtain statements from him on the existence of a military conspiracy in the Workers and Peasants Red Army with the broadest group of participants. In so doing, Yezhov gave me direct instructions to apply physical methods against Medvedev without hesitation in choosing them.

"When I began to interrogate Medvedev, I found out that he had been dismissed from the Workers and Peasants Red Army 3 or 4 years before and worked prior to his arrest as a deputy construction chief for some hospital. Medvedev denied any anti-Soviet work and his ties with military circles. When I reported about this to Yezhov and Frinovskiy, they suggested that I "squeeze out" of him his "conspiratorial" ties and repeated that I should not be shy about it.

"It was obvious to me that Medvedev was a person long separated from the military environment and there was no doubt about the truthfulness of his statements. In carrying out the instructions of Yezhov and Frinovskiy, however, I obtained from him statements about the existence of a military conspiracy and about his active participation in it. And in the course of subsequent interrogation, especially after he was beaten by Frinovskiy in the presence of Yezhov, Medvedev named a large number of important leading military workers.

"In the course of the case, I saw and knew that the connections named by Medvedev were invented by him and he declared to me the entire time, and later to Yezhov and Frinovskiy, that his statements were false and did not correspond to reality. Despite this, however, Yezhov reported this deposition to the Central Committee.

"Medvedev was arrested on the orders of Yezhov without any compromising materials, with the intention of starting with him in trumping up a case on a military conspiracy in the Workers and Peasants Red Army."

On the basis of these statements by Medvedev, now rehabilitated, as well as on the basis of the testimony obtained from Putna and Primakov 9 months after their arrest, Tukhachevskiy, Feldman, Kork, Eydeman, Yakir and Uborevich were arrested in May 1937. In their initial interrogation, they all categorically denied carrying out any criminal activity. Only subsequently were statements obtained from them on their belonging to a counterrevolutionary military conspiracy. A check established that these statements were false; they were obtained through the use of illegal means of investigation: deceit, blackmail and physical measures.

When interrogated in the procuracy on 5 July 1956, former NKVD section chief A.A. Avseyevich stated:

"...I summoned Primakov to interrogation in approximately March 1937. He was exhausted, emaciated, ragged and looked ill.

"In their initial interrogation, Primakov and Putna categorically refused to acknowledge their participation in the counterrevolutionary Trotskyist organization. I summoned them 10 to 20 times each. They told me that, besides being summoned to me, they were repeatedly summoned to Yezhov and Frinovskiy. In one of the interrogation sessions, Primakov declared that the day before he was summoned to Yezhov and that there he was seriously warned of the consequences in the event that he refused to testify.... Primakov promised Yezhov that he would think about it and make statements right away.

"Putna was also summoned to Yezhov and Leplevskiy but for a long time did not acknowledge his guilt.

"At one of the conferences in May 1937, deputy section chief Ushakov reported to Leplevskiy that Uborevich does not want to make any statements. Leplevskiy ordered the use of physical methods against Uborevich."

The former NKVD worker V.I. Budarev remembered:

"I personally did not investigate the case of Primakov but during the course of the investigation I was ordered to sit with him for hours until he wrote his own testimony. The section chief and his deputy gave me and other workers instructions to sit with Primakov even before he made his statements. This was done to prevent him from sleeping and to force him to give testimony on his own participation in the Trotskyist organization. In this way, they did not leave him alone. It was known during the investigation of the Primakov and Putna case that both gave statements on their participation in a conspiracy after they were beaten at Lefortovskaya Prison... It was at this time that the arrests of such persons as Tukhachevskiy, Uborevich and others began."

The former deputy section chief of the NKVD Ya. L. Karpeyskiy testified:

"Of the group of military people convicted along with Tukhachevskiy, I participated in the case of Eydeman only.... The interrogation was carried on without presenting Eydeman with specific materials but he was told that he was being convicted as a participant in a "military conspiracy" and that it was useless for him to deny this. Eydeman did not confess, however.... During the time of the interrogation of Eydeman, one could hear from adjoining rooms the cries and moans of people and other noise...."

Back in 1938, former deputy section chief of the NKVD Z.M. Ushakov, who took part in the interrogation of Tukhachevskiy, Yakir and Feldman, gave testimony on the extensive use of illegal methods of investigation of those arrested.

Another evidence of the use of cruel measures against those arrested is the fact that the protocol of the interrogation of Tukhachevskiy on 1 June 1937, in which Tukhachevskiy's acknowledgement of his own guilt is recorded, as well as pages 165-166 of the case show spots that, according to a biological examination, are drops and smears of human blood.

As a check of the case established, the confirmation at the trial of the invented statements made by the accused in the preliminary investigation was dictated by the fact that they continued to be under the control of the investigators until the end of the trial. The investigators accompanied their suspects to the court and were with them in the waiting room. All of the arrested were in separate rooms and there was an investigator with each one. They were all told that their confession in the trial would ease their fate.

In this way, all of the efforts of the investigation were aimed at one objective, the obtaining of a confession of guilt from the arrested. These confessions were needed more to create the appearance of justice and Yezhov and Stalin hardly believed in them.... The statements of the convicted do not inspire confidence. They are extremely unspecific and unfounded and contain many significant contradictions and obvious falsehoods.

Thus, for example, Feldman initially testified that he was brought into the conspiracy by Primakov but in subsequent interrogation he stated that he was recruited by Tukhachevskiy.

Kork initially named Tukhachevskiy, Putna and himself as comprising the "staff of the revolt." Later he excluded Putna and added Yakir, Uborevich and Eydeman.

In the investigation, Tukhachevskiy testified that as far back as 1925 he passed on secret information to the Polish spy Dombal. At the trial, however, he declared that he did not know Dombal as a spy but as a member of the Polish Communist Party Central Committee.

At the trial, Tukhachevskiy and Uborevich, who had admitted being leaders of the conspiracy, revealed complete ignorance of the details of the "palace revolution" that they supposedly planned.

Thus, the statements of the accused turned out to be falsified. The case had no other materials confirming the accusation....

Former USSR NKVD workers Leplevskiy, Ushakov, Agas, Mironov and Frinovskiy, who took part in the investigation of the case of Tukhachevskiy, Yakir and others, were sentenced to be shot in the years 1938-1940 for illegal arrests, the falsification of the investigatory files, and the use of illegal methods in the conduct of the investigation. Their bloodthirsty leader Yezhov was also shot. Stalin, of course, knew all about this. Over the course of 20 long years, however, the names and merits of Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eydeman, Feldman, Primakov and Putna were buried in oblivion. After them, thousands more faithful sons of the Motherland—commanders and commissars of the Red Army—were annihilated and disgraced. About 40,000 people were repressed just from May 1937 through October 1938. For this despotism, in itself bloody, we paid even more blood during the war.

5.

There is another now widespread version of the beginning of the falsification of the Tukhachevskiy case. It is based on foreign sources. Hitler's intelligence service, striving to weaken the Red Army, fabricated documents showing that Tukhachevskiy negotiated with the Germans on the organization of a plot against Stalin.

For this purpose, use was made of a secret 1926 agreement between the German and Soviet commands, under which the "Junkers" firm provided us technical assistance in establishing our aviation. Tukhachevskiy was then chief of staff of the Workers and Peasants Red Army and naturally had official meetings with German officers. A genuine signature of Tukhachevskiy was on the document about the 1926 agreement. This made it possible to fabricate a false letter, having copied his signature. In the letter, Tukhachevskiy and his "kindred spirits" supposedly were arranging to liberate themselves from civilian guardianship and to grab control of state authority for themselves. The false letter had genuine

stamps of the "Abwehr" intelligence service—"Top Secret" and "Confidential." There was also a genuine resolution from Hitler—an order to organize the surveillance of German Wehrmacht generals who supposedly were linked with Tukhachevskiy. The letter was the main document and altogether the "dossier" had 15 pages. Besides the letter, it included various documents in German signed by Wehrmacht generals (the signatures were false, copied from bank checks). To convey the dossier to Stalin, they simulated the theft of the "dossier" from the "Abwehr" building during a fire. Later a photocopy of the "dossier" turned up in the hands of the head of the Czechoslovak Government Benes, who sent this file on to Stalin.... The vile seed fell on prepared soil. For this false document, according to foreign sources, Yezhov's department paid 3 million rubles.

Our documents—the conclusion of the procurator general of the USSR and the decision of the Military Cases Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court on the setting aside of the sentence against Tukhachevskiy and others—contain no mention of the falsification by the German intelligence service. In the trial, consequently, it apparently did not figure as evidence. But if it existed, then the staff of the Special Court Office may have known about it.

...After the sentencing of Tukhachevskiy, his family, friends and colleagues began to be arrested. Seeing a portrait of the marshal on the wall of the apartment of one of those arrested, an NKVD worker uttered with surprise:

"So you have not taken it down yet?"

"No," responded the arrested person. "Know that with time they will put up a monument to him."

This prediction is coming true today. The streets of many of the country's cities bear the name of Marshal Tukhachevskiy. Memorial plaques in his honor have been put up in Moscow and Smolensk. The thought suggests itself of immortalizing the memory of the marshal in the armed forces. Any of the military educational institutions, for example, could accept his name with pleasure and bear it with pride.

Solton on Violation of 'Spirit' of INF Treaty
LD1108184988 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 11 Aug 88

[Text] NATO is carrying out military exercises on the territory of West Germany. It would be just an ordinary type of exercises but for one thing: (?prime movers) carrying three Pershing-2 nuclear missiles left the American base in Mutlangen on Wednesday morning. More from Yuriy Solton:

The missiles were put in combat readiness in a (?ward) about 2 miles to the northeast of the city of Wueschheim. It was the medium nuclear missiles to be scrapped under the Soviet-American INF Treaty, which came into force on 1st June. Under its provisions the two sides pledged to stop the production of these missiles and their tests. Formally, the involvement of Pershing-2 missiles at the military maneuvers in West Germany does not run counter to the letter of the treaty. The missiles are to be scrapped within 3 years. But there is not the slightest doubt that this action violates the spirit of the agreement. The exercises are aimed at testing the missiles in combat action. The question is: Why do we make NATO soldiers deal with the missiles which, according to the Pentagon, the United States begins to eliminate as of 8th September? Is it military bureaucracy following blindly old instructions? I don't think it is, writes Yuriy Solton. It looks like somebody doesn't want to give up Pershings and is in a hurry to demonstrate their power and possibilities.

I don't think, writes Yuriy Solton, that the military want to prevent the realization of the Soviet-American INF Treaty. I believe there is something else to this. They want to show it is necessary to make up for the missiles to be scrapped and promote plans of modernization of other kinds of weapons.

Comment on Transfer of U.S. 401st Air Wing from Spain to Italy
18010416a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jul 88 1st Edition p 3

[Article by Col V. Goryainov under the rubric "International Notes": "Is It Only a Change of Airfields?"]

[Text] By a majority of votes on 30 June the house of deputies of the Italian parliament approved a resolution of the council of ministers of the country on the question of the redeployment of the 401st Air Wing from Spain to Italy; that is, 72 American F-16 fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons on board. Thus, the intensive cultivation of Italian governmental and parliamentary circles by the NATO leadership achieved its objective. And so, L. Lagorio, chairman of the committee of the Italian parliament for defense matters, who yesterday was still calling for caution on the question of American fighters, today is attempting to convince the

public that the F-16 shift should not be viewed as a new threat to the East, inasmuch as, so he says, this is strictly an internal NATO matter. We are moving aircraft—for whom is this bad?

This is the bourgeois propaganda method—intentional lessening of the meaning of some fact for the purpose of diverting attention from it. This is very likely exactly the case here. The appearance of 72 modern aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons to any point on the planet is not a joking matter. This is a step which leads to a change in the strategic situation. If the matter concerns Europe, then it is especially so. Mister Lagorio also understands this well. Although he also knows why it was Italy that was selected as a new haven for the 401st Air Wing.

American General George Galvin, supreme allied commander of NATO armed forces in Europe, recently directed the attention of journalists to this aspect of the question. In his words, Italy is a loyal ally which fulfills its obligations to the bloc in an exemplary way and also makes great sacrifices. As is known, Italy is a Mediterranean country. And the uneasy Mediterranean today is a zone for special consideration by the U.S. and NATO. Its eastern part is frequently called the weak flank of the bloc. Here there are Greek-Turkish contradictions, which from time to time let their presence be known. The intractable Libya is also here, which requires, in Washington's opinion, constant looking after. Here, as nowhere else, one can feel the heat of the middle eastern hotbed.

The most important thing, in the end, is that the change of the deployment site of the 72 F-16 aircraft denotes their being brought closer to the borders of the Warsaw Pact countries not less than 2,000 km. It is known that the Atlanticists, examining the possible variants of the start of a war, give preference to a surprise attack without prior strategic deployment. In this sense, it is not possible not to consider the redeployment of the 401st Air Wing as a threat to the security of the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Now located in Spain, the American aircraft are in the second strategic echelon of the OVS [combined armed forces] of NATO in Europe, and they cannot enter into combat action without prior preparation. Their relocation in Italy changes the situation appreciably.

Taking the fact into account that as usual the leadership of NATO adheres to the concept of nuclear intimidation and does not intend to follow the example of the Soviet Union, which took upon itself the obligation of no first use of nuclear weapons, the action of redeploying nuclear weapons carriers from Spain to Italy cannot but cause anxiety and concern. This action, as a matter of fact, is one of the measures undertaken by the West in order to "make up" for the loss of nuclear power in connection with the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles in the arsenals of the USSR and the U.S. But this

contradicts the statements of the highest-ranking representatives of the U.S. and NATO who assert that they are trying to strengthen security "at the lowest possible level."

13052

Critique of Israeli Arms Sales Abroad

18010416b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Sigov: "Tel Aviv: Business in Weapons"]

[Text] . . . In South Korea forces for maintaining internal order opened fire on a demonstration of students who were demanding the resignation of the puppet government. . . South African racists fired on an Angolan border settlement from occupied Namibian territory. . . In Salvador military aircraft subjected an assembly area for partisan forces to bombardment. . .

The reader will ask what these events have in common, occurring in corners of the planet so remote from each other? The fact is that in all three cases weapons with the stamp "Made in Israel" were utilized. The export of armaments today has become a cornerstone of state policy in Tel Aviv. Loudly declaring itself to be an adherent of "peace and nonviolence," Israel has in reality transformed "trade in death" into one of the key aspects of its foreign policy activity.

In order to give fuller meaning to the current "militaristic itch" of the strategists from Tel Aviv, we will return to the year 1952 when, after the first military conflict in the Middle East, some English "Spitfire" fighters were left in hangars of the Israeli forces. They showed up through hitherto unknown channels. . . in Ceylon, which then and there was the very beginning of the criminal business of the Zionists. Since that time Israel has been firmly numbered among the 20 most important weapons exporters in the world. And if the share of military equipment in the country's industrial export is taken into account (it constitutes almost 25 percent today), then Israel turns out to be almost the largest "merchant of death" in the world.

How was it possible for a small state in the Middle East to create its own national military-industrial complex in a very short time and to attain a volume of weapons exports on a level with such developed capitalist countries as Italy and the FRG? We will note straight off that the U.S. played the decisive role in the formation of Israel's industry. It is under the influence of the powerful Zionist lobby in congress that the government of the United States has been bearing the main financial burden of Tel Aviv's military expenditures over the course of many years. Today, 90 percent of the artillery and 85 percent of the aircraft in Israel's armaments are of American production. The stamp "Made in the U.S." appears on the engines of Israeli "Merkava" tanks, armored personnel carriers, and "Kefir" fighters. Tel

Aviv, in response to the "friendly concern" of the Pentagon, carefully checks out American weapons "in action," provoking armed conflict with neighboring Arab states and "pacifying" Palestinians in the occupied territories.

As the Israeli press notes, the "military machine" of Tel Aviv does not meet either the economic or the population capabilities of the state. However, despite the huge foreign debt, the unrestrained growth of inflation and the limitations of raw material resources, Israel today spends about one-third of its national income on military needs. There are now about 800 industrial enterprises in the country that produce weapons and munitions. They bring more than \$1 billion of export revenues annually, which goes into the production of new types of weapons. About 20 companies with a work force of about 100,000 persons are engaged in scientific research work in the field of military production, receiving large state credits.

The foundations of Israel's military industry were laid back in the 1950s. The company "Israeli Aircraft Industry" (aviation), "Israeli Military Industry" (tanks, BTR, and small arms) and "Raphael" (scientific research work for the development of new types of weapons) constituted an ominous "triangle of death" which now gives Tel Aviv the capability of creating the most modern weapons systems practically independently of other countries. Incidentally, this kind of "independence" of Israel first appeared in 1967 when an embargo (true, having a purely symbolic character) on the delivery of weapons to Tel Aviv, which was conducted by some NATO countries, did not at all affect its military potential. Moreover, Israel increased its military exports even more and broadened their variety.

Now Israel is producing a PVO system, a surface-to-air class of missiles, bombs, landmines, 52-mm mortars, "Reshet" missile-equipped small surface craft, the "Galil" automatic rifle, the "Uzi" assault rifle, and the multipurpose "Kefir" tactical fighter (based on the French "Mirage-3C" aircraft). Israel has become a very useful source to a specific circle of consumers for acquiring weapons on the world market. First, this is weaponry, as a rule, which has already been tested directly in combat operations, and, second, (which especially pleases the U.S.), Israel establishes military ties with "clients" who have stained themselves with bloody crimes against their own people (YuAR [Republic of South Africa], Chile, and Nicaragua in Somosa's time).

The volume of Tel Aviv's "trade in death" is growing swiftly: at the beginning of the 1960s the annual export of weapons constituted not more than \$10 million, by the middle of the 1970s it reached the half-billion dollar mark, but in 1986 it already reached the gigantic sum of \$1.3 billion. Israel gladly participates in various kinds of international fairs and exhibitions of military equipment, especially in countries of the third world. Thus, for

example, in March 1986, at an exhibition of military aviation equipment in Chile, Israeli "exhibits" were considered by western experts to be among the best.

Who is it that buys Israeli weapons? The principal market for its sales are the developing countries. Approximately one-third of Israel's total exports goes to Latin America (Tel Aviv maintains especially close ties with El Salvador and Honduras). Africa and Asia are next in volume of purchases. Exposure of the machinations in the supply of weapons in the "Watergate" affair showed that Tel Aviv is not reluctant to line its pockets in the continuing Iran-Iraq war.

But perhaps Israel's main trading partner in the military field is the racist YuAR. The criminal cooperation of the two regimes began in 1975, and up to 1980, when Pretoria had not yet developed its own military industry, 35 percent of Israel's armaments exports went to the YuAR. Today, under Israeli license, the racist regime produces "Uzi" assault rifles and armored personnel carriers, and the weaponry of the YuAR army includes Israeli missile boats, mortars and also missiles of the ship-to-ship class of the "Gabriel" type.

Cooperation in the nuclear sphere occupies a special place in relations between the two countries. According

to testimony of the American journal "American Affairs," the YuAR and Israel signed a secret agreement as early as the 1970s on the joint production of nuclear weapons. The YuAR supplied the uranium and ranges for tests, and Israel provided technical management. The mysterious flash, fixed by the American satellite "Vela" on the shores of the YuAR in 1979, in the opinion of specialists, represented a test explosion of a nuclear charge developed by the South Africans with the active assistance of the Israelis.

Using the generous financial support of Washington, Israel continues to build up its military potential. The militarization of the country has now attained unprecedented dimensions. At the same time it is apparent that Israel has created a redundant military production capability and that the economy of the country itself has become too dependent on the export of weapons. Therefore, various strata of Israeli society today are for the government's rejection of an unbridled militaristic course in foreign policy, and for a reduction of expenditures on weapons, and they demand that an end be put to the sinister business of the "merchants of death" from Tel Aviv.

13052

Former POW Relates Experiences

18010266 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Jul 88 p 4

[Article by Ye. Bay: "Released From Captivity"]

[Text] One of the halls of the House of Soviet Science in the Afghan capital is filled to overflowing. Soviet Army Private Aleksandr Yankovskiy is speaking at a press conference held by a representative of the Soviet embassy.

In March of this year he was freed from captivity (he was exchanged for several members of the armed detachments of opposition captured by the Afghan Army). Until June the private was in a military hospital, and after complete recovery returned to duty and is continuing to serve in one of the units of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. A. Yankovskiy told the Soviet and foreign journalists about the months he spent in captivity.

"I was seized in October 1987 while I was carrying out my military mission, along with subunits of the *tsarandoy* (Afghan militia) in Logar Province," states A. Yankovskiy, answering a question from an IZVESTIYA correspondent. "At first I was held in the 'Dzhi-o-Dzhi' training camp, several kilometers from the Pakistan border, and then was secretly transferred to the Maydok Training Center on Pakistan territory."

Yankovskiy is asked whether he has any evidence of the fact that the bands are continuing to hold other Soviet prisoners of war captive. "From the *dushman* themselves," states Aleksandr, "I heard that they are holding Soviet military personnel who have been captured. According to my calculations there may be about a hundred."

A. Yankovskiy recalls the foreign military advisors located in the camps of the armed opposition on Afghan territory. They are primarily Arab and French advisors. The question follows: Was he subjected to beatings, psychological influence or threats?

"The Afghan extremists treated me disdainfully and loathsomely, and often beat me with sticks and rocks," states A. Yankovskiy. "They began to feed me decently only a week before I was freed. American and British journalists representing BBC and other radio stations and newspapers attempted to question me several times. They were interested chiefly in purely military aspects, for example, what we knew about the Stinger missiles, but the ending of the 'heart-to-heart talks' was the same. They suggested that I cross over to the West."

From the details of Private Yankovskiy's talk a picture gradually took shape, like a mosaic panel, of the conditions under which Soviet officers and soldiers captured in Afghanistan find themselves.

HIS EVIDENCE BECOMES A NEW ACCUSATION ADDRESSED TO THE PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES, WHO CONTINUE TO ASSERT THAT SUPPOSEDLY THERE ARE NO SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR ON THE TERRITORY OF THEIR COUNTRY.

Meanwhile, listening to this one senses with particular force what energetic steps the Soviet Government, our embassy in Kabul, and the command of the contingent of Soviet forces are taking to liberate captured Soviet personnel.

"Most difficult for me was the fact that I did not know how my relatives and friends thought about me. The band leaders repeatedly threatened that they would report that I was supposedly fighting on their side. 'And then your own people will curse you,' they tried to convince me. But the hope always lived in me that sooner or later I would return home. And now, if through the help of journalists those who are still held captive, and those who forcibly or succumbing to propaganda were taken out to the West, will hear me, let them know that recently the USSR General Prosecutor, in the name of the Soviet Government, declared amnesty for all prisoners of war, regardless of the circumstances of their capture or actions in captivity. Remember, your country has not abandoned you, and it is doing everything to free you."

9069

Establishment of 'Coordinating Committee' of Soviet Society for Liberation of Soviet POWs

18010432a Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Jun 88 p 4

[Article by unknown TASS correspondent: "They Must Return Home"]

[Text] The fate of Soviet servicemen missing in action or taken prisoner in Afghanistan worries not only their relatives, friends, and those who fought side by side with them. Trade unions, the Komsomol, women's councils, committees for world peace, veterans committees, labor committees, and other public organizations are trying to do everything possible to search for them and help them return to their homeland.

At the initiative of these organizations and soldier-internationalists, a constituent assembly of the Coordinating Committee of Soviet Society for Freeing Soviet POWs in Afghanistan was held on 29 June in Moscow at the House of Unions. The committee was headed by V.G. Lomonosov, deputy chairman of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council. He gave an interview to a TASS correspondent.

"Vladimir Grigorevich, the humane and patriotic nature of the initiative for founding this committee is obvious. How will it work? What is its potential?"

"Representatives of Soviet society visited the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow and delivered a message addressed to President Zia-ul-Haq requesting assistance in searching for Soviet servicemen being held captive in Pakistan. Contacts have been established with representatives of foreign and international organizations which search for MIAs.

"It is necessary to ascertain the fate of every Soviet MIA. We will continue to appeal to the International Red Cross and various UN for assistance in this important matter. At the same time, we will contact representatives of societies of a number of foreign countries, including Pakistan, Iran and the United States. It is known that a number of social organizations maintain relations with the Afghan rebels; their representatives have visited and visit their camps. We think it would be completely warranted to request their assistance in freeing Soviet citizens.

"The Coordinating Committee's capabilities are the result of the broad composition of its participants, who are plenipotentiaries of our social organizations. Our main purpose is to coordinate the actions of all Soviet social organizations for the soonest possible return of Soviet POWs to the homeland. In our work, we are counting on the broad support of international public opinion standing for humanism. Our committee will be guided in its activities by the principles of humaneness and principles of human involvement in the fate of those who are subjected to the rigors of captivity."

12567

Reservists Issue Appeal for POWs Still in Captivity

18010432b Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Jun 88 p 9

[Unattributed article: "Appeal by Soviet Reserve Soldiers Who Fulfilled Their International Duty in the Republic of Afghanistan"]

[Text] We Soviet soldiers appeal to state institutions, political parties, and anti-war, pacifist and religious organizations to whom the ideals of freedom and humanism, happiness and life of man are dear.

We appeal to the organizations of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Asia, Europe and America.

We appeal to the youth, who have always felt so sharply both the heroism and the tragedy of the events in Afghanistan.

We appeal to all the people of the earth who hold human rights dear and who are willing to defend them.

Not everyone returned from Afghanistan. Some of our combat comrades, through no fault of their own, were captured by the Afghan rebel forces.

None of the dead will ever be forgotten, but we must let our combat buddies, our peers, who ended up in enemy captivity due to tragic circumstances, remain forgotten.

We know that Soviet soldiers who have been captured are subjected to inhumane tortures. Their fate in the torture chambers is so horrible that even death would seem to be a deliverance there. Those who survive face a fate of people without a homeland, eternal exiles, and wanderers.

The signing of the Geneva agreements, an example of the political wisdom and foresight of all the sides participating in drawing it up—Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA—opened the way to settling one of the most acute conflicts of recent times. The hopes associated with this agreement prompted us to make a request of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, M. Zia-ul-Haq, to use every opportunity and all his authority and influence on the Afghan rebel leaders to free Soviet soldiers from captivity. However, the events of recent days are causing concern for the fate of our comrades who are deprived of basic civil and human rights and isolated from their family and friends.

A number of agreements on settling the situation in the Republic of Afghanistan are not being fulfilled, as required by the Geneva agreements.

We soldier-internationalists, comrades in arms, and friends of those who are languishing in captivity consider it our duty to continue the struggle to free our compatriots, believing that this will bring peace and tranquillity closer to the land of Afghanistan and strengthen faith in humanism and the value of human life. We ask all who are able, if only for a minute, to bring the release of our friends closer: Be merciful for the sake of the future, help us in our efforts.

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